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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to draw the perceptional and attitudinal map of workers and 
managers towards participation in managerial decision making. Problematic 
areas in the implementation of codetermination are empirically studied using 
both formal questionnaires and informal interviews. The formal survey was 
conducted with 480 workers in a state-owned textile factory (Silmerbank) and 
323 workers in a privately owned factory of comparable size (Altinyildiz). 
Having isolated 14 areas of participation which were a prioriranked along a 
dimension of personal to non-personal, results showed that workers were most 
likely to prefer participation in areas of personal importance. Attitudes 
toward participation were also compared for the two factories, revealing that 
workers from Siimerbank were more open to participation. The PERI 
"Psychological Symptoms Scale" was administered, with results showing that 
workers from Siimerbank had significantly higher psychological symptoms 
scores. Positive attitudes toward participation were not significantly associated 
to psychological symptoms level. The potential privatization of the Siimerbank 
is offered as a possible source of stress, thus accounting for the higher levels 
of psychological symptoms at Stimerbank. A framework for the 
implementation of codetermination is offered, and directions for future 
research are suggested. 
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In contrast to the traditional managerial sy,Istem in an enterprise, where 
the decisions taken by top management are successively decomposed 
through hierarchical layers until they are finally given as a command to 
the operational level, the sy,rstem proposed by "codetermination" is defined 
as a process in which employees have some say or equal power in 
determining the outcome of decisions that affect them directly or 
indirectly. Although codetermination has many worldwide applications at 
the moment, Turkey has hitherto witnessed almost no attempt in that 
regard. Furthermore, theoretical/empirical studies conducted in Turkey 
investigating various aspects of implementing such a participatory 
decision-making process seem to be at an embi-yonic stage. Motivated by 
such an urgent need, the aim of this research is to draw the perceptional 
and attitudinal map of workers and managers toward problematic areas in 
the implementation of codetermination in Turkey. For that end, the 
textile industi-y has been chosen, as the major sector in Turkey, and it is 
aimed to form the said map by both formal and informal interviews as 
well as secondary! materials. The formation of that map is believed to be 
functional in designing new forms of organisational structures which 
would enhance not only production efficiency but also political efficacy. 
Although laden with problems of definition and of 
operationalisation, codetermination has been investigated, and 
implemented in various settings, over the past decades. The two well 
known and successful examples can be cited as that of Germany's 
Alitbestimmung and that of Japan's high level of participation at grass- 
roots in the form of "Quality Circles" and "Total Quality Management". 
Such mechanisms surely have their OWII costs and risks, which should 
very carefully,' be assessed before any implementation, otherwise the-y may 
outweigh the benefits that one expects from the introduction of such a 
mechanism. A maldesig,n may, therefore, ruin an otherwise would be 
beneficial project, which explains the utmost need in conducting both 
theoretical and empirical research in that field. Furthermore, as 
codetermination has a multidisciplinary aspect, covering mainly 
economics, sociology and psychology'', any research to be conducted in 
that regard should not overlook that very multidimentionality. 
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Even a quick tour d'horizon would enable us to safely claim that 
the prospects of codetermination are appealing. The increasing tendency 
in industrialised countries of passing from a -Fordist" technology to a 
"Post-Fordist" one, where the emphasis is to rely less extensively on 
comparatively simple mass production technology in favour of more 
specialised production where the knowledge, collective skills and 
expertise of workers become an important factor, definitely constitutes 
one of the most important reasons for giving increased attention to 
participatory mechanisms. This technological drive also happily coincides 
with a political environment which now seems to be much more fertile 
for such collaborative actions in contrast to the laissez-faire discourse of 
the 1980's. 
The hope is that the findings of this research will provide vital 
information for Turkey, as a country with a high growth rate manifesting 
the need to restructure its managerial basis and with an ever increasing 
need and demand for political and economic pluralism. Once the problem 
areas in defining the boundaries of codetermination as a plausible system 
of management are crystallised, the research aims to better understand 
where the differences in mutual interests are arising, thus illuminating 
possible scopes of cooperation which otherwise would stay dormant. 
Although these findings will be (textile) industry-specific, some 
projections could certainly be made for general economic activities. 
The concept of participation is a complex one. Often when we speak of 
participation it is difficult to agree upon what is understood by this 
evasive term. Furthermore, even if we agree upon a definition of 
participation there are differences in what people feel should be the 
criteria by which participation is granted. Another area of participation 
which is up for discussion is how beneficial participation will be. Will 
participation enhance the quality of life for the worker, andlor the quality 
of production above and beyond the costs that may be incurred by 
decentralising managerial decisionmaking? One of the general aims of 
this project will be to delineate the present attitudes and perceptions 
towards participation in the Textile Industry of Turkey. In this study we 
shall investigate three different aspects of participation. First, what are 
the attitudes and perceptions of textile workers in Turkey toward 
participation? Second, do these attitudes differ for workers who work in 
a State owned factory as opposed to those employed at a privately-owned 
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factory? Third, is there an association between positive attitudes toward 
participation and lower levels of "psychological symptoms's? 
These specific issues reflect a realisation that the concept of 
codetermination is a complex one, and that only with substantial empirical 
research can controversial problems surrounding this issue be solved. 
This study keeps an open mind to both problems and positive 
contributions which accompany the sharing of power and decision making 
represented in various codetermination models. Furthermore, it is felt 
that each country will have to sculpt out its own form or model of 
codetermination based on the level of capital accumulation, industrial 
infrastructure, democratisation and cultural acceptance presently attained. 
No single solution appears to provide a grandiose model to organise 
managerial sharing. This in and of itself obligates that each country 
should investigate the attitudes and readiness of its workers and managers 
toward participation. 
These three general areas of interest represent the grounds of our 
data collection. The data was collected from two separate factories 
wherein 803 textile workers have given complete responses. Initially 
taking the data set as a whole, With the general aim of delineating present 
attitudes and perceptions, we considered four sub topics: namely, i) what 
areas do workers want to participate in, ii) do they wish to personally 
participate or rather that a representative do so on their behalf, iii) when 
is participation seen as valid, and iv) is there an association between 
attitudes toward participation and various demographic variables for 
individuals? Initially, then, we sought to answer questions dealing with 
what areas workers wish to participate in. As the areas of participation 
are endless, we identified 14 areas ranging on a dimension of personal to 
macro, non-personal, issues of participation. These categories have been 
developed for the purposes of this research and do not represent a 
definitive and exhaustive classification. At the far personal end of this 
dimension we consider such areas of participation as wage negotiation. 
At the opposite non-personal end, we consider such issues as decisions on 
what products should be produced. 
Another aim of this research is to probe how workers feel it would 
be most beneficial to their own interest to be represented. Would they 
prefer to participate personally or would they rather prefer a 
representative acting on their behalf. Furthermore, does the method of 
participation which the workers prefer differ in the different areas of 
4 
possible participation? With such information one could better develop a 
model of participation which would fit the needs of the workers of 
Turkey. This aspect of the research is important when we consider that 
participation in and of itself has a cost to the production unit as a whole 
in terms of time and resources. If the areas of representation are more 
precisely defined and the mode of participation delineated, then it will be 
possible to aim for a more efficient and functional model of participation 
wherein the needs of the workers and capital owners can be best satisfied. 
When is participation seen as valid is another important question 
which we have confronted in this research. Furthermore, the question 
that how do workers feel about the right to participate is of equal 
importance in order to grasp the attitudes towards codetermination. We 
are also interested in the relationship between participation and the issues 
of ownership, seniority, knowledge and skills. We also pose the question 
whether merely working at the factory is reason sufficient enough to 
validate participatory rights. As the phenomenon of participation takes 
on different forms in different cultures and settings, in order to be able to 
serve for the best interest of workers and owners these parameters should 
be precisely defined. 
Isolating more precisely the factors which facilitate the desire to 
participate will aid us in making decisions about codetermination. This 
study also examines the relationship between participation and the 
individuals' demographic data. How do characteristics such as gender, 
age, and education affect individuals' attitudes and perceptions towards 
codetermination? For instance, are workers from different educational 
backgrounds more eager to participate? As our goal is to set up 
codetermined production, to the extent we isolate more precisely the 
factors which facilitate the desire to participate our task will be reached 
more easily. 
After attempting to generally delineate attitudes and perceptions 
about participation as we have outlined above, our second major aim in 
this study is to investigate a possible relationship between participation 
and factory ownership. With a major transformation taking place for the 
society in Turkey, one of the major issues has been the decentralisation of 
the State. Within this framework, the privatisation of State owned 
industries has been of primary importance. Privatisation, however, is a 
complex process involving not only economic issues but sociological and 
psychological ones as well. As industry in Turkey transforms to meet the 
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needs of modern production, an understanding of how workers perceive 
working for the state as opposed to workers working for the private 
sector gains importance. How do such sentiments translate into attitudes 
about codetermination? Do workers who work in a privatelyowned 
textile factory feel more eager to participate than those in a State owned 
factory of a comparable size and structure? Do workers differ in areas of 
participation? How viable is participation perceived to be? It is felt that 
without considering such questions, healthy steps forward to transform 
the society and the industry in Turkey cannot be undertaken. 
Finally, this study examines the relationship between participation 
and "psychological symptoms". An important issue of codetermination is 
the value that participation adds to the workers' quality of life. 
Participation in the workplace, and thus having some leverage over 
important events which may have decisive consequences, may add to the 
overall ability of the individual to build up resistance against stress. If 
such a tendency can be empirically validated, it is felt that the justification 
for codetermination will be decided upon more easily. 
Within this context, this study investigates whether the urge one to 
control her/his social environment rather than be a passive actor destined 
by the decisions of others, provides grounds for a healthier personality. 
Does the urge to participate represent a willingness or capacity to cope 
with the changes that our social environment bring us face to face within 
our daily lives? If so, then, this should be reflected at the individuals' 
level of psychological symptoms. To assess the respondents' level of 
psychological symptoms, this study uses a psychological symptoms scale 
developed by Dohrenwend for use in normal population survey studies. 
The individuals' psychological symptoms level is expected to be inversely 
associated with her/his positive attitudes toward participation. 
In summary, then, in Chapter I we introduce the study and give a 
general outline of how the problem of codetermination is approached. In 
Chapter II we review the theoretical work in this area and attempt to 
provide a historical backdrop to the issue of codetermination. Here, the 
economic, socio-political and psychological dimensions of this study are 
discussed. In Chapter III we approach the problem of codetermination 
from the perspective of Turkey. A general outline of Turkey's 
economic/political history is presented, with an account of industrial 
relationships, past attempts at codetermination, and the textile industry. 
In Chapter IV we review the aims of this study and present our method of 
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investigation in detail, discussing the measurement instruments used, the 
setting in which the research took place, and our sampling procedures. 
Results are presented in Chapter V. finally, in Chapter VI we discuss the 
findings and offer our suggestions for further research. 
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF 
CODETERMINATION 
CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF 
CODETERMINATION 
2.1. Defining the Traditional Paradigm of Hierarchy and the 
New Paradigm of Codetermination at Enterprise Level 
In the traditional managerial system, decisions are taken by top 
management, and an implementation plan is successively decomposed 
through layers of management hierarchy until it is finally given as a 
command to the operational level. Aoki (1990), for example, 
characterises the traditional model of hierarchy by the following three 
basic attributes: 
every constituent unit is crystallised around a well-defined specialised 
function; 
each constituent unit has one and only one immediate super ordinate 
to which it reports and coordination between any two (or more than two) 
constituent units is performed by the lowest super ordinate common to 
them; 
there is only one unit (the central office) which is super ordinate to 
every other unit (p. 269).* 
The departure from the subjection to the employer's authority in the 
workplace brings about employee participation in enterprise decision- 
makin(4 through different channels, which is called codeterminationi. 
Codetermination can thus be defined as a process in which employees 
have some say or equal power in determining the outcome of decisions 
vvhich affect them, directly or indirectly. 
The concept of codetermination is somehow, to use the Roca and 
Retour (1981) term, "bogged down,- as the questions on the nature of 
participatory subjects, the level of application in an organisational 
structure, the subject-matter of participation, and the forms and areas of 
participation are subject to different interpretations and definitions. 
Nevertheless, the characteristic that belongs to the core of 
* In quotations, throughout the research, all original italics are presented in italic form, our 
emphasis, however, is underlined. 
-Codetermination- and -participation- will be used interchangeably throughout this 
research. 
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codetermination can be given as "the capacity to influence, to exercise 
control, to have power, to be involved or to intervene actively in the 
decision-making of the organisation" the intensity of any of these core 
capacities defining the degree of participation in the enterprise (Roca and 
Retour 1981: 2). 
2.2. Conceptualisation of Codetermination 
The introduction of a codetermined system would have important 
implications. These should carefully be analysed, and the pros and cons 
be thoroughly considered. To that end, the issue will be covered through 
four dimensions, namely sociological, political, economical and 
psychological. The term of reference will be the enterprise, although 
macro-level participation, and its interaction with micro-level 
codetermination, will not be left out of the picture. 
2.2.1. The Economic and Socio-Political Dimension 
For a proper treatment of codetermination it is necessary to take into 
account, from an economical and socio-political perspective, the costs and 
benefits of introducing a participatory mechanism. First, the benefits of 
codetermination are classified as follow's: 
1. There would be a reduction in labour disutility obtainable when 
workers participate in decision-making of the enterprises, as traditional 
management may have the tendency to undertmisestimate (as they do not 
have any incentive to take into account) workers' preferences about the 
specific uses to which their labour is put (Nuti 1987). To be more 
specific, Steinherr (1977) pinpoints that workers' utility could be seen as 
"a positive function of participation itself, most likely with an S-shape" 
(p. 547). Similarly, managers may welcome codetermination, as this will 
satisfy their sense of justice and democracy (Steinherr 1977). Needlessly 
to remind, positive valuation of codetermination by managers may 
decrease after a certain intensity of codetermination due to a loss of 
managerial status and independence. These two aspects are also very 
interrelated with the psychological dimension, a topic that we shall discuss 
further along. 
10 
An increase in organisational effectiveness is expected due to 
codetermined relations. The introduction of such a scheme would 
eliminate strategic (game-theoretical) behaviour in bargaining and 
improve working conditions through better communication of power. 
since work relationship would be decided jointly as opposed to 
opportunistically. As Aoki (1990) clearly indicates, the real value of 
codetermination lies in the access it gives workers to accurate and 
credible information about the firm that would otherwise be confined to 
management, reducing the incentive for strategic bargaining behaviour. 
Hence, the decrease of the number and intensity of conflicts in the 
enterprise would in turn bring about an increase in productivity and a 
reduction in monitoring costs and managerial slacks (see Steinherr 
(1977), Aoki (1984b), Barlett and Uvalic (1985), Bonin and Putterman 
(1987)). 
Codetermination may facilitate the internalisation of external costs of 
enterprises, since the increased level of political pluralism has been 
interpreted as bringing about a long-term vision (Dahl 1985; Devine 
1988; Adamson 1990). This might be detrimental in cases where the firm 
heavily pollutes the environment but is not held responsible for that fact 
due to either the lack of a functional juridical system or by the ability of 
the firm to by-pass the constraints set by such a system. In that regard, 
even some (Bullock 1977) have argued that the inclusion of a third party 
(as a way of representing the "community/local interest") into the 
decisionmaking bodies of the enterprise is of prime importance a topic 
that We shall discuss below. 
Since workers, being employed by one single enterprise, cannot 
diversify their labour services among different enterprises, as opposed to 
shareholders who can diversify their portfolio and hence their risks 
(Fama 1977), there is an ethical reasoning that they must assume the right 
to share the control as they are bearing the risk of the firm at which they 
are working (see e.g. Schuller (1985)). 
Participation in control of the firm through democratic processes is 
claimed to be a value in itself, distinct from any changes in the actual 
decisions made by the firm. Organisational conditions that discourage 
participation at work may also decrease interest and involvement in local 
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and national level participation. As Elden (1981) indicates, "industrial 
work resting on an undemocratic authority structure socialises people into 
passivity and political apathy" (p. 43). Codetermination should therefore 
be understood as a necessary condition for political education and 
democratic competence of the population, in the sense that it would 
stimulate greater participation and better citizenship in the government of 
the state itself, foster human development and enhance the sense of 
political efficacy (see e.g. Blumberg (1968), Pateman (1970), Dahl 
(1985), Hodgson (1984), Greenberg (1986), Held (1987), Keane (1988)). 
The corollary of this fact is that economic success would often 
come more plentifully in cultures that place greater emphasis on norms of 
conduct quite different from that of narrowly defined self-interest 
maximisation (Morishima et al. 1982; Dore 1983). 
6. Through codetermination it would be possible to articulate knowledge 
which would otherwise be hidden (Adaman and Devine 1994; Aoki 
1990). The implicit assumption here is that employees possess valuable 
knowledge which can neither be objectified and codified nor transferred, 
and, therefore, can only emerge through their active participation in 
decision-making. The particularity of this local knowledge was first 
underlined by Hayek, the following quotation of whom expresses itself 
ven' neatly: 
The peculiar character of the problem of a rational economic order is 
determined precisely by the fact that the knowledge of the circumstances 
of which we must make use never exists in concentrated or integrated 
form but solelv as the dispersed bits of incomplete and frequ-entiv 
contradictorv i'nowledge which all the separate individuals possess. ( ...) 
[The economic problem] is a problem of the utilisation of knowledge 
which is not given to anyone in its totality. (...) [P]ractically every 
individual has some advantage over all others because he possesses 
unique information of which b-eneficial use might be made, but of which 
use can be made only if the decisions depending on it are left to him or 
are made with his active co-operation (Hayek 1945/1949: 77-80). 
After having stated the benefits, it is now the turn to refer to the possible 
costs of introducin2; codetermination: 
Under such a scheme, information processing, meetings, and extensive 
discussions would require the allocation of some extra resources (in the 
form of time and money) (see e.g. Sartori (1987)). In addition to this, 
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these costs are expected to increase more than proportionately with higher 
levels of participation (Steinherr 1977). 
Furthermore, the cost of codetermination may be aggravated by 
two reasons. First, the way of defining the internal structure of a 
codetermined management may prove problematic. As we shall see 
below, there are many ways of participating in the decisionmaking of 
firms, with variant intensities. The determination of the best combination 
of codetermination may be rather difficult to achieve, and in some cases 
this may probably require a tatônnenzent process, all of which would 
presumably increase the costs. Second, the practical application of 
codetermination may vary from industry to industry or technology to 
technology; specific types of industrial organisations or technological 
structures may prove more accessible to a codetermined managerial 
process whereas others may not be so responsive. In the lack of a 
uniform model for enhancing participation at the workplace, it would be 
very difficult indeed to find the optimal menu. 
Having said this, however, a reservation to the alleged excessive 
cost of the time that is needed to be invested during the participatory 
process should be raised. There seems to be no doubt that, regarding a 
short-term and static perspective, the time invested needs to be treated as 
a cost (see e.g. Sartori (1987)); but should the perception be widened to 
take into account the educative element of this procedure, then 
categorically this time cannot be treated as a cost, as many scholars from 
Mill onwards have been arg,uing (see Cole (1920: 1938; 1950), 
Macpherson (1973). Pateman (1970), Greenberg (1986) and Held 
(1987)). 
After having stated, in general terms, the pros and cons of implementing 
codetermination, it is now the time to raise the question whether the 
incorporation of profit sharing with codetermination would have any 
positive or detrimental effect on the efficiency level of the enterprise. At 
first sight, it may be argued that profit-sharing and participation should 
go hand in hand, as both would reinforce each other. Yet, a more closer 
investigation will reveal the opposite. From a theoretical perspective, it 
may be argued that a profit sharing firm will behave quite similar to the 
Labour-Managed-Firm which maximises the value-added per worker, and 
thus will duplicate the perversity aspect of it, the reasoning of which is 
presented below. 
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The tradition followina the contributions of Ward (1958), Domar (1966), 
and Vanek (1970) takes as the point of departure the assumption that in 
the so-called Labour-Manag.,ed-Firms (LNIFs) the aim is to maximise the 
dividend per worker-member, defined as the value-added per worker. 
More specifically, the LMF chooses inputs in the short and long run to 
maximise the value-added per worker: 
= VIL = [pQ(K,L)-rK]/L, 
where the output. Q(K,L), sold at a price p, depends both on labour input. 
L. and on the amount of K of capital goods employed, the latter being 
hirable at a rental r. The LMF's production function is assumed to be 
differentiable and exhibits positive and decreasing marginal products of 
capital and labour. In the case of the short-run (where capital is taken as 
fixed), the first order condition av/aL 0 of maximising the value-added 
per worker gives 
p(aQ/aL) v. 
In the case of the long-run (where capital becomes a variable), the first 
order conditions avfaL 0 and avtaK 0 of maximising the value-added 
per worker give 
(aQ/aLmaQ/aK) 
The consequence of the Ward-Domar-Vanek assumption regarding the 
behaviour of LIVIFs is that of inefficiency and perversity, which will be 
discussed below under the short run, long run and investment 
categorisation (for a general discussion see, for example. Bonin and 
Putterman (1987) and Kleindorfer and Sertel (1993)). 
Short-run Problems of the LMFs: 
The main three problems that are expected to arise when capital is 
assumed to be fixed can briefly be stated as follows: 
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LIVIFs will be smaller than their capitalist twins (equipped with the 
same production function Q and facing the same markets) if profits are 
positive. Note that if there is a positive profit, the profit that goes to 
shareholders in a capitalist twin firm would be divided among workers in 
an LMF, making the value-added per worker greater than the ongoing 
wage rate. Recalling that the marginal product of labour is decreasing, 
the LMF has to use, under the positive profit scenario, less labour in 
order to attain the optimality condition (2), bringing about inefficiency. 
LIVIFs would behave perversly to autonomous shifts in the product 
price, by lowering (increasing) its labour force, and thus output, when the 
price goes up (down). The proof is given as follows (via Sertel (1987)): 
Let Q stand for Q - L(aQ/aL), then the optimality condition (2) can 
be rewritten as 
Q = K.rip 
(2') 
It is clear that ApAQ<0. In order to see the sign of ALAQ, we 
have to check the sign of aQ/aL. which is 
as2 oL = - L(a2Q/aL2). 
This is positive, as a2Q/aL2 is assumed to be negative: we therefore get 
ApAL<0. 
3) If there is a positive profit and the value-added per worker differs 
among the LMFs in an industry, labour allocation in the LNIF economy 
would not be Pareto optimal. Clearly, a reallocation of labour toward the 
LMF with the higher value-added per worker from the LMF with a lower 
one would increase total output in that economy. 
Long-run Problem of the LNIFs: 
The main problem here is that in the long run if there is a positive profit, 
the maximised value-added per worker will exceed the ongoing wage 
rate, thus the choice of technique characterised in (3) would be more 
capital intensive than the optimal combination level. 
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Investment Problem of the LMFs: 
The under-investment malady has long been attributed to LMFs: due to 
the anticipated finiteness of tenure of members who cannot fully 
appropriate the cash flow results of internal investment, members would 
adopt a higher effective discount rate and underinvest (Furubotn 1976). 
Furthermore, as Fehr (1992) noted, due to the fact that initial members of 
LMFs are subject to expropriation by newcomers there would be again an 
incentive to underinvest. In other words. incumbent workers cannot 
monopolise the benefits from growth, even if they bear the cost of 
Growth. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the LMFs' design is fundamentally 
flawed: the main surprise, however, is that they have occupied, and still 
occupy, the attention of many economists to the existing extent (for a 
relatively recent contribution see, for example, Dréze (1989)). There 
have been many attemps to cure this flawed structure (for a review see 
Bonin and Putterman (1987)). Yet, none has been successful enough to be 
able to properly answer all the deficiencies: furthermore, the fact of the 
matter turns out to be that the Ward-Domar-Vanek framework prevents 
the emergence of such a proper answer (Kleindorfer and Sertel 1993). 
Only if the shares and capital structure of the workers' firm were valued 
and sold to both present and potential future employees, then the 
persistent perverse and inefficient character of the LMFs would 
evaporate. 2 
2 This avenue was first explored by Serte! (1982), with further contributions along that line 
being in continuum (see Dow (1986), Sertel (1987), and Kleindorfer and Serte! (1993)). 
In Sertel's system (where the new term Workers' Enterprises (WE) is preferred to the old 
LMF), any expansion of the membership list requires the approval of both the newcomers 
and the current members, likewise any contraction can only be realised if both those who 
are to retire and those to stay give their mutual consent. Therefore, the WE unanimously 
agrees to adjust capital variable so as to maximise the value-added per worker, and the size 
of labor, i.e. the membership list, is itself subject to the worker-partnership market. As 
such, la] deed price at which no sellers can find buyers and no buyers can find sellers will 
not only be an equilibrium deed price, but will also correspond to a rest point in the 
formation of the firin and to an equilibrium firm size- (Sertel 1987: 1621). 
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The conclusion to be drawn, from our point of view, is that should profit 
sharing be incorporated into a codetermined organisation, then workers 
would have the tendency to reveal similar behaviour to LIVIFs, thus 
creating, inefficiencies. A related issue is that codetermination may 
impart "syndicalistic" characteristics to enterprise behaviour, bringing 
about a loss of flexibility, and thus inefficiency, to the firm since hiring 
and firing would no longer be easily executed should workers have a 
strong influence over over the determination of that issue (Bonin and 
Putterman 1987). These two points, valid from a pure theoretical 
framework but not rigorously supported empirically (on this, see below), 
should be kept in mind in designing any mechanisms which are alternative 
to the traditional management system. This brings about, once again, the 
importance of the design problem that we face with, since 
codetermination has a lot positive points, but not without any drawbacks. 
The efficiency implications of codetermination has been extensively tested 
empirically, and the result of the results is that usually, but not always, 
codetermination brings about an efficiency increase (Cable and FitzRoy 
1980; Streeck 1984: Bonin and Putterman 1987; Fitzroy and Kraft 1993). 
2.2.2. The Psychological Dimension 
It ,..a_oes without saying that individuals' willingness and readiness to take 
part in codetermination may have an important role in determining 
psychological symptom levels. For that end, it would be necessary to set 
out a theoretical framework which would explain this correlation. 
The detrimental effects of an unstable social environment on the 
individual has dominated stress related research for decades. In 1939 
Fans and Dunham (1939) disclosed findings that there were 
proportionally higher rates of first admissions to psychiatric hospitals for 
schizophrenia from the poverty stricken areas of center city Chicago. 
Similar findings were found by Hollingshead and Redlich (1958) in their 
New Haven study. Srole et al. (1962) showed that the findings were 
similar for a non-treatment population. These findings set off a chain of 
research which still persists today. Two major theoretical approaches 
developed, one claiming that psychological symptoms occurred due to the 
rampant conditions that lower class individuals were exposed to (social 
causation theories) and another approach which has come to be referred 
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to as -drift theory . Drift theorist claimed that it was not the conditions 
that were causally important in explaining the higher rates of mental 
illness in the lower classes but rather that individuals who were in some 
way afflicted with mental illness drifted to the lower levels of the class 
structure due to their incapacitating conditions. This drifting down of 
mentally incapacitated individuals was seen as responsible for the inflated 
rates at the lower class levels. 
In later years it was established that not only were rates higher for 
lower class individuals but for women and blacks as well. It appears that 
the most important underlying factor to this non proportional share of 
psychological ailments is that the vulnerable group lies at the 
disadvantaged end of some power dimension. Be it gender, race, or 
social status, it appears that individuals lying at the disadvantaged end of 
the power scale are more vulnerable to the effects of a stressful 
environment. In other words, given equal amounts of stress, usually 
measured in terms of life events3, individuals from disadvantaged social 
groups are more apt to breakdown with psychological symptoms. 
Within the framework of the social causation theory, various modes 
of explanation have been put forth to explain these empirical findings. 
The most obvious is the claim that individuals in the lower class have less 
material resources to cope with the effects of stress. Others have 
approached the problem in terms of social support and/or coping skills 
buffering the effects of stress either prior to the event, during, or after 
the event. Such intervening variables have been found to partially explain 
the differential vulnerability experienced by disadvantaged groups, 
however the explanatoiy power of these isolated variables has been weak. 
Mandalinci (1995) in a recent study in Turkey made use of a new 
intervening variable in an attempt to bring a theoretical explanation to the 
phenomenon of differential vulnerability. The variable of -predictive 
capacity-, defined as the individuals ability to predict before hand what 
will transpire socially as a result of ones actions prior to acting, has found 
empirical support. The general idea is that individuals are active players 
in defining and determining what transpires in the social arena and that 
3 Life evens are any events, either positive or negative, which require that the individual 
adapt in some form or another. Usually life events are measured using a checklist where 
changeful events are read to the respondent and asked if such an event has occurred to the 
individual in the past year (i.e., death of a child, divorce, marriage). 
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their ability to socially map, and to understand the social forces which 
determine their interests, largely depends on their ability to "predictify" 
their social environment. "Predictification" is a sustained quality of 
knowing, within some probabilistic range, what will transpire under 
given conditions and actions. "Predictification" of one's social 
environment is obtained through interaction and participation in 
information rich social phenomenon. The idea is closely related to the 
symbolic interaction theoly and represents what may be called a measure 
of "generalised other". As Mead (1934/1962) says, the self is seen as 
developing through the acquisition of social roles wherein the individual 
develops through social participation and understanding of him/herself 
through _generalised estimations of others' behavior. 
Within this theoretical framework the explanation of vulnerability 
to stress is spelled out in terms of the groups having been denied access 
into information rich areas of social interaction, where social meaning is 
derived and accumulated. With limited access to such "predictifying" 
interaction the individual is limited in the development of "predictive 
capacity" with which to manipulate social events and thus lessen the 
possibility of psychological breakdown given stress. Here stress or a life 
event is seen as a catalyst which begins a chain of efforts which work 
toward the resolution of an event. When the individual lacks "predictive 
capacity.' s/he knows not how to act in his/her best interest. Non-action 
can be as detrimental as wrong action. 
When events are not resolved and return to consciousness 
repeatedly for a resolution, adaptive energy, which is mobilized by the 
body during times of stress, is rapidly depleted. We refer to such 
situations as "stress loops". The persistence of a "stress loop" for a 
prolonged period of time increases the probability of psychological 
damage. The concept of "stress loops" is essential to the "predictive 
capacity" hypothesis. As an individual "predictive capacity" increases the 
probability of avoiding a "stress loop" initially and the probability of 
breaking out of a "stress loop" should one occur is increased. Individuals 
with low levels of "predictive capacity", in other words, those individuals 
who lack the capacity to predict how their actions will play out in social 
relationships prior to acting, will have increased their probability of 
entering a "stress loop" and a lesser chance of exiting a loop should one 
occur. In short, a prolonged ''stress loop" with no foreseeable resolution 
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of the event rapidly depletes adaptive energy as Selye (1956/1978) offers 
and psychological damage onsets. 
Given that "predictive capacity" is gained through participation in 
social interactions wherein role accumulation and inside information 
about the functioning of the system are gained, then we would assume that 
those individuals who have an urge to participate in the management of 
their work place would have higher levels of "predictive capacity". 
Within this context then the "predictive capacity" hypothesis would hold 
that individuals who see the importance of and/or have the urge to 
participate in the management of their work place, thus having higher 
levels of "predictive capacity", should also have lower levels of 
psychological symptoms. Here the assumption is that individuals with 
higher levels of "predictive capacity" are more apt to avoid and or exit 
"stress loops" which may occur and thus would have lower levels of 
psychological symptoms. 
In summary, then, given the assumption that positive attitudes 
toward participation are positively associated with "predictive capacity", 
then we would expect that positive attitudes toward participation taken as 
an indicator of "predictive capacity" would be inversely related to the 
individual level of psychological symptoms. The higher an individual 
reveals the need to participate the less psychological symptoms they 
should currently have. 
Most studies of stress have employed the use of "life event check 
lists as a measure. The development of these various check lists date 
back to Adolf Meyer's use of "life charts" as a clinical tool. His 
observation was that prior to the onset of mental illness, there appeared a 
clustering of eventful incidents in the individuals' life history. Holmes and 
Masuda (1974) began developing life events check lists back in 1949. 
Life events were later rated by individuals to develop a "Social 
Readjustment Rating Scale". From this, each event was assigned a weight 
representing the amount of readjustment the event required. The 
association between the number of life events experienced by the 
individual and her/his psychological symptoms level has been well 
established. The idea that the lower classes might be experiencing more 
life events then those in the upper classes and that this might provide an 
explanation to higher rates of mental illness in the lower classes was 
fostered but empirical research proved this not to be the case. 
Differential exposure to stress was proven to be unsubstantiated. 
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In the present study we do not have a measure for level of stress, 
usually measured by a life events check list. Here then we assume that the 
level of stress is constant. Stress is mediated by an individuals capacity to 
understand and manipulate the social environment in his/her own interest. 
While doing so we claim that the degree to which the individual can assess 
how to adapt or adjust depending on a knowledge of how the social 
processes function will allow the individual to avoid "stress loops". As 
we have stated "stress loops" are situations wherein the individual is 
pressured by the pressing and reappearing need to resolve an event with 
no viable alternative to do so. The continuing depletion of adaptive 
energy, as the event returns to consciousness for resolution, leads to 
psychological breakdown. 
In short, then, in this study ve take an individuals' positive attitudes 
toward participation as an indicator of his/her level of "predictive 
capacity". As "predictive capacity" increases the level of psychological 
symptoms should decrease. Thus we expect an inverse linear relationship 
between an individual's positive attitude toward participation and his/her 
psychological symptoms level. 
2.3. The Two Prerequisites of Participation Democratic 
Commitment and Capability of Taking Part in Decision-Making 
The first prerequisite of an effective codetermination is the democratic 
commitment, in which individuals would have to follow democratic rules 
in order to enhance participation. These democratic rules must include, 
inter alia. equal voting, and enlightened understanding and control of the 
political agenda (see e.g. Dahl (1985)). In order for this democratic 
structure to be fully functional, Held visualises that 
individuals should be free and equal in the determination of the 
conditions of their OW11 lives: that is, they should enjoy equal rights 
(and, accordingly, equal obligations) in the specification of the 
framework which enerates and limits the opportunities available to 
them, so long as the-v do not deploy this framework to negate the rights 
of others (He-Id 1987-: 271). 
Thus, there seems to be a perfect understanding that in order for 
participatory decision-making processes to be full-y functional, they must 
be based in principle on democratic rules. Obviously, at this stage, the 
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ways by which decisions are to be finalised within participatory processes 
assume great importance, as any voting mechanism, apart from the 
unanimity rule, would bring about a bias ("voting paradox")4, thus 
highlighting the importance of the selection of the voting agenda. But, an 
expectation can be made that in such a decision-making process, in which 
all those affected participate, a dynamic towards consensus and 
compromise would emerge. 
Democracy brings about the right to participate; but whether individuals 
are capable of fully participating obviously depends on their potentialities 
to take part in such decision-making processes. This requires, as a second 
prerequisite for effective participation, the elimination of differentiation 
and hierarchy among employees in the workplace, which gives some 
consistent advantages over others. For a social organisation in which 
everybody is entitled to access on an equal basis to the essential resources 
for effective participation in economic decisionmaking, pleasant and 
unpleasant work, and conceptual and administrative work, need to be 
shared; individuals, in this regard, need to rotate through some sequence 
of tasks so that no one enjoys consistent advantages over others. A 
collective responsibility to promote the ability of everyone to participate 
in decisionmaking processes requires that the enterprise is organised in 
such a way that the resources needed for people's self-development are 
available (Adaman 1993; Bahro 1978; Devine 1992). 
2.4. Models of Participation 
Any attempt to implement participation should identify who participates, 
over whom those who participate exert influence, and finally, on what 
areas and in what ways participate will take place. In this section an 
attempt will be made to sketch a map of the areas and forms o f 
participation. 
2.4.1. The Areas of Participation within the Enterprise 
The areas of participation within the enterprise are needless to say very 
numerous, in the sense of covering all the areas of decision-making 
4 See e.g. Mueller (1979) 
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related with enterprise activities. Therefore, it would be convenient to 
collect all the basic decisions under 14 headings (as it would be used in 
our questionnaire) and classify them in order to facilitate the articulating 
and ranking of the areas of participation according to their importance 
and weight. One such an approach is illustrated below (fig. 2. 1.), which 
is a slightly modified adaptation of the one that has been used in 
-Industrial Democracy in Europe Revisited- by the Industrial Democracy 
in Europe, International Research Group (1993: 5).5 Rows are separated 
according to the length of the decision's effect, into -short", -medium" 
and -long" terms. Here, although we do not want to specify an exact 
length of time, it should be conceivable to think short term as up to one 
year, medium term as between 1 and 5 years, and long term as more than 
5 years. The columns indicate the three different areas of participation: 
-work/social conditions-, "personnel" and "economic aspects". 
figure 2. 1. 
5 The modification maintained by adding two new items (namely Welfare Facilities and 
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Yet, an alternative classification, regarding the functional level of the 
power sharing, as depicted at the following chart (fig. 2. 2.) can also be 
constructed. 
figure 2. 2. 
This classification is heavily inspired by Aoki's (1990) approach, in which 
the distinction between strategic decision-making and operational 
decision-making has been proposed. Operational level participation (OLP) 
covers the decisions regarding the daily routines of a workplace and the 
production process of a plant. Strategic level participation (sLP), on the 
other hand, is concerned with those decisions of the firm (corporate 
organisation) which structure the basic framework of its operations" 
(Aoki 1990: 268). Very broadly speaking, we also notice that operational 
level decisions usually do not require major expenditures, and, therefore, 
are less risky from the management point of view: the strategic level 
decisions on the contrary require major expenditure, and for that end are 
risky. 
Strategic decisions such as the scheming of new investments and 
new products, deciding on technology renewal or marketing and price 
determination were easier to classify. The same thing can also be said for 
the decisions regarding practical and operational issues, such as task 
assignments and transfer of workers from one unit to another, or 
problems relating with the choice/assignment of personal equipment. Yet, 
it should perhaps be explicitly stated that even in this classification the 
demarcation line is not very clear-cut. For example, in the short run, 
welfare facilities might not be strategically important for the productivity 
of the firm: yet, in the long run, when one considers the impact of such 
facilities on the workers' motivation, and in turn on the firm's 
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productivity, one may well wish to classify it as a strategic decision. 
Another example could be given among the decisions regarding the 
betterment of the workplace conditions: such decision-making surely does 
not require (generally speaking, of course) major efforts or expenses and 
consequently there seems to be no reason as not to classify it under OLP. 
A final example might be the decision regarding the appointment of a new 
department head. Such a decision despite that fact it is not financially 
binding- might be seen as strategic because sharing power with the 
employee in electing a managerial body requires an important amount of 
hierarchical earthquake and change of perception. 
Finally, a third categorisation can be invented. There is the possibility of 
classifying all the 14 items along a -personal- and -non-personal- 
spectrum a path that will be explored later on. 
2.4.2. The Forms of Participation 
The most conventional way of classifying the forms of participation is to 
make the distinction between direct and indirect participation. According 
to Heller (1992), direct participation means to give each employee the 
opportunity to take part in discussion, consultation and decisionmaking, 
usually in small groups-. Consequently, indirect participation implies 
participation through a process of electing representativ es. Although 
there is no one to one correspondence, while strategic level participation 
tends to be indirect in the form of board representation, operational level 
participation is usually undertaken directly through councils, committees, 
or circles. 
At this point, the distinction between voluntary. management-led 
and juridical/corporatist-led participative structures could be mentioned. 
The voluntary form of participative structures are those structures in 
which both the management and employees of an enterprise unanimously 
agree to share decision-making power: in the management-led form, the 
managerial positive attitude towards codetermination dominates the 
organisational form. Juridical and corporatist participative structures are 
those which are backed up with detailed laws and come to function as a 
consequence of a mutual agreement at the macro level between the social 
partners, namely the government, capital and labour. The empirical 
evidence indicates that, on the one hand, voluntary and management-led 
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structures do not commonly tend to have any juridical backing and do not 
usually function as a mean for any significant amount of power sharing; 
on the other hand, juridical/corporatist-led structures aim at 
encompassing national, industry wide, enterprise based, and workplace 
level decisionmaking processes, in all areas, with a variety of 
committees, boards, and councils. 
The inclusion of third parties into workers representatives is still 
an unsettled issue. In that regard argue the necessity of including trade 
union members who are not employed at the enterprise, as otherwise 
particularistic tendencies of the enterprise may not be so easily controlled, 
and the link between the enterprise, industry and the whole economy 
might be loose (Briefs 1989). Some others underlines the necessity of 
including a -neutral part" into the decision-making process. The Bullock 
Report (1977) of the United Kingdom is an interesting example in that 
regard: the report underlines the importance of the third party's function, 
and advocates the -2x-Ey- formula, in which the "y-, which is to be less 
than one third of the total board, consists of co-opted directors who are 
selected by both the employees and the employers, and -x" is the workers' 
and investors' representatives. The co-opted group is aimed to have a 
dual function of mediating between the investors and workers and to 
bring wider experience and considerations to bear. The Bullock Report 
did not want to propose any restriction as to eligibility for co-option, 
other than the agreement of a majority of each of the other two groups, 
but explained their view that this might be made up of senior personnel 
from other companies, experts, and trade unions who are not employees 
of the enterprise. 
In practice we have been observing many different forms of 
codetermination, in many different countries; a potpourri of these 
applications are presented as "Case Studies," which appear in the 
Appendix A. 
2.5. An Historical Account of Codetermination vis à vis the 
Ideological, Technological and Cultural Plasma 
Ideological, cultural and technological dimensions are to be considered 
for discussing and assessing the prospects and possibilities of 
codetermination. 
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First, it would be useful to understand how different ideologies 
may handle and approach codetermination with respect to the changing 
political climate of the era. Different social classes and groups according 
to the changing socio-politic and politico-economic milieu would give 
different responses towards this multi-faceted issue. 
Second, technological changes and transformations that occur in the 
production process in relation to the changing market circumstances 
demand a re-organisation of the existing organisational structure. 
Consequently, this re-organisation will demand a serious consideration of 
codetermination if it is to be handled with a long-term perspective. 
And, finally, cultural aspects are quite crucial in understanding the 
demands and potentialities of different social partners (i.e. workers and 
investors) since one of the determinants of their attitude towards 
codetermination will be the historical and cultural heritage of that 
particular society. 
2.5.1. Ideological Aspects 
A classical dichotomy dominates the ideological sphere: individualism 
versus collectivism. Generally speaking, individualism sacrifices 
cooperation and participation for the sake of competition and the 
hierarchical dominance of the fittest. Collectivism's approach to 
codetermination, on the other hand, is not always a welcoming one: a 
paternalistic version of it. for example, would reject any participatory 
mechani sm s. 
Within the twentieth century context, the general approach 
towards codetermination has varied. In the Western European context, 
when the expansionary Keynesian policies were providing a favourable 
environment for labour, in the post 1950 era, the attitude towards 
codetermination was reasonably positive (Allen 1990). The Keynesian 
consensus of the tripartite system provided codetermination at the societal 
(macro) level with the participation of the government and top institutions 
of labour and capital. On the other hand, at the enterprise (micro) level, 
this period saw extensive adaptation of "experimental" forms of 
codetermination. But, since the technology used in production throughout 
the post-World War II era was not very compatible with, or receptive 
towards, participative activities, these models could not translate the 
democratic atmosphere created in the societal level into the hierarchical 
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atmosphere of the workplace. Furthermore, a paternalistic state vision 
was accepted without much discussion. Hence, these forms of 
codetermination could not alleviate the alienation of the masses from the 
-formal" democracy and from the hierarchic organisational structure. As 
a result, this alienation caused a reactionaly shift from the collectivist 60s 
and 70s towards the individualist and liberal 80s, rather than towards 
more articulated and participative democratic structures. During the 
1980s, as a result of the ideological hegemony of the individualism, the 
corporatist structures of the macro level were abandoned and only micro 
level forms of codetermination which do not disturb the hierarchy of the 
firm began to be promoted and allowed to attend (Marsh 1992). 
In this milieu the attitude of trade unions also played an important 
role: some, for example, shifted to a more defensive strategy and chose a 
conflictual relationship with the capital, while others opted for looking 
for some compromises in return for their compliance to the hegemony of 
the capital. 
2.5.2. Technological Aspects 
At the plant level, the crisis of Fordism and Taylorism determines the 
real circumstances that necessitates the re-organisation of the production 
process and the introduction of codetermination. Fordism, as a system of 
production, is aimed at mass markets and being undertaken in mass 
production with product specific machinery. Taylorism, on the other 
hand, is an organisational structure in which semi-skilled workers are 
engaged in routine occupations. It is argued that these technological and 
organisational forms of production, faced with the changing parameters 
of the international competition at one hand and developing technology at 
the other, are bound to be re-structured and re-organised. The analysis 
of Piore and Sabel (1984) defines post-fordisin or, to use their 
terminology, flexible specialisation, as a system aiming at producing a 
variety of customi sed goods for diversifing markets, with multi-purpose 
machinery, conducted by skilled and innovative workers. Roobeek 
(1987),6 in that regard, outlines the following two reasons in explaining 
the transition to the post-fordist era: First, the inflexibility of Fordist 
production technologies and the incompetence of Taylorist organisational 
6 Via (Greig 1992). 
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structures vvere preventing industries from producing the optimal 
amounts and variety of products in response to localised and diversified 
markets, hence causing structural over capacity. Second, the saturated 
markets of the after-Keynesian, monetarist period necessitated high 
quality and capital intensive products for competing in a highly 
competitive environment. Capital intensive and high quality production 
requires human capital and workers' involvement. Yet, the deskilling 
Taylori sed organisational structures and hierarchic work relations, which 
were failing to provide the required positive environment for worker 
involvement, had lead to the problem of poor quality. A similar and 
complementay explanation comes from Allen (1990): 
The new international division of labour has forced producers in the 
advanced industrialised states to rely less extensively on comparatively 
simple mass production technology in favour of more specialised 
production. The option for industries in the industrialised world to 
continue to rely on the postwar mass production strategies is 
increasingly diminishing. The essence of these arguments is that workers 
may be able to recapture some of their lost craft skills precisely because 
employers will need to rely on the skill base of their work force to remain 
internationally competitive. [...] Workers are being asked to concern 
themselves with more than just distributional (wage and benefits) issues. 
They are being asked to use their skills to deal with questions of 
production, precisely at a time when employers feel vulnerable to the 
outslaught of low wage, mass production industries in the newly 
industrialising countries. In short, employers L.] may be increasingly 
dependent on the collective skills and expertise of their workers and 
their workers' unions to remain internationally competitive (Allen 
1990: 263-4; two footnotes are omitted) 
Changing and diversifing markets, combined with incompetent 
technology, resulted therefore with two problems: structural over 
capacity and poor quality control (Nielsen 1991). Attempts have been 
made to solve these two problems. A first approach was to introduce 
newer technology and to modify the production objectives with respect to 
globalised competition and diversifing market niches without altering the 
hierarchical Taylorist organisational structures. That attempt, which is 
called the neo-fordist ways out of the crisis. proved to be inadequately 
hopeless (Mathews 1989a: 1989b).7 It has forcefully been argued that, to 
transcend both Fordist and Taylorist limitations. and to address the core 
of the problem, a firm should make a paradigm shift towards 
Via (Greig 1992). 
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participation. This is a corollary of the fact that human capital is the most 
fundamental requirement for the highly computerised and diversified 
production technology, as local knowledge assumes greater importance. 
In this perspective, it is argued that, only a postifordist strategy 
underlines the importance of giving labour responsibility, in addition to 
arGuino the need for process variability and product innovation. These 
points are schematised in the below figure. 
figure 2. 3. 
adopted from the three dimensional model of production system 
by Badham and Mathews (1989). 
2.5.3. Cultural Aspect 
Cultural aspects and cultural heritage are also highly influential in 
determining the prospects of codetermination. In the Japanese context, 
for example, it is argued that the experience of Total Quality Management 
is heavily moulded with the paternalistic and solidaristic aspects of this 
Eastern society. 
In an era of technological transformation, codetermination at 
enterprise level requires human capital. and this is found in industrialised 
countries more easily, due to the high amount of educated people, as 
compared to less developed countries. From this perspective, it can be 
argued that the prospects of codetermination are better in developed 
countries than in less developed countries. Yet, despite the possible 
impotency of worker representatives in the decision-making process, due 
to their lacking of necessary training, managerial skills, or experience, a 
training programme that is moving parallel with the introduction of 
codetermination, on the one hand, and the election of more experienced 
8 One can talk of a very limited, operational level participation which neither hinders the 
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members of the workforce as representatives, on the other, might help a 
lot (Hansmann 1990: Heller 1992). Also as Heller (1992) underlines, 
independent institutions such as Norwegian and Swedish lifork Research 
Centres would be very useful as consultants in giving their academic and 
technical support to these individual worker-representatives. In that 
regard, codetermination, as a structure of interaction and knowledge 
articulation, should perhaps be perceived as a mean for creating the 
necessary human capital for the hi-tech industries of today. 
Finally, workers, mostly of developed countries, are on the eve of 
redefining their objectives from the pure economic gains of the post-war 
Trade Union movement to the formation of democratic workplaces and 
creative jobs in which they can alleviate alienation, to the adoption of 
efficient technology through which they can have more free time, and the 
acknowledgment of the flexibility of jobs in which they can learn and 
practice a variety of skills and occupations (Gorz 1982). This move, 
however slow it might be in reality, clearly indicates the workers' 
association, stronger than ever, with codetermination. 
2.5.4. Reassessing the Historical Account vvith respect to the 
Ideological Climate, Technological Change and Cultural 
Heritage 
The tradition of Ouality Circles and Total Ouality Management 
During the transition from the Fordism to the Post-Fordist era, quality 
circles (QCs) have been highlighted as an important tool for delivering 
product innovation and process variability into production. QCs are small 
groups of five to ten voluntary employees and their supervisor, who by 
receiving training in problem analysis and statistical techniques, are 
expected to contribute to the identification of work-related problems and 
to propose solutions addressing these problems (Barrick and Alexander 
1992). Management, which retains the responsibility to accept, modify, 
or reject these proposals, holds the authority for decision-making while a 
certain form of worker participation comes to life (Marsh 1992). These 
QCs ceased to exist by the end of the eighties, however, due to lack of 
interest among employees. Lawler and Mohrman (1985) even argued that 
QCs were seen as a transitional mechanism which would become non- 
functional once its mission was completed. When QCs were implied in 
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firms, as they are voluntary and not all workers agreed to participate into 
such programmes, they created a dual structure alongside the 
conventional organisational forms. Furthermore, once certain production 
problems were solved, there did not remain any rational for the 
continuing activities of QCs. Additionally, as QCs lacked any sort of 
implementary power they lost their desirability for the workers. Hill 
(1991) rather illuminatingly underlines that QCs were doomed to cease 
not because they were a transitional mechanism but because they were 
only a part of a complete paradigm, i.e., Total Quality Management 
(TQM). 
TQM, on the other hand, as its theoretical advocates Deming (1986), 
Ishikawa (1985), and Juran (1988) argue, provides a complete culture of 
overall quality improvement through inner-firm planning with horizontal 
and vertical coordination. Horizontal coordination implies the intra-firm 
-customer-supplier" relationship (i.e. inter-departmental input-output 
relationship) being handled according to high quality criteria. Vertical 
coordination implies opening up the hierarchical organisational structure 
to more communication and greater involvement (Hill 1991). 
The tradition of European Codetermination 
The western European tradition of codetermination has a distinctive 
feature of the QCs and TQM. While QCs and TQM have been largely 
implemented as an answer to the crisis of the fordist production, and in 
that regard have been initiated by the management, the Codetermination 
and Works Councils (WCs) tradition of Europe is largely a gain for the 
labour movement and the corporatist culture of these economies. 
Codetermination in the European context has aimed to build the two 
dimensions of micro-level participation and macro-level participation. 
Macro-level participation implies a democratic corporatist structure 
where the representatives of the top institutions of the Social Partners 
(workers' and investors' top union federations) negotiate over 
macroeconomic and social issues. As for the micro-level, it implies 
enterprise level participation through direct involvement in works 
councils or indirect representation in supervisory and managerial boards. 
Yet, Allen (1990) argues that the link between micro and macro-level 
participation was not strong enough to preserve the European model of 
Codetermination and to dominate the industrial democracy scene of the 
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80s. It can be argued that, a more participative and decentralised system 
of codetermination, which would provide larger autonomy to the councils 
of direct participation, could be a remedy for the alienatingly rigid nature 
of the European tradition of corporatist Codetermination. 
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A BRIEF OUTLOOK AT THE ECONOMIC, 
POLITICAL AND SOCIAL HISTORY OF 
INDUSTRY IN TURKEY WITH A SPECIAL 
EMPHASIS ON THE TEXTILE SECTOR 
In this Chapter, our aim is to give an account of industrial relations in 
Turkey within the context of her industrialisation effort. In doing so, the 
attempt will be to understand the economic development not only in itself 
but within the context of social and political change. To that end we will 
start with an examination of the economic and political history of the 
industrialisation drive in Turkey from the early days of the birth of the 
Republic of Turkey in 1923 until today, with an emphasis given to the 
post-1980 period. Afterwards, the attention will be turned to the 
investi2ation of the history of relations between the state, labour and 
business in Turkey, and to the depiction of a picture of industrial 
relations. Following this, a brief account of the theoretical and empirical 
studies which have been undertaken over the field of codetermination in 
Turkey will be outlined, and the applications of codetermination, as of 
yesterday and today, will be discussed. Finally, the role and significance 
of the textile sector in manufacturin2 industry, which constitutes the 
environment of our empirical research, and its organisational structure, 
will be highlia,hted. 
3. 1. An Economic and Political History: The Framework of 
Industrialisation until 1980 
An examination of Turkey's economic and political history in relation to 
economic development should begin with the years of the foundation of 
the Republic. Immediately after the war of independence (1919-1923), 
the leading cadres, guided by Mustafa Kemal, took a clear position that 
the establishment of the political independence of a newly: born nation 
state be very closely connected with her commitment to industrialisation 
and to creating the conditions conducive to that. This commitment is 
easily understood when one recalls the motto of the First Izmir Congress 
of Economics in 1923 (held even before the foundation of the Republic in 
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1923): -National sovereignty,' could only be achieved through economic 
independence."' Along this perception, the period following the foundation 
of the Republic witnessed the passing of major economic measures that 
were backed by many political, cultural and social reforms. Within the 
context of Kemalism, industrialisation was defined as the key objective 
and project of the Kemalist state, along with the need of a major 
transformation of the society of Turkey toward a westernised and 
industrial society. This view was then clarified as the choice of an étatist 
approach toward industry (as the private capital accumulation and human 
capital were almost nil); after that the state made her move in actively 
participating in economic activity via the establishment of Siimerbank and 
Etibank in the respective sectors of textiles and apparel, and metallurgy 
and mining, during the early 1930s. In this manner, and also through the 
enforcement of the isolatory international environment of the post-1929 
Crisis, étatism entered the dictionary of the state as the key concepts and 
remained popular until the 1950s. This étatist order was designed to 
achieve a set of interrelated targets: building an infrastructure; producing 
various intermediary/capital goods; creating human capital; dealing with 
regional imbalances; and bearing risk in the sense of confronting the 
typical uncertainties of newly opened markets. For the first three decades 
these targets can be said to have met with success. (See Adaman and 
Serte!, 1995, and references cited therein.) 
The 1950s signified a new approach toward the economy and 
society after the Democrat Party (DP) were elected when Turkey accepted 
a multi-party representative democratic system. This new approach was 
characterised by the priority given to agriculture, initiatives toward 
private enterprise as a locomotive of industrialisation, and by the winds of 
liberalisation in foreign economic relations also complemented by a 
move toward gaining international recognition via participating in major 
international institutions, such as NATO and GATT. Even though the DP 
initiated some liberal domestic and foreign trade policies, such policies 
became subject to change towards interventionist ones as economic 
difficulties arose (Boratav 1990; Keyder 1987). Generally speaking, 
during the period 1950-1960, the economic policy could mainly be 
labeled as -inward looking'', but this with an ad hoc character and a lack 
of coordination (Baysan and Blitzer 1990). On the whole, the foreign 
trade regime of the time was highly restrictionist, and controls, 
regulations and multiple exchange rates were often subject to government 
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changes. In 1960, owing much to the economic crisis and socio-political 
instability, the militan,' cadres, supported by intellectuals and students. 
halted the DP government. 
A new constitution was later prepared (officially passed in 1961) 
under the guidance of militanr leaders, again with the contribution of 
intellectuals, within which planning was defined as a vitally important part 
of the strategy of the State in Turkey towards industrialisation (as a 
reaction to the liberal discourse of the DP period). This formed the basis 
for the establishment of the State Planning Organisation (SPO). Hence. 
the period after 1960 is usually known as the period of -planned 
industrialisation- coupled with "import substituting accumulation 
strategy" both of which were objectified in the five-year plans. 
Thereby, economic growth, structural change towards industry, and the 
diversification of the export base to finance the increasing import-need of 
the economy, all emerged as the main objectives. The basis of such an 
accumulation strategy vvas the development of import-competing 
production lines under the state's provision of a protective umbrella, and 
of guidance through its direct participation in the economy and overall 
support to industrial activity and exports. This drive was then conducive 
to a double-sided strategy: both private enterprise and the state would play 
crucial roles in realising the industrialisation attempt within the official 
rhetoric of 'the mixed economy principle-. It should also be noted that 
industrial labour with strong unions (which quickly emerged thanks to the 
new constitution of 1961) constituted the third arm of this new coalition, 
in which the bureaucracy and the urban industrialists were the other two. 
The state, in this framework, became a supporter, organiser and regulator 
of economic activity, as well as an actor itself (Keyder 1987). 
In this context, the first phase of the Import-Substitution regime, 
which aimed at replacing the imports of non-durable goods (food 
processing, textiles (especially yarn), etc.), was successfully implemented 
between 1963 and 1973, despite the fact that the country was then 
experiencing a socio-political turbulence which constituted the rationale 
for yet another military intervention in 1971. But, owing much to the 
changing international climate and external shocks, the attempt at the 
second phase of the Import-Substitution strategy, which, generally 
speaking, aimed at the import substitution of consumer durable goods, 
intermediate (steel, refined products, petrochemicals, etc.) and investment 
goods, failed an important explanation being that these products were 
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basically capital-intensive, requiring high technology and skilled/technical 
labour for their production. which could not be met in the case of Turkey 
at that time (Akder et al. 1987). 
The years preceding the 1980 adjustment program, generally 
known as the "crisis years'', were mainly characterised by macroeconomic 
instability, and by social and industrial clashes. The country experienced 
very high rates of inflation, debt crisis and negative growth rates - where 
the oil shock and the consequences of Turkey's intervention in Cyprus in 
1974 both played decisive roles. That period was also marked by political 
turmoil and industrial disputes as well. Faced with such a deteriorating 
economic situation, the government made an attempt to -.revitalize" the 
economy by the reform program (of 24 January 1980) which was formed 
by the direct participation of the World Bank and the IMF. The country 
was then subjected to a coup d'etat in September of that year, and the 
military junta suppressed and sometimes terminated all oppositional 
groups and acted as a protector/guarantor of the 24 January economic 
program. 
3. 2. Economics and Politics in Turkey in the 1980s and in the 
First Years of the 1990s 
In the short-term, the structural adjustment programme of 24 January 
1980 essentially aimed at removing the immediate obstacles to the existing 
capital accumulation strategy. This meant that the burning problem of the 
availability of imported inputs into industry and foreign exchange had to 
be solved. Towards this end, the policy package included devaluation, a 
minimum of import liberalisation, and export promotion measures. At 
the same time, industrial and social conflict that exercised the most serious 
threat on the existing order was addressed by a political project that aimed 
to -discipline" workers' organisations (and other oppositional groups). In 
this respect, Turkey's approach to structural adjustment had two broad 
initial economic objectives: stabilisation cum export-led recover-y, and 
liberalisation of the economy of Turkey. The former was addressed, 
first, by a tight monetary programme that was a -popular" response to 
economic difficulties (of low or negative growth rates, rising inflation 
and the deteriorating current account position) around the globe in the 
period under question, and, second, by measures directly targeting 
exporters in order to overcome the foreign exchange problem (Oni§ 
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1993). The process of liberalisation, on the other hand, featured the 
following sequence: i) deregulation of industrial prices: ii) removing 
controls on the financial markets through an interest rate reform: iii) 
trade liberalisation in successive stages: and, iv) partial decontrol of the 
capital account of the balance of payments. This liberal discourse WaS 
later coupled with a strong appeal in favour of fullscale privatisation, an 
issue which has been on the agenda since then but with no major 
realisation (Adaman and Sertel 1995). 
Stabilisation policies that were put into practice during the 1980s 
can be regarded as the primary failure of this grandiose economic project, 
with inflation averaging 60-70 percent and the public sector borrowing 
requirement (PSBR) rising to 12-15 percent annually. The era of the 
junta government (1980-1983) can be seen as an exception to this 
performance, during which restrictive monetary targets and fiscal 
restraints were strongly pursued to restrain domestic demand and, along 
that path, to curb inflation. Declining government budget expenditures, 
low public investment in health and education, on the one hand, and 
declining real wages of public workers and civil servants, and reduced 
support prices to agriculture, on the other, meant controlled budget 
spending and less need for credit expansion and all these at a period in 
which large amounts of foreign funding were readily available. The rise 
of the Motherland Party to power in 1983, however, brought with it high 
levels of investment in the infrastructure, and lucrative incentives to trade 
and business. That, in turn, gave rise to an increasing need for a greater 
money supply andlor domestic and external financing of such spending, 
although the wage income was further lowered in real terms throughout 
the 1980s (Boratav 1991b). Also, the presence of, what may be called, 
-election economics,- put an enormous strain on the government budget: 
as a result, PSBR rose above the levels of other high-debt countries in a 
way to characterise inflation as -chronic- in the context of Turkey 
through out the 1980s. 
After 1983, under heavy budget deficits, executive cadres of 
governments of Turkey have shown a tendency to shift low cost foreign 
borrowing initially obtained from World Bank, IMF and the OECD 
Consortium, first into high cost, short-term domestic borrowing, and, 
then, in 1991, after the formation of the coalition government, proceeding 
the Motherland government. into high cost, short-term foreign 
borrowing, with a significant contribution from municipal governments 
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and the private sector. In this context, the high levels of public sector 
debt have created the conditions supportive of rent-seeking behaviour. 
Tax-free government bonds and treasury bills, which carried substantial 
real returns, have been a way of obtaining large rents for commercial 
banks as well as other economic interests, such as industrial capital and 
other rentiers (ICI 1993). In this respect, the crisis that dominated the 
economic field in 1994 is claimed to be the first of its kind experienced in 
Turkey, as it chiefly originated from the financial sector needless to 
mention the role of the state's fiscal and debt crisis as the starting point of 
the crisis which opted for "open positions" in their accounts by heavily,' 
borrowing in international financial markets and using such borrowing as 
a means of obtaining bills and bonds. The development that led to the 
crisis in the short term was the revision of the creditability rates of 
Turkey (by the watchdogs of the international financial capital such as the 
ER' and Standards and Poor), which implied that the financial sector 
needed the funds quickly (vvhich were converted into Turkish Lira (TL) 
valued bonds), as they were not going to be able to replace them with 
newer foreign funds. This rush for foreign exchange also had an 
important implication for the productive sector in the sense that credits 
extended to the latter were requested back before their maturity, and this 
with higher interest rates. This situation continued until the financial 
centres put their houses into order and/or after they obtained excess 
loanable funds with high interest rates. 
On the liberalisation front, on the other hand, it is to be noted that 
the 1980s witnessed frequently changing measures regarding trade policy. 
Generally speaking, it may be seen that nominal and effective protection 
of industry was increased, with the official proposition that the large 
dispersion of effective protection in the manufacturing industry may have 
been a source of strong political pressures, rent-seeking behaviour and 
lobbying (OECD 1991). More specifically, throughout the 1980s, export 
industries remained somewhat more protected than other industries. This 
refers us to the sig,nificant and increasingly -double-edg,ed- role extra- 
budgetary funds have come to play in this field. On the one hand, they 
have been mainly financed by protective levies on trade: and, on the 
other, they have been a source of various export incentives to firms. In 
this respect, in addition to an undervalued currency and protection of 
industry, major incentives such as export tax rebates (which led to 
fictitious exporting), preferential credits, foreign exchange allocations, 
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retained foreign exchange earnings and exemptions from corporate 
taxation, all signified the state's commitment to exporting and to exporters 
in the short run. 
One of the overriding characteristics of industry in Turkey through 
out the 1980s and in the first years of the 1990s was that the level of 
productive investment in the private sector fell by record percentages 
and could not even reach their level during the so-called crisis years of 
1977-80.1 The nature of exporting in the 1980s is also illustrative of the 
extent of structural change in the industry and of its "new" (and 
consciously implemented) mode of articulation with the world economy: 
i) the composition of exports remained discouraging, and the tremendous 
export performance achieved in the 1980s was simply based on labour- 
intensive, simple-technology (textiles and apparel, processed agricultural 
products. forestry, leather, etc.) products that have a low sophistication 
and poor quality character (OECD 1991): ii) the export boom of the 
1980s was largely supported by two factors: the provision of extensive 
export incentives and dispersion of effective protection, and the massive 
grovvth of Middle Eastern markets: and, iii) there was not (and there is 
still no indication of) a broadening of the industrial base related to 
exporting, and massive exports were largely based on existing capacit,3,7 
created before 1980 which was expanded through productivity increases. 
In this context, the important point is that the rapid increase in exports 
simply meant a massive transfer from the domestic markets to the world 
economy, and this mainly due to high incentives given to exporters. In 
other words, the export boom in the 1980s was not based on structural 
change and a broadening industrial base, but on existing capacity and 
transfers out of the economy (6ni§ 1993). 
Finally, it is nowadays widely acknowledged that financial reform 
has not brought about what it initially aimed for: First, the savings rate 
has not risen, indeed it has fallen, mainly as a result of the fact that 
private disposable income was mostly used for consumption to achieve the 
high, albeit unstable, growth rates during the 1980s. Furthermore, as 
already pinpointed by Akyaz (1990), the private savings rate, although 
possibly rising since 1984, has been no greater during recent years than in 
the late 1970s, even though real interest rates, financial savings and per 
1 Although there has been an increase in the total amount of private sector investment undertaken 
during the 1980s, the bulk of it took place in the housing sector. 
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capita income have been substantially greater. Here, too, the unstable 
growth rates imply that the high growing performance of the economy 
was not based on a broadening industrial base, but on the increased use of 
existing capacity, triggered by rising domestic and external demand. 
Second, although the primary objective of financial liberalisation was 
claimed to be to increase the resources available to the productive sector. 
the high public sector deficit led to a situation in which basic credits 
extended to the manufacturing sector declined in real terms between 1979 
and 1990. Despite the observation that the structural adjustment 
programme of the 1980s involved no major restructuring for industry 
(Wolff 1987), the economy lived through certain stages of financial 
liberalisation, which reached its highest stage after the legislative changes 
toward the full convertibility of TL. This issue became such a critical one 
during the early 1990s that the full convertibility decision and legislative 
changes in 1989 did bring about a situation which supported rent-seeking 
behaviour at the expense of productive investments. 
As one may easily predict, the consequence of such an economic 
environment on income distribution has been severe. In 1987 a research 
regarding the Personal Income (i.e. Size) Distribution depicted that since 
1973 a very unequal income distribution continued with the gap between 
the rich and poor slightly widening: the share in the National Income of 
the lowest 40% of the population declined even further to 11% from an 
already astonishing figure of 12.6%, whereas the richest 20% continued 
to enjoy 55% of the whole cake (DIE 1987; DPT 1976). Daily 
observations furthermore indicate that the economy of Turkey has been 
moving from -formal- to "informal- activities, where it is generally 
known that the labour's value added is underpaid, labour's insurance and 
retirement benefits are half-given, and working conditions are 
insufficient; yet the magnitude of informalisation, and its effects on 
income distribution, is hard to judge in the absence of any comprehensive 
study on Turkey (see Ozar, S. (1994a)). According to another research 
which has been undertaken on a Functional basis, the share of 
Agricultural Income and Wages continued to decline throughout the 
decade, while the share of NonAgricultural NonWage Income in the 
National Income was boosted to 57.6% by the end of the eighties whereas 
in 1979 it used to be 42.4%. If one looks for a comparison between 
Non-Agriculture Wage Incomes (as in agriculture of Turkey there is a 
widespread petty commodity production) and the Others (including 
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Agricultural and NonAgricultural NonWage Income), the share of 
Others in overall total arrived at a spectacular 69.67% at 1994, whereas 
in 1979 it was approximately 59% (Ozmucur 1994). 
3. 3. A Brief Description of the History of Relations betvveen 
State, Labour, and Business in Turkey 
To start with, it may be worthwhile to restate that the main objective and 
project of the Republic of Turkey was to climb the ladder of 
industrialisation as a means for national sovereignty. This perception on 
the part of the state implied the creation and, later, the sophistication of a 
group of industrialists who were (hopefully) supposed to start the 
industrialisation drive a discourse which was clearly stated by the 
leading cadres (especially by Mustafa Kemal himself) in the early days of 
the Republic (hveren, various issues). This attitude, which even 
continued during the étatist and the mixed economy,' periods, was 
nevertheless accompanied with a determined willingness on the part of the 
state to preserve its strong presence in the economy (Bugra 1994). 
In this context, the foundation and sophistication of capital 
groups,- with increasing interlocking between industrial, financial and 
commercial capital, was the major institutional development of the post- 
1960 period. In addition, the increasing participation of foreign capital, 
mainly in collaboration with these groups (though in different ways of 
partnership) in the manufacturing of a range of products predominantly 
for the internal market, brought a different dimension into the picture. 
The birth of employers' and workers' unions coincided with the 
historical development of industry of Turkey of the period mentioned 
above, and this ipso facto reflects the impact of the state on industrial 
relations. As noted above, the state, based on the principle of mixed 
economy, emerged not only as an organiser, supporter and regulator of 
economic activity, but also as an economic actor itself. Within this 
framework, the state decided to get involved in the employee-employer 
relationship, again within a westernised perception, by introducing 
levislative and constitutional clauses which would later initiate the 
establishment of workers' unions. This establishment was a -created or 
induced- one, in the sense that a major grassroots workers' movement vvas 
virtually absent at that time (Erdut 1992). In that regard, and after the 
introduction of the relevant clause in 1947, the Confederation of Turkish 
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Workers' Unions (CTWU) was the first confederation to be established in 
1952, on the basis of a principle of shop-floor union organisation. The 
Confederation of Turkish Employers' Union (CTEU), on the other hand, 
was formed in the early 1960s with a need to counter the workers' 
organisation. These confederations were later followed by the 
Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions (CRWU) and 
Confederation of Nationalist Workers' Unions (CNWU). The 1961 
constitution, prepared under the direct auspices of the military, made it 
clear that the state's role in industrial relations was crucial, in the sense of 
safeguarding the wide range of newly designed legislative and 
constitutional clauses that extended the basic rights of the working 
population. In this context, the workers and civil servants were given the 
opportunity to organise themselves into unions and to have the right to 
strike for basic rights as well as for wages. The 1971 pronunciamento, 
however, took a step back and limited certain rights for workers, 
removing the legal ground for the political organisation of civil servants. 
The crisis years (1977-80), on the other hand, emphasised an 
increasingly ideological side of the unions, paralleling the general political 
polarisation of the society along the lines of revolutionarism and 
nationalist-fascism. This was also the mechanism in which social strife in 
society in general was reflected in industrial enterprise, and, only in this 
context can one interpret the requests of the business community for 
economic and social stability and peace (TrSiAD, various issues). These 
years also led to fierce competition among unions, which in 1978 reached 
the number of 912, in obtaining high wage settlements as a way of gaining 
new members. The growing power of (especially leftist) unions in 
uniting workers behind their ideological tenets, and the ongoing social and 
political strife, however, would bring about a significant reflection on the 
industrial relations in Turkey in the coming decades. 
At the frontier of state-society-economy relations. the 1980s were 
also the years of restructuring. Indeed, during the 1980s, the working 
class suffered considerable welfare losses, as well as major setbacks in 
their basic rights, which are outlined in the 1982 constitution and related 
clauses of the law. To start with, looking in retrospect at the pre-1980 
events, the business community and military officials had a basic 
understanding regarding the restructuring of the socio-economic life of 
Turkey, and this was born in mind in the preparation of the 1982 
constitution. In parallel to the restriction of basic rights, strikes were 
44 
banned for some time, union organisation was rendered more difficult 
(many leading figures having been jailed anyway), unions' expenses and 
activities were monitored quite closely, and the organic relationship of 
unions with political parties were disallowed from the outset. At the same 
time, the military introduced a ban on worker layoffs in both public and 
private enterprises. Furthermore, during the years of the Motherland 
Party (1983-1991), such constitutional and legislative clauses were 
reinforced by the introduction of a basic martial code, under which a 
special police brigade was formed to tackle -unlawful" strikes and 
"unlawful activities" during strikes "unlawful- referring to the existence 
of strikes out of the economic reasoning, or for political and ideological 
reasons and even for basic rights (like safety at work). This meant a strict 
confinement of strike activity to wage bargaining in the case of 
disagreement between the parties, and this of course on an unequal 
footing,. 
With the industrial and social strife of the late 1970s in retrospect, 
it seemed that the industrialists put top priority in the post-1980 period on 
establishing "consensus and dialogue" with the workers' organisations. 
With the other rights of workers almost totally restricted, however, this 
meant a concentration on the wage issue and its linkage with worker 
productivity and/or inflation at the bargaining table. Interestingly, this 
move necessitated supporting a strategy of powerful unions and 
confederations, implying that the confederation open to dialogue, i.e. 
C.1-WU, was to be supported, while the -ideological- one, i.e. CRWU, 
outlawed. However, such strategies for removing the working class out of 
its historical-ideological context were not effective and a stage of 
consensus and confidence-building was not possible for most of the 1980s 
onwards, and, ipso facto. the late 1980s witnessed major workers' 
movements. Such a stage of consensus and confidence-building in the 
absence of democratic rights could become, however, a possibility after 
the recognition by the workers' unions of deindustrialisation as a potential 
threat. In this context, interestingly, during the last couple of years it is 
possible to witness, albeit not at a full-scale level, the interlocking of the 
long-term interests of the industrialists and workers' unions against the 
threat posed to industrial firms by the increasing domination of financial 
markets. 
Within this context, during the rule of the Motherland Party, the 
1980s brought a new understanding to the role of wage and labour 
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flexibility as a means of creating international competitiveness which still 
seems to be continuing. This was a clearly stated strategy of articulating 
the industry of Turkey into the world economy by means of utilising 
abundant and cheap labour resources. This also signified that Turkey 
would -open up" to international markets through its labour-intensive and 
simple-technology sectors, specifically textiles an issue which will be 
taken up later on. Up to this stage, however, it was reasonably clear that 
industry and the working population were quite complementary to each 
other within the context of a growing, inward-looking industry, with the 
latter's role being significant within the consumer-producer relationship 
for import-competing, not export-competing, products. 
The 1980s can also be categorised as a period in which attempts 
were made, with some success, to form a corporatist structure, with 
CTWU as the third party to economic policy making. This, however, 
does not mean that CTWU was consulted at all levels of decision-making 
or policy implementation via formal or informal mechanisms, but that it 
was a confederation which emphasised national unity. In this sense, it was 
kept from dissenting first by its General Secretary becoming Social 
Secretary for the state and later by its presence at the economic 
bargaining table after years of being banned from union activity and wage 
bargaining. It was only after 1986 that CTWU realised the degree of 
erosion not only in their basic rights but also in real vvages, when they 
then started raising their voices against this situation. However, the 
growing labour movement and the demands and achievements of real 
wage increases attracted a bitter response from employers in the form of 
large scale labour shedding in the post-1990 period. 
In relation to the field of industrial relations, the 1980s also 
witnessed the establishment of public employers' unions, which later 
became members of CTEU. For the state this meant a change of tactics in 
the field of wav,e settlements in the formation of a mechanism through 
which the state could effectively regulate the labour market at a 
decentralised and -de-politicised" level, with a facade behind which 
governmental (political) decisions could be hidden. In the public sector 
this mechanism was also utilised for spelling out the separation of workers 
and civil servants, and was executed in State Economic Enterprises 
through categorising large numbers of workers as civil servants, with the 
implication of constituting a barrier to union movement in that sector. 
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Within the context of industrialisation, and the relations between state, 
labour and business, the approach of each side to the issue of workers' 
participation at the workplace was quite indicative of the way industrial 
relations in Turkey developed and was influenced by the state. The state 
was again the initiator, at least discursively, of such a participation taking 
place in the industr-y with a view of the Western model in mind. Apart 
from some earlier moves in that regard which were of minor importance, 
as can best be exemplified with the decision, taken in mid-1960s, of 
including a -workers' representative" with no major power at all onto the 
board of directors of state economic enterprises, the successive Ecevit 
Governments of the late-1970s took the issue up and had a positive, and in 
many sense radical, attitude towards that issue. With its strong popular 
basis, the Ecevit team tried to implement a -democratic left" programme 
aiming at "self-management by the people-. At the beginning, the 
implementation of codetermination was promising, but later it became 
clear that this project was bound to be restricted to a limited number of 
public enterprises (Boratav 1991; Uca 1979). Although CTWU member 
unions were quite keen on pursuing the initiative even outside the public 
sector and volunteered to have a say in the running of the enterprises in 
which they worked, the response of the Cl'ELT was exclusionary from the 
outset. It seemed that the CTELT vas against any notion of participation 
with the fear that this might involve the decrease of authority and 
decision-making power within the enterprise (I§veren; informal 
interviews ) On the workers' side, CRWIJ with its strong devotion 
towards class struggle and a conflictual industrial relationship was also 
quite hostile towards any type of codetermination other than collective 
bargaining (Uca 1983; informal interviews). As the coalition 
governments of Ecevit came to an end, and especially after the coup d'état 
of 1980, the notion of codetermination evaporated from the discourse for 
over a decade (Boratav 1991; Bugra 1994; Uca 1979).2 The socio- 
political milieu of the 1970s. however turbulent it may have been, proved 
to be instrumental in motivating some academic research in that area. 
Below several studies undertaken during that era will briefly be 
considered. 
2 In passing, we should note that a legislation to advance workers' participation was prepared, but 
then subject to a veto of the Ecevit cabinet (see Serte! 1982), 
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Fisek's study (1977), in that regard, was based on a questionnaire 
conducted at 28 state economic enterprises, where the subjects were 
participatory organs in their hierarchical structures, with 149 managerial 
committee and board members including workers' representatives: the 
research was aimed to understand how the existing situation was 
considered and perceived by the population on hand and to work out the 
attitudes of this sample population towards codetermination. The results 
of the questionnaire indicated that the determination of wages, extra 
payments, hiring and firing procedures, were all perceived to be crucial 
as the areas of participation: workplace conditions, transfers and 
promotions, and discipline issues were found to be of secondary 
importance. Among the remaining decisions the least important of all was 
said to be the capital retrieval. The corollary of these results can be 
interpreted as that from codetermination the given population understood 
participation to be on issues relating to work and social conditions, that is 
to say, personal rather than economic issues. As for the relationship of 
causality between participation and efficiency, 38.41% of the population 
argued that there was no causality between these two concepts: 22.22% of 
the worker representatives were among the ones who denied this 
causality. Of the population. 27.54% held the belief that there were 
certain advantages of adopting codetermination for responding to new 
technologies, production methods, and so on. The belief in the qualities 
of codetermination regarding its consensus-inducing effects over 
conflictual capital-labour relationships, such as strikes and slowing down 
of work, was 25.36%. All of the worker representatives thought that 
participation was useful, whereas 31.53% of the rest of the population 
answered this question as 'not useful'. 
This very last issue was in line with the results of an earlier 
research, the one that had been undertaken by the Milli Prodiiktivite 
Merkezi (National Productivity Centre) (1970) in 19 public and private 
enterprises which employed more than 1000 workers. The questions 
were directed to the employer (manager or owner) of the firm and the 
union representative of the employees working in that firm. The research 
results indicated that while employees were ready for full and decisive 
participation, employers were opting for a gradual introduction of this 
procedure. Employers, while answering the questionnaire, were in 
complete agreement that if one wants to participate in decision making, 
s/he should take all the financial responsibilities of those decisions. Three 
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quarter of employers furthermore thought that it was too early to 
introduce such an issue into the agenda. while another two thirds of the 
same sample insisted that participation in decision-making should be a 
right that is related to the ownership of the firm. 
Dicle's study (1980) was based on an extensive survey of the 
country studies and a comprehensive outlining of different forms of 
codetermination implementations. I§ikli (1980), in his study, discussed 
the theoretical background of codetermination and self-management going 
back to Owen and Proudhon and undertook an extensive investigation of 
the Yugoslavian experience. Uca (1983), in the early eighties, made an 
attempt to understand the trade union attitudes toward codetermination. 
As already said, at that time most trade unions were indicated a negative 
attitude towards any forms of participation. 
Although the issue largely remained dormant during the 1980s, it was 
reintroduced when some business communities discovered the needs in 
implementing Quality Circles and Total Quality Management. The 
response of the leading unions' confederation (CTWU and CRWU) to the 
issue of Japanese style management and labour relations techniques, on the 
other hand, is quite revealing: both consider this as a façade through 
which the worker is led to believe that sithe is involved in taking decisions 
which affect the running of the enterprise, but, overall, what s/he is asked 
to do is to increase productivity and quality at a ve:ry micro-level. They 
also add that they are ready to welcome a worker's participation scheme 
at board level: however, although they say this (which is a move, at least 
for some, from their pro-1980s' standpoint), it _does not seem that they 
have taken the issue seriously (CTWU [TÜRKIS] Bulletin; CR-WU 
[DISKAR] Bulletin; Ozkaplan 1994; informal interviews). One should 
also recall the fact that, as briefly outlined above, the informal activities 
have assumed great importance in Turkey in terms of both the value- 
added produced and the number of workers employed. Needless to 
mention, if one cannot speak of the right of unionisation, of social 
security, of job guarantee, one can hardly mention the prospects of 
codetermination in that field. It might be the case that workers' unions 
may want to give emphasis on that line. 
Despite this, there are also some academic research flourishing in 
Turkey regarding the theory of such micro-level participative models. A 
leading figure, Kavrakoglu (1994a; 1994b), theorises the Total Quality 
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Management as an efficiency inducing, participative, innovative, and 
competitive form of organisational structure. In his book, Total Quality 
Management (1994b), he underlines that motivation has positive effects 
over the efficiency of the worker, and participation and responsibility are 
two of several motivation inducing elements. 
A very recent study by AKigil (1994) aims to reveal the impact of 
work-related beliefs over the expected outcome from participation. The 
scope of the study covers a total of 630 personnel of the largest 500 firms 
in Turkey. The personnel were classified into three main groups: high 
ranking managerial personnel (214), medium ranking managerial 
personnel (322), and finally blue collars (94). The study considers 
participation as a consequence of a certain belief system, or an ethical 
problem, rather than considering it as an efficiency-inducing 
organisational system. Therefore, the costs of participation are not 
considered as a part of the determinants of participation. According to 
the results of the survey, while medium ranking managers are willing to 
protect their status against any sort of organisational change, high ranking 
managers seem to be more humanistic and receptive towards 
participation, a fact which also revealed itself in the informal interviews 
we have conducted. Even more protective are the blue collars who only 
demand sincerity. This survey indicates a softening of the attitudes of the 
(at least the high ranking) employers, yet again one should be cautious 
that the sample only consists of the largest firms and, most probably, the 
more modernised section of the economy 
Having shed some light on the socio-economic history of Turkey and the 
industrial relations, we will now focus on the textile industry. 
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3. 4. The Role and Weight of the Textile Industry in the 
Economy of Turkey 
The textile industry (including the clothing industry) is the largest sector 
of the industry of Turkey in terms of production, employment and 
exports. Because its production capacity has reached a significantly high 
level and also it is a prime example of how to make a leap forward in 
foreign economic relations via exporting (with its experience with yarn 
exporting during the 1970s) it is regarded as the locomotive industry of 
overall industrialisation and exportation of Turkey. In 1992, its share 
was 36.6% of total exports (as opposed to 5.4% of total imports); in 1988, 
its contribution to the total value added in the manufacturing industry was 
14.2%; and, again in 1988, its share of employment stabilised at around 
17% of total manufacturing employment (with a parallel decline to that in 
the OECD area (OECD 1992)). 
The following gives a very brief history of the textile industry in 
the Republican era. After the initial establishment of Siimerbank in the 
early 1930s, private investment in textile mills and weaving emerged 
during the 1950s. Starting with the late 1960s and early 1970s, the sector 
lived through two stages of intensive investment in yarn production. By 
the mid-1970s, the sector's emphasis was moved to establishing large-scale 
weaving and knitting production units, as well as clothing factories. The 
crisis of the late 1970s, however, limited the extent of such investment 
expenditures, especially in the weaving, dyeing-finishing-processing and 
clothing areas, which then delayed the restructuring of the industry with 
an implication of a lack of focusing on the right product configuration 
vis-a-vis foreign markets (especially the EC market). The sector started 
the 1980s, after the foreign exchange crisis of the late 1970s, with 
favourable conditions, which were based on high state support. However, 
towards the end of the 1980s, direct subsidies were to come to an abrupt 
end, with the signing of the GATT Subsidy Code and with increasing 
pressure from the EU and USA. This was accompanied by a reversal of 
policies on the exchange rate in 1989 (as outlined above) and by 
increasing pressure on wages by the leading Workers" Union (CTWU). 
At the same time, however, the 1980s also presented the textile sector 
with the new problem of cotton. Cotton producers' cooperatives were 
obtaining foreign exchange by exporting their products; however, 
exporting came to mean that cotton was being imported for domestic 
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industrial use, and, of course, at prices above the price of exports. This 
implied the presence of a power structure against the textile chain, in 
which the (three) cotton producers' cooperatives had oligopolistic control 
over cotton. Another important point to mention is the fact that in 
Turkey energy costs for the industry were and still are well above the 
average of the OECD countries in the area. In this context, it may be true 
to conclude that, throughout the 1980s, although the textile chain enjoyed 
factor benefits such as receiving substantial subsidies and credits, 
coupled with limited wage costs and exchange rates it also faced 
problems in cotton, energy costs and undervalued foreign exchange rates 
(Yapr 1994). 
The factors summarised above (along with protectionist measures 
taken against exporters of Turkey by the EC) implied the orientation of 
the sector more towards the already accepted strategy of increasing the 
value added per item, which, at the end, dictated the move towards the 
clothing sector in the industi-y, which then seized domination of the 
sector. Within this sector, the strategy was again based on increasing the 
value added per item and collections and brand-creation (as price 
competitiveness was no longer possible on standard products vis-à-vis 
NICs) and on subcontracting (to by-pass the unionisation problem, and 
direct and indirect wage costs). Although the two objectives seemed at 
odds with each other, the implicit character of organisation between the 
main firm and subcontractors via a long-term relationship based on trust 
seems to have produced the much-needed quality standards. 
The issue of human rights, or, rather, the lack of them, seems to be 
the main factor behind the sector's survival strategy vis-à-vis increasing 
international competition. and domestic economic conjuncture and policy 
outcomes in the 1980s. This statement is valid to the extent of our 
understanding of the forms of production organisations in the sector, 
which can be categorised under 5 headings: i) firms working only on the 
basis of subcontractors, where design and preparatory and finishing 
processes are undertaken by the main firm, with quality control mainly 
left to the subcontractors' discretion: ii) firms both hav ing their 
production units as well as getting into subcontracting arrangements to 
create some sort of a -supply and labour flexibility-: iii) (very large) 
firms which decided to become smaller and create a subcontracting 
network, as a crisis, or survival, management strategy: iv) firms working 
only on the basis of their production units, for whom creating a brand 
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image and top quality production are the overriding concern; and, v) 
firms trying to develop their own networking organisation, by dictating 
and assisting the formation of a subcontractor production unit, a major 
characteristic of which is the limiting of the outlet channels of such units. 
On this basis, we can clearly state that the sector's dominant form of 
organisation is in the initial category, which approximately accounts for 
80% of all firms. In this sense, one can speak of a -human rights issue" in 
the sector, as non-unionised, uninsured, cheap or, flexible labour 
forming the basis of such organisations. Indeed, in the other categories as 
well, strategies toward subcontracting or getting an agreement with 
workers at firm level without the involvement of the union are stated to 
be a result of i) the lessons drawn from the late 1970s' environment of 
industrial and social strife. ii) the need to control direct and indirect wage 
payments, and iii) establishing a form of supply-flexibility and 
differentiation. However, whether this form of organisation would 
continue to be the dominant one in the near future is a question open to 
discussion. At this point, one has to account for the interplay of the two 
strategies of the sector: on the one hand, to increase the value added per 
item along with the quality of products and processes (to escape increasing 
competition on standard products and eliminate EU based protection on 
such products), and, on the other hand, to be prepared for a new era of 
protectionism in "Fortress Europe- of -social and environmental 
dumping- (an example of its encapsulation being the ISO 9000 quality 
standards) (TCNIA 1993). Here, the key notion is social dumping, as it is 
clear that the sector has established a strategy of using cheap labour, 
without much consideration for human rights, in order to be able to 
differentiate itself from its competitors (TCMA 1993). 
With the developments in the sphere of economy, especially trade 
liberalisation, the clothing sector managed to reach the stage of 
"globalisation- in terms of resourcing and marketing policies. 
Furthermore, it seems that, with its closeness to the much required 
foreign exchange, this sector did far better in creating the surplus and 
investing in technological modernisation (as well as other fields of foreign 
exchange earning activities, such as tourism) than the other sectors of the 
manufacturing industry, especially after the import liberalisation of 1990 
in preparation for the customs union with the EC. 
The sector's position in relation to state-labour-industry relations 
has always been in the forefront of industry of Turkey. Actually, the 
53 
sector, throughout the 1980s, obtained the lowest wage increases and 
initiated an approach towards establishing consensus on the bargaining 
table with workers' unions (4veren, various issues). Indeed, it is 
interesting to see that the leaders of the most important workers' and 
employers' unions confederations have actually been the leaders of the 
unions organised in the textile sector. These basic contextual advantages, 
however, were also accompanied by difficulties for the CTEU in keeping 
the members under the union rubric against the threat of subcontracting 
and, thus, "de-unionisation-. 
The sector's relations with state institutions have also been quite 
effective from the sector's point of view. The presence of a very active 
para-statal institution in the sector, the priority ascribed to the sector by 
the state as the prime example of "opening up,- and the existence of a 
ven' active and conscientious business organisation in the sector, have all 
created the conditions for an established relationship with the state. This 
relationship was not only confined to the joint preparation of five-year 
plans, organisation of trade fairs, or foreign business travels: it was also 
manifested within the common understanding of the production of cotton, 
in which the textile chain, and especially the clothing sector, was subject 
to pressures to bring the domestic price of cotton to the world price level 
as described above. 
This discussion ends our summary of the history of the industrialisation of 
Turkey within the context of her political and economic development and 
of industrial relations, as well as a brief account of the history and 
organisation of the textile industry of Turkey. 
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CHAPTER IV 




THE AIMS AND METHOD OF THE RESEARCH 
4.1. The Aims of the Research 
The aim of this study is to better understand the issue of codetermination, 
which has been discussed and applied in many countries over the past 5 
decades, in the textile context of Turkey. In that regard, it is hoped that 
such a study will shed light on the state of industry in Turkey for those 
who would like to consider codetermination as a plausible system. 
The study attempts to make it clear for the case of Turkey what is 
meant by participation, what values are attached to it, and what areas 
workers most wish to participate in. While doing so we also probe how 
such participation should proceed. 
Our second general aim is to investigate the relationship between 
participation and the workplace. It is believed that working in a State 
Factory as opposed to a Private Factory can alter individuals views on the 
values and possibilities of participation. The answers to these questions 
are of importance, as Turkey transforms its industrial base it will need to 
be accompanied by innovative managerial systems. 
Finally, our last aim in this study is to bring data to bare on the 
hypothesis that participation taken as an indicator of "predictive capacity" 
will allow the individual to cope better and control a changing and 
adaptation requiring world. With this enhanced coping skill, it is 
expected that participation will be inversely related to psychological 
symptoms. In other words, as individuals' positive attitudes toward 
participation increase then we would expect that individuals' level of 
psychological symptoms decrease. 
4.2. The Nlethod of the Research 
4.2.1. The Preparation of the Questionnaire and the Pilot 
Study 
Once the aim of the questionnaire was set as how to investigate the 
perceptions and attitudes of workers towards the idea of codetermination, 
we proceeded with the design of the questionnaire. To start with, two 
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major problems with the interview were foreseen: the workers' lack of 
experience regarding any sort of participation, bringing about the 
difficulty of explaining the concept itself, and the time needed to 
undertake such a lengthy questionnaire to be addressed to hundreds of 
subjects. 
The hypothetical nature of the questionnaire was an important 
problem in maintaining a dialogue with the individual-worker. Since the 
subjects had never (or very seldomly) experienced a participatory 
decision-making scheme, we thought that the questionnaire should begin 
with a clear definition of that term and its applicability areas. In that 
regard the need for a clear-cut description of the areas and forms of 
participation assumed great importance. After having decided the 14 
areas of participation (see Section 2.4.1.), with due consideration devoted 
to previous researches, several pilot studies were undertaken with a 
variety of employees in different firms and establishments, in order to 
finalise the best way to explain them to workers. 
In the first attempt, we put forward two different sets of questions 
in order to make a distinction between the types of participation (direct or 
through representatives) and the tension of the participation demands. 
For the latter, there was a scale ranging from no time to 60 minutes a 
week to be allocated for participation in each item of participation area 
(in the form of: 1) no time, 2) 15 min., 3) 30 min., 4) 45 min., 5) 60 
min.). The answer would indicate the intensity of the subjects willingness 
to participate in that area (time allocation denoting an opportunity cost). 
Yet, pilot studies showed that this method had certain abstraction 
problems. The subjects of the pilot studies were ver y eager to ovenralue 
their will for participation, and had a tendency to choose 60 or 45 
minutes (fifth and fourth items of the answer scale) for most of the 14 
participation areas. But after summing up these allocated times, one 
would come up with a sum of (approximately) ten hours a week allocated 
for codetermination activities. Each subject then realised that this 
aggregate time was rather too much, and therefore opted for a 
reconsideration of hisiher answers, demanding an extra amount of time. 
The other set of questions, which were aimed to clarify whether the 
participation would be undertaken directly or through representatives for 
each of the 14 items, also turned out to be time consuming. Given the 
lengthy nature of the questionnaire, therefore, a restructuring of the 
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questionnaire proved to be inevitable. Thus resulting with the first part 
of the questionnaire. 
The pilot studies made it clear that a couple of questions in the 
second part of the questionnaire were of an offending and culturally 
incompatible nature. We therefore either eliminated or reworded them, 
which made the questionnaire run smoothly and less lengthy. 
The final version of the questionnaire was given to the polling company 
"TRIO- who implemented data collection. There, the questionnaire was 
rearranged into a comprehensive pattern, making it convenient and easily 
implementable. The final version of the questionnaire along with its 
translation used in this research project can be seen in the Appendix B. 
4.2.2. Measurement Instruments 
The survey consists of four parts: namely, the areas of participation, 
attitudes and perceptions, psychological symptoms, and demographic 
information. Let us consider each of them in details. 
1. In the first part of the survey, workers were asked to place themselves 
in a hypothetical world, where they would be actively participating in the 
decision-making process. Although the areas of participation are 
numerous, we had already classified them under 14 headings (see Section 
2.4.1.). The objective is therefore to measure the workers' willingness to 
participate in those 14 areas. One method would be to ask each worker 
whether or not sihe wishes to participate in each area. The 14 items could 
then be ranked according to the summation of their participation votes. 
Yet this mechanism would not reveal the intensity of their choices. One 
solution to this, would be to ask people to indicate their intensities as well 
as the so-called "Borda- system entails. 
In the Borda system, items to be chosen are ranked, a number of 
points are given to each position on the scale, these points are added up, 
and then the candidate with the highest score is chosen. The Borda 
method is fine tuned, and the so-called -weighted-Borda" system provides 
an even further calibration. In that, a number of points are distributed 
before the voting takes place, and individuals are asked to allocate these 
points among the items as they see fit. This mechanism uses ranking 
information fully. 
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The -weighted-Borda" system was chosen in this research in 
determining the areas of participation. This would give us not only a 
high calibration of ranking information, but also be an easy and feasible 
questionnaire technique. It allovvs the voter to express the intensity of 
rankings on the one hand, and to express the same degree of preference if 
this were the case. To facilitate the implementation of the questionnaire, 
an icon-table (see the Appendix B), representing these 14 items, was 
prepared. With the icon-table, where the 14 areas of possible 
participation placed in front of the respondent, workers were asked to 
place a total of 20 poker chips in any number and in as many squares as 
they wished. After the chips had been arranged, the interviewer went 
back and asked the respondent for each square within which poker chips 
were placed if they wished to represent themselves personally for that 
area or if they wished that a representative do so on their behalf. This 
was repeated for each square which contained votes (poker chips). 
It should however be noted that such a voting procedure, as many 
others that rely in one way or another on information regarding 
individuals' preference ordering, is vulnerable to strategic-voting, where 
individuals may prefer not to reveal their genuine preferences. 
Furthermore, the second drawback of the Borda counting is the fact that 
the dropping of an option that was not in contention could make a 
difference to the result, which is known as the violation of the 
-independence of in-elevant alternative" (Mueller 1979). It was felt that 
in our survey these two drawbacks would not constitute a serious 
problem, as the probability of workers acting strategically to manipulate 
the outcome would be nil, and that the dropping of an option would not 
be the case. 
The reader should in passing be reminded that no procedure which 
adds up individuals" preference orderings and calls the result "social 
orderings- can satisfy a set of important requirements. Thus, any voting 
procedure will have some drawbacks (known as the -Arrow' s 
Impossibility Theorem."). 
To extract information regarding the amount of time the subjects 
were willing to allocate to codetermination activities a single question was 
used: "Now that you have chosen the areas that you want to participate, 
how many hours would you devote for codetermination in these areas per 
week?- 
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The second part of the survey deals with respondents" attitudes and 
perceptions towards codetermination. Questions were designed to 
understand workers' point of view regarding the rights to participate, the 
relationship between codetermination and social equality/productivity 
increase/workplace harmony, the implementation of a profit-sharing 
mechanism, the inclusion of a third party into the decision-making 
procedure, and the timing of the implementation of codetermination in 
Turkey. 
The third part of the survey aims to measure the psychological 
symptoms of individuals. Psychological symptoms were measured using 
the "Psychiatric Epidemiology Research Interview" (PERI, revised 
edition (1984)), with the permission of Bruce Dohrenwend from the 
Social Psychiatry Research Unit at Columbia University. This instrument 
has been previously used outside of the United States in Israel (Shrout et 
al. 1986) as a first-stage screening device administered by non clinicians. 
In the second stage, detailed diagnostic assessments were made by 
clinicians. Using only 7 of the 18 PERI scales 94% of the patients were 
correctly classified as psychiatric cases and 84% of the well community 
respondents were correctly classified as non cases (Shrout et al. 1986: 
318). 
When requirements such as quickness and ease of administration, 
and appropriateness for general population administration, are considered 
a relatively small number of instruments can be determined. Most of these 
instruments are descendants of the Psychosomatic Scale of the 
Neuropsychiatric Screening Adjunct developed by the U.S. Army during 
World War II (Star 1950 cf. Shrout 1986: 315). Two such prominent 
instruments are the 22-item instrument from the Midtown Study (Langner 
1962) and the Health Opinion Survey (HOS) developed by the Stirling 
County researchers (Macmillan 1957 cf. Shrout et al. 1986: 315). 
Acknowledging their brevity, reliability and applicability to the general 
population, Link and Dohrenwend (1980) and Seiler (1973) question their 
unidimensionality. With this in mind, Dohrenwend et al. (1980) felt that 
the general demoralisation dimension which these scales seemed to 
measure should be augmented with other scales specific to individual 
psychological disorders. The PERI fixed response, interview- 
administered questionnaire with 18 diverse scales of psychological 
disorder was developed in response (cf. Shrout 1986: 315). In developin,g 
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the item pool for the PERI they relied on previous research as well as 
adapting items from the MNIPI, the World Health Organization research 
on schizophrenia and the Robins' approach to measuring antisocial 
personality (Dohrenwend et al. 1980: 1230). Aiming to develop an 
instrument applicable to diverse social and cult-Ural backgrounds, they 
used Puerto Ricans, blacks and advantaged ethnic groups in their initial 
analysis (Dohrenwend et al. 1980: 1231). Initially starting with 33 item 
groupings, 25 survived their clinical and psychological scrutiny. They 
have shown that 25 (PERI) symptom scales are reliable in groups of 
different social and cultural backgrounds in the general population as well 
as isolating 8 of these 25 scales as measures of nonspecific distress and 
differentiated from the other 17 scales (Dohrenwend et al. 1980: 1234). 
How applicable is the PERI for research in Turkey? Are 
nonsological categories valid, and can the reliability ratings established in 
America be generalised to Turkey (a quasi-European, prominently 
Islamic State)? There is reason to believe that nonsological categories are 
universal, although how mental illness is perceived can vary with cultural 
differences influencing both its rate of prevalence as well as its 
institutional treatment. Varying methods of statistical collection present 
yet another problem. Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend (1974) agree, with 
caution, with the conclusion of Phillips and Drags (1971) that given the 
controversy, "[t]he majority of the field holds that diagnostic categories 
are universal in representation, though different in distribution" (Phillips 
and Dragus 1971: 469 cf. Dohrenwend and Dohrenwend 1974: 431), and 
add that -[w]herever psychiatric epidemiologists have attempted to 
conduct studies in non-Western societies marked by their own 
distinctively different traditions and a relative absence of modern 
technology, one of their main goals has been to see whether Western 
psychiatric classifications are applicable. We know of no instance in the 
'true' prevalence studies where investigators have attempted to use 
Western classifications in non-Western societies and felt them to be 
inapplicable- (p. 431). 
Although such questions are beyond the scope of this research, we 
have compared two sets of findings published by Dohrenwend et al. 
(1980) on the reliability of the PERI. In Table 1 below, Dohrenwend 
isolates a group of 11 scales that appear to be strongly inter-correlated 
relative to their reliabilities. Although scales are expected to measure 
common attributes, for scales to have classifying utility, they must also 
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capture something different. To the extent that this is not the case two 
scales measure the same thing, and the use of both contributes no 
additional information. In looking at the reliabilities of differences 
between pairs of scales in the Dohrenwend data, we see that the first 8 
scales are not often greater than .50, the acceptable level (Dohrenwend et 
al. 1980: 1232). 
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The re 'abilities in boldface are less than the acceptable level. 
Reprinted from Arch Gen Psychiatry- Vol. 37, Nov. 1980 with the permission 
of B. Dohrenwend. 
63 
1 Dread 
2 Anxiety .43 
3 Sadness .32 .15 
4 Helplessness 
Hopelessness 




.41 .27 .45 .34 
6 Percei ved 
Physical 
Health 
.46 .43 .51 .49 .29 
7 Poor 
Self esteem 
.42 .36 .40 .29 .29 .39 
8 Confused 
T hi nki ng 
.56 .51 .43 .49 .41 .51 .44 
9 Somatic 
Probl ems 
.56 .60 .49 .58 .33 .31 .45 .60 
10 Enervation .65 .65 .58 .63 .48 .45 .47 .45 .59 
11 Guilt .53 .50 .41 .35 .45 .56 .53 .50 .66 .66 
Table 1: Reliabilities of Difference Scores Between 11 PERI Scales based on 
Dohrenwend Data 
1 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 
The PERI symptoms scales used in this study are given below: 












Drinking Problems * 







Perceived Physical Health 




Suicidal (within last month)* 




* Not included in the analysis. 
* These sub-scales were not used in the global measure of psychological symptoms since 
it was found that over 95% of the females did not use alcohol and thus the questions were 
irrelevant for half our population. 
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Each sub-scale category was scored according to the PERI 
instructions. Individual response values were added and divided by the 
total number of items. For the purpose of this study, some items had to be 
removed due to a time restraint placed by the factory authorities. The 
sub-indexes drinking problems and drinking reasons were not included 
since 95% of the female population did not drink alcohol. Drinking or not 
drinking in the case of females is not a question of preference, but rather 
it is influenced by religious tradition and the gender specific stigma 
attached to drinking. Sexual problems were not asked due to the inability 
to match the gender of the respondent and interviewer. The nature of the 
workplace lacked privacy to some extent and it was felt better to drop 
those questions (and in addition pilot studies gave some clues along that 
line). 
4. Finally, workers were asked for demographic information such as age, 
education, experience, sex, birth place, and marital status. 
4.3. The Setting 
4.3.1. Siimerbank 
Stimer Holding Bakirkby Ready-Made Textile Production Corporation is 
a state-owned, export-oriented, competitive firm. The firm was 
established in 1850 as a privately owned textile plant. Later, during the 
étatist period of the young Republic of Turkey, it was nationalised and 
reorganised as a modern plant, undertaking every activity, from the 
production of fabrics to the tailoring of end-products. In 1986, it was 
once again modernised into an end-product industry, as the old fashioned 
and ecologically problematic technology had to be restructured. 
There are three main departments in the plant; Shirt production, 
Casual Wear production, and finally, Coat and Suit production. In 1994 
there were 1208 employees working in these three sections, of which 691 
were female. Over 1000 of the 1208 workers were married and 90% of 
them had more than tWO children. The firm's export figure for 1993 was 
approximately 8.000.000 Dollars. It is situated on a very valuable piece 
of property, in the heart of the city, along the coast of the Marmara Sea. 
Although the firm is being included in the "privatisation package," 
the workers of the plant are strictly against its privatisation. Through a 
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union report, several alternatives for privatisation are being proposed. 
The report argues that, a liquidation of redundant assets such as the I1OW 
dysfunctional hospital within the factory, the housing provided for only 
36 high-ranking employees and the Guesthouse which is located on a very 
valuable piece of property, along the seafront, would provide the revenue 
required to cover the deficits of the firm, accrued from expensive credit 
payments. Other alternatives include moving the plant to a less valuable 
site and selling off the valuable property on which the plant is now 
situated. Another alternative is the workers' proposal for retaining the 
ownership of the firm. 
4.3.2. Altinyildiz 
Altinyildiz began operations in a 14.000 sq. plant in Istanbul's Eytip 
district in 1952. The firm undertook its first exports of fabrics in 1959. 
In 1971 Altinyildiz moved into ready-made clothing industry with the 
Beytnen brand. In 1977, the factoi-y had moved from Eytip to Yenibosna 
where it is now situated. The factory in 1994 was employing 869 
workers. 
In 1994, Altinyildiz exported 11.5 million Dollars worth of goods. 
This export figure in 1994 accounts for about 25% of its total production 
of 4,900 thousand meters of cloth. The enterprise has a distinct character 
and is devoting the necessary,/ attention towards fashion trends. In other 
words, it is aiming to create a brand of its own, a niche in the highly 
competitive international markets. Hence, a great deal of attention is being 
given to design and styling. Furthermore, quality is another aspect of 
serious consideration for the Altinyildiz plant; their published material 
often contain rhetoric which echoes the discourse of TQM. 
4.4. Sampling 
In Siimerbank, 492 interviews were implemented, of these 480 complete 
responses were obtained and used in the study. Survey respondents were 
chosen randomly. Among this population only 7 of them were not 
members of the union. In Altinyildiz, 331 interviews were implemented, 
of these 323 complete responses were obtained and used in the study. 
Again the survey respondents were chosen randomly. Among this group 
30 were not member of the union. In Altinyildiz 39.3% (N=127) of the 
66 
group were women, whereas in Stimerbank the females constituted 51.6% 
(N=248). In Altinyildiz 75% were married and 23% single; the figures 
were similar for Stimerbank, where 84% were married and 14.5% single. 
The remaining small percentage were both divorced or widow. 
In Stimerbank there were only 16 workers (roughly 4%) who had 
been working in the plant for less than five years, whereas in Allinyildiz 
approximately 20% percent of the sample had been working in the plant 
for less than five years. The turnover rate at Allinyildiz appears to be 
higher than that of Stimerbank. Approximately 71% of the Stimerbank 
sample had been working in that plant for more than six and less than 8 
years, whereas for the same range in Altinyildiz there were only 103 
workers (i.e. 31.9%). On the other hand, 44% of the workers at 
Altinyildiz had been working for more than 9 years, whereas at 
Stimerbank only 25% of the workers had been working for more than 9 
years. 
Although, most of the parents of workers had at best managed to 
complete a primary school (for mothers 38.7% never attended, 8.2% 
could not finished, 49% finished; for fathers 19.3% never attended, 7% 
could not finished, 64.4% finished), workers themselves had at least 
finished primary school or did better (49.8% of the group completed 
primary school, whereas the remaining 46.7% did manage to go on 
further). 
Most of the workers were not natives of istanbul. A significant fact 
was that for Stimerbank approximately half of the group and for 
Altinyildiz approximately 40% of the group was originated from the 
Black Sea region. 
4.5. Procedure 
Interviewers set up stations in offices located in different parts of the 
factories. Foremen were requested to cooperate, by top managers, by 
randomly channeling workers to the offices a few at a time. The 
questionnaire was executed during lunch breaks and at the convenience of 
workers by the TRIO research company, with an interviewer contingency 
of 30 people. For each plant it took a week to complete the questionnaire. 
The duration of the questionnaire was around 30 minutes. In Allinyildiz 
there were three different lunch hours which facilitated the 
implementation of the questionnaire. It can easily be said that there was a 
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convenient and friendly environment for the successful implementation of 
the questionnaire in both plants. 
In Stimerbank people were more friendly, and the workplace was 
less disciplined. The manager-worker relations were in a paternalistic 
manner. On the other hand, in Altinyildiz, the manager-worker 
relationship appeared more universalistic and with a modernised 
detachment. People were less friendly and more concerned with the 
production process and more disciplined. The workplace in Altinyildiz 
was cleaner and tidier than the Stimerbank workplace. 
Each questionnaire was filled out by the interviewer on a pre-coded 
form. Respondents were given an iconic representation of the areas of 
participation and 20 poker chips which they placed as their votes for 
participation. After completion of the voting, they were asked to indicate 
which areas in which they had voted they would prefer to represent 
themselves personally or have a representative do so on their behalf. 
Next, various questions dealing with their attitudes and beliefs about 
participation and their psychological symptoms were probed. During 
each set of questions, a 6x10 card with large figures showing the possible 
responses were appropriately shown to the respondents along with he 







The idea of workers participation in industrial decision-making and 
management is new to Turkish society. In addition to this, the historical 
accumulation of Turkey's industrial infrastructure is fairly recent. If 
concerns such as efficiency, quality control, maximum utilisation of 
resources, come with long effort and time, then it may be that Turkey is 
on the threshold of fine-tuning its industrial relationships. Prior to this 
overdue transformation, this study holds claim to the importance of 
empirically investigating the issue of codetermination. It is held that a 
healthy transformation of Turkish industry will depend on a proper 
analysis of its human resource potential. This study is an attempt to begin 
such a task by investigating the current attitudes and beliefs that Turkish 
workers and managers hold toward the idea of participation. 
The major aims of this research and the results to be disclosed in 
this section can be summarised under three broad categories: namely, i) 
general attitudes and beliefs about participation, ii) the relationship 
between participation and factory ownership being private (Altinyildiz) 
compared to state ownership (Stimerbank), and iii) the relationship 
between the desire to participate and the level of psychological symptoms 
for the individual. 
Initially, under "general attitudes and beliefs about participation" 
we shall attempt to delineate the general aspects of participation as is seen 
by Turkish textile workers. This will include their views on who they 
feel has the right to participation, under what conditions participation 
should be granted, in which areas they are willing to take part in decision- 
making, which forms of participation the-y are preferring, and what they 
feel will be gained from workers participation in management. Second, 
while looking at the relationship between participation and factory 
ownership, we consider the importance of questions dealing with the 
privatisation of state industries. We seek to answer the question whether 
workers in a state owned textile factory are more or less conducive to 
seek participation rights when compared to those workers in a private 
textile factory of comparable size. Finally, we look at the relationship 
between the desire to participate and psychological symptoms. 
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Our major goal here is to bring data to bear on the hypothesis that 
individuals who have a need to actively establish control over their social 
environment will be better equipped to cope with stressful events, thus 
becoming less vulnerable to the detrimental effects of change which 
manifest in psychological symptoms. We assume then that those who are 
ready to actively participate rather than passively accept others' decisions 
will be less vulnerable to stress and thus have lower rates of psychological 
symptoms as a result, given the assumption that there is always enough 
stress. 
5.1. General Attitudes and Beliefs about Participation 
As we have stated, our aim here is to delineate the specific dimensions of 
participation for Turkish textile workers. Here, a set of questions on the 
attitudes and behavior towards codetermination was directed to employees 
of both firms. A sentence is read, and then the worker is asked to indicate 
how much s/he would be in agreement, by pointing out one of the five 
alternatives viz. (strongly agree) (agree) (neither agree nor disagree) 
(disagree) (strongly disagree), with that statement. 
The first set of questions deals with the issue of who has the right to 
take decisions in plant. The questions and the answers given to them by 
the workers of both enterprises are presented below (Table 1). 
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'T he right to manage a factory depends on the seniority level of the 
individual." 
strongly agree neither agree disagree strongly 
agree nor disairee disagree 
7.3% 53.8% 8.8% 25.4% 4.6% 
-Workers who participate in management should share in both cost and 
profit.- 
strongly agree neither agree disagree strongly 
agree nor disagree disagree 
9.5% 52.9% 13.7% 17.8% 6.1% 
The answers given to the first question [K. 34] clearly indicate that the 
majority of the workers (i.e. over 56.8%) do not agree with the statement 
that the rights to manage a factory belong only to the owner or those 
people whom they appoint. Workers in general feel that the right to 
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Table 1: Response percentages k) the statements indicated fiv textile workers 
in both privately and state owned factories (N= 803). 
The rights to manage a factory belong only to the owner or those people 
whom they appoint." 
strongly agree neither agree disagree strongly 
agree nor disagree disagree 
5.4% 29.7% 7.8% 44% 12.8% 
"Those working in a factory have the right to participate." 
strongly agree neither agree disagree strongly 
agree no disairee disagree 
18.6% 70.8% 5.6% 4.4% 0.4% 
'T he right to manage a factory depends on the individuals level of 
knowledge and skills.- 
strongly agree neither agree disagree stronglv 
agree nor disagree disagree 
12.3% 71.8% 5.5% 8.4% 1.9% 
manage is not reserved by ownership. Our second question [K. 35] deals 
vvith whether those working in a factory have the right to manage. The 
responses to this question are overwhelmingly positive, an outcome which 
echoes the first questions' answer. Over 90% agree that workers should 
have a right to participate merely due to the fact that they work in that 
factory. 
In the next question [K. 36], employees were asked to express their 
attitudes towards the statement that the level of knowledge and skill" 
should be taken as a criterion for the right to participate. 84% of the 
respondents agreed with the statement. "Seniority" as a right to 
participation [K. 37] was also agreed to, but only by 61% of the 
respondents. 
In general, then, an average 90% of the workers feel that it is their 
right to participate. Of the 3 factors which we probed as criteria for 
participation we found that the least important factor was seen as 
seniority. Merelv working in a factory appeared to be necessary and 
sufficient to oive the individual the rioht to participate. Workers in 
addition seem to be in agreement that seniority, although important, 
cannot be held as equally important as skill and knowledge. To the final 
question [K. 38] of this set, that workers who participate in management 
should share in both cost and profit, the respondents did not give strong 
support, which will be confirmed by the following question. 
Our next question [K. 39] was designed with the aim of getting an 
information by means of establishing a real situation in which the 
individual would have to make a personal choice. This choice it was 
assumed will reflect the individuals' desire to share in the consequences of 
participation. For participation to be lasting, positive efforts should be 
reciprocated. The question was: 
Table 2: Preference of workers of both privately and state owned firms 
regarding profit sharing (N=803). 
[K. 39] "Imagine that you are participating in management. You have a choice; 
you can either receive an average pay, or chose to receive a low wage 
+ a premium from profit. Which one would you chose?" 
Average Wage LOW Wage + Premium from Profit 
424 -(52.8) 379 (4-7.2%) 
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As can be seen above, the responses to this question are almost split half 
and half. There appears to be no serious preference to participate in a 
share of wages. This result may be a function of various underlying 
dimensions. One probable dimension is that individuals lack trust toward 
management. They may be suspicious about how such calculations will be 
made and how these profit shares are to be distributed. They may, on the 
other hand, believe that the factory will not profit, thus would prefer to 
get an average wage, feeling that the amount received from profit share 
would not compensate the low wage option. A third alternative may be 
that workers are in such a critical wage wise situation, in a "barely 
making do" sense, that they cannot afford to risk a higher return. In 
other words, the cost of the risk (i.e. a possible drop in wage levels) is 
seen as too high. 
Our next set of questions deals with what workers feel can be 
gained from a participatory scheme. The frequencies for these questions 
are given in Tables 3 and 4. 
Table 3: Response percentages to the statements indicated for textile workers 
in both privately and state owned factories (N= 803) 
[K. 401 `Imagine that local citizens are being affected by a factories 
production. Even if the local peoples demands fall contrary to your 
interests, these people should have a right to participate in decisions 




neither agree disagree strongly 
nor disagree disagree 
9.5% 13.8% 3.9% 
As can be seen, 72% of the workers feel that codetermination as in the 
case with the rights of locals to participate is a right which should be 
granted even if they may suffer from the consequences as individuals. 
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Table 4: Response percentages to the statements indicated for te.xtile workers 
in both privately and state owned factories (N= 803) 
[K. 41.] The participation of workers like me in management will increase the 
profitability of the factory." 
strongly agree neither agree disagree strongly 
agree nor disagree disagree 
16.9% 69.8% 8.7% 4.1% 0.4% 
[K. 42.] 'The participation of workers like me in management will increase 
social equality." 
strongly agree neither agree disagree stronglv 
agree nor disagree disairee 
19.8% 66.4% 9.1% 4.2% 0.5% 
[K. 43.] -The participation of workers like me in management will increase 
harmony in the workplace." 
strongly agree neither agree disagree strongly 
agree nor disagree disagree 
21.9% 67.6% 7.3% 2.9% 0.25% 
As for the benefits of participation, workers agree overall that a 
codetermined factory will be more profitable (87%), add to social 
equality (86%) and increase harmony at the workplace (89%). When 
workers were forced to rank order the three possible assets in terms of 
contribution the following order was revealed (Table 5). 
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Table 5: Rank order of the contributions that codetermination ntay have on 
Me workplace (N=803) 
N= 
Note: The number of workers that chose this category as having primary importance. 
Workers perceive "workplace harmony" as the most important 
contribution that a codetermined system will bring about. 
The next question deals with the timing of codetermination. It is 
possible that one would expect important contributions from an 
innovative managerial reform while at the same time feel that such a 
system was untimely given the present conditions. The below question [K. 
47] probes this possibility (Table 6). 
Table 6: Frequencies of choices made between 3 questions regarding the 
tinting of codetermination by workers (N= 803). 
N= 
The time for Turkish workers to join in management is overdue. 587 73 
It is the right time for Turkish workers to join in management. 178 
It is still early for Turkish workers to join in management. 38 5 
Note: Each respondent made one choice among the 3 alternative statements. 
Turkish Textile workers overwhelmingly feel that the time for workers to 
join in management is well overdue. 95% felt it was either overdue or 
just the right time, with only 5% feeling it is still early. Workers do 
appear to want to join in the management of the workplace. However, the 
alternative to different schemes of managerial participation are vast. For 
a participatory scheme to function properly it is important that the system 
be well defined and boundaries well drawn. Managerial systems left 
ambiguous with lax definitions of responsibility and authority may do 
more harm than good. 
Another area of interest for this study was what areas of management 
workers wish to participate in. To investigate this aspect, a simple 
method to probe various areas of possible participation was developed. 
As discussed earlier (section 4.2.2.) initially, in the first pilot study 14 
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Workplace Harmony 342 37 
Increase Profit 319 34 
Social Equality 252 27 
areas of possible participation were formulated, and to give participation 
a cost respondents were asked how much time they would send meeting 
for the particular area of participation. Time spent in meetings to solve 
various issues pertaining to the 14 areas of participation appeared to be a 
simple and obvious cost which could be used. Probing each area and 
asking respondents to allocate a specific amount of time they were willing 
to spend turned out to be inefficient. The process took too much time, 
and was difficult to understand. It became clear that many workers were 
not familiar with the idea of -meetings" in the sense that individuals meet 
and discuss a problem. A process that they were familiar with, however, 
was voting. It was thus decided to represent the 14 areas with icons, give 
each worker 20 poker chips and ask them to allocate their votes according 
to which areas they felt it was most important for them to participate in. 
As it turned out the process worked very quickly and efficiently. 
Below we see the total number of votes placed for the different 
areas by the workers (Table 7). 
Note that the total chips allocated is less than the total chips available, as some workers 
preferred not to use all of his/her 20 chips. 
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Table 7: Frequency of votes by respondents of both factories for possible 
areas of participation. 
N 
1. Education of workers 1224 10 
2. Disciplinary action and firing 876 7 
3. NeW investments for the factory 
(opening new sections, buying new machines) 720 6 
4. Working hours, overtime, hours per shift, 
holidays, total hours of work per week 1011 8 
5. Problems dealing with machinery that 
workers use 575 4 
6. What products should be produced 509 4 
7. Working environment and conditions 
(lig,hting,, noise control, air circulation) 1162 10 
8. Work assignments and departmental transfers 581 5 
9. Hiring procedures 562 4 
10. The assignment of foremen and group leaders 610 5 
11. Wage Levels and Wage Differentiation 2061 17 
12. Product pricing and marketing decisions 410 3 
13. Nursery, preschool, infirmary, transportation 
and food services 1142 9 
14. Decisions on vvhat type of technology to use 623 5 
The above scores represent the total amount of votes each of the 
participation categories received. As a matter of interest it was speculated 
that respondents would prefer to participate in areas that were more 
personal than those which were not. The above 14 categories were rank 
ordered by 4 judges in terms of how personal the items appeared to be. 
The interjudge reliability score was r=.87, thus the ranks were a priori 
accepted. These a priori ranks were then used to assess whether 
respondents were more apt to choose personal issues of participation (see 
Table 8). The Spearman Correlation Coefficient was significant for the 
rank orders at .78 (Z=2.84, N=803). The ranks are given below in Table 
8. 
Another aspect of concern to this study is how respondents may vaty upon 










11. The determination of wages 1 1 
2. Disciplinary action and firing, 
1. Education of workers 3 
6 
7. Working environment and conditions 
(lighting, noise control, air circulation) 4 3 
8. 1,Tork assignments and departmental transfers 5 10 
13. Nursery, preschool, infirmary, transportation 
and food services 6 4 
4. Working, hours, overtime, hours per shift, 
holidays, total hours of work per week 7 5 
10. The assignment of foremen and group leaders 8 9 
9. Hiring procedures 9 12 
5. Problems dealing, with machinery that 
1N-Porkers use 10 11 
3. New investments for the factory 
(opening, new section, buying new machines) 11 7 
14. Decisions on what type of technology to use 12 8 
12. Product pricing and marketing decisions 13 14 
6. What products should be produced 14 13 
Table 8: Rank orders for areas of participation based on an a priori ranking 
on a dimension personal vs non-personal, compared to a rank order 
based on the sum of the respondents votes for a willingness to 
participate in that area. 
themselves or have a representative do so on their behalf? Might this 
vary with the nature of the area of participation? 
The most obvious analysis is to look and examine whether the 
choices of participation correspond with an urge to participate and thus in 
association with a dimension of personal vs non-personal. This is 
presented below in Table 9. 
Table 9: Rank orders for areas of participation based on an a priori ranking 
on a dimension personal vs non-personal, compared to a rank order 
based on the sum of the respondents votes for a willingnes.s to 
participate in that area and a rank based on the frequency that 
respondents indicated that they wished to personally represent 
themselves in that area. 
Here we look at the three rank orders together. Comparing the 3 
samples with 14 cases, each using the Friedman nonparametric test, we 
have 8 tied groups giving us a Chir-Square of 4.536. The three dimensions 
do run significantly parallel. This indicates that Turkish workers prefer 














11. The determination of wages 1 1 1 
1. Disciplinary action and firing 1 . 6 5 
1. Education of workers 3 2 1 .
7. Working environment and conditions 
(lighting, noise control, air circulation) 4 3 3 
8. Work assignments and departmental transfers 5 10 10 
13. Nursery, preschool, infirmary, transportation 
and food senices 6 4 4 
4. Working hours, overtime, hours per shift, 
holidays, total hour of work per week 7 5 4 
10. The assignment of foremen and group leaders 8 9 7 
9. Hiring procedures 9 12 12 
5. Problems dealing with machinerly that 
workers use 10 11 9 
3. New investments for the factory 
(opening new sections, buying new machines) 11 7 6 
14. Decisions on what type of technologv to use.... 12 8 8 
12. Product pricing and marketing decisio-ns 13 14 13 
6. What products should be produced 14 13 11 
as choosing to represent themselves personally as opposed to a 
representative doing so on their behalf particularly in these areas. 
5.2. Participation and its Association to Workplace 
Our second set of general aims deals with participation and workplace. 
How does one's workplace affect his/her urge to participate? Does 
working for the state facilitate one's urge to take part in the management 
of the factory? Does the idea of an almost overwhelming body seen as the 
owner alienate one from the idea of participation? Is individuality 
trampled under the idea of State ownership? Or does the idea of State 
ownership foster feelings that the factory is to begin with common 
property thus more opportune to shared management? 
Often the meaning of working for the State in Turkey, intuitively 
speaking, translates into consistent and stable employment. On the other 
hand, one would expect that the private sector would represent the profit 
motive, risk and the possibility of quick mobility. As will be recalled, to 
[K. 39], which asked workers if they would prefer an average wage or a 
low wage + share of profit scheme, the respondents seemed to be split. 
Taking this as an indicator of participation, the analysis of the respondents 
in terms of workplace revealed the following results. As was mentioned, 
dimensions of trust and perceptions of how stable and profitable the firm 
will be, are impoitant factors. 
To help clarify some of these possibilities several demographic 
variables were initially controlled. Gender differences were one such 
variable which may give us clues to the nature of this relationship. Of the 
52.8 % who said they would prefer an average wage 51% were females 
and 49% were males. Of those who preferred low wage + share in profit 
41.6% were females and 58.3% were males. Gender differences and thus 
possible differences in risk taking do seem to be an important factor when 
it comes to preferring low wages + share in profit. 
In explaining variance to [K. 39], a multiple regression analysis 
shows us that Gender (B= 0.131, p= 0.0005) and place of occupation (B= 
0.13, p= 0.0004) are significantly associated (see Table 10) to whether an 
individual chooses average wage of a low wage and share in profit. Age, 
education, marital status, and seniority which were also statistically 


















No Residual Statistics Compute( 
Beta Coefficient Tabk 
Value: Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probab.: 
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% lower: 95% upper: 90% lower: 90% upper: Partial F. 
Note: The variables for education and seniority are positively coded so that higher scores 
indicate higher education and seniority. The remaining variables are coded as such; Gender 
(1=F, 2=M), Place of Occupation (1=Altimildrz, 2=Stimerbank), Marital Status (1=married, 
2=single, divorced, widow), Choice of Wage Type (1=average wage, 2=low wage + share of 
pTofia 
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Regression 6 5.814 .969 1.97 
Residual 796 194.305 .244 p=.0006 
Total 802 200.12 
1.068 
.131 .038 .131 3.47 .0005 
-.025 .02 -.058 1.265 .2062 
.13 .037 .127 3.546 .0004 
.013 .023 .02 .561 .5748 
.029 .048 .023 .601 .5477 
.006 
, 
.017 .016 .7115 
.057 .205 .069 .193 12.04 
-.063 .014 -.057 .007 1.6 
.058 .201 .069 .19 12.572 
-.032 .057 -.025 .05 .115 
-.065 .123 -.05 .108 .362 
-.028 .041 -.022 .035 .137 
Table 10: Regression model for GenderAge, Place of Occupation, 
Education, Marital Status, and Seniority regressed on Choice 
of Wage Type. (average wage= 1; low wage + share of 
profit=2) 
Multiple Regression Column 39 6 X Variables 
DF: R: R2: Adj. R2: Std. Err.: 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source DF: Sum Sq.: Mean Sq.: F- Test: 
1802 1.17 1.29 1.022 1.494 
The results show that the answer to this question is largely a function of 
trust. Gender as we suspected is significantly associated as well as the 
factory wherein one is employed. Males are more willing to participate 
in a low wage + share of profit wage structure. In addition, those 
employed at Stimerbank, a state owned factory, are also more inclined to 
participate in a low wage + share of profit scheme then those working at 
the privately-owned Altinyildiz factoy. Considering the factors, which 
such a choice may be a function of, we see that both risk and trust are 
empirically supported. It appears that those at Stimerbank either have 
more trust in management or believe that Stimerbank will be more 
profitable than Altinyildiz (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: Percentile comparison of workers who select normal pay over 


















This aspect will be reconsidered in our discussion section. In short, we 
should consider the meaning for individuals of working for the State. 
Concepts gain meaning in social context. The phrase "Devlet Giivencesi" 
(Government Security) has a meaning above and beyond what is 
understood in its translation for the Turkish people. The phrase is 
culturally loaded with what has come to be accepted by citizens over time 
about the security provided by working for the State, often referred to as 
"Devlet Baba" (Our Father State), to express an almost sense of 
omnipotent trust and security. The positive association between working 
for a State factory and inclination to prefer a wage scheme which includes 
low wages plus a share in profit should be considered under this light. As 
a measure of positive attitudes toward participation a participation index 
is designed'. In the following analysis, positive attitudes toward 
participation are taken as the dependent variable and the effect of 
workplace along with various control variables, are examined (Table 11). 
1 The index was devised by summing responses to questions 33, 34,35, 41-43, + 
47 coded to give smaller values for positive attitudes towards paricipation and then 

















No Residual Statistics Computed 
Beta Coefficient Table 
Std. Err.: Std. Value: t-Value: Probab.: 
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
Parameter 95% lower: 95% 90% lower: 90% upper: Partial F: 
upper: 
Note: The variables for education and seniority are positively coded so that higher scores 
indicate higher education and seniority. The remaining variables are coded as such; Gender 
(1=F, 2=M), Place of Occupation (1=Altinyildiz, 2=Siimerbank), Marital Status (1=married, 
2=single, divorced, widow), Choice of Wag. e Type (1 =average wage, 2=low wage + share of 
profit). 
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Regression 6 6.246 1.041 4.677 
Residual 796 177.19 .223 p=.0001 
Total 802 183.436 
2.589 
.045 .035 .047 1.28 .201 
.011 .018 .028 .616 .5384 
-.085 .036 -.089 2.364 .0183 
.012 .017 .031 .725 .4684 
-.032 .022 -.052 1.462 .1442 
-.137 .035 -.14 3.939 .0001 
-.024 .115 -.013 .104 1.637 
-.025 .047 -.019 .042 .379 
-.156 -.014 -.145 -.026 5.589 
-.021 .045 -.015 .039 .526 
-.074 .011 -.067 .004 2.137 
-.205 -.069 -.194 -.08 15.517 
Table 11: Regression analysis of variables Marital Status, Age, Gender, 
Seniority, Education and Place of Work regressed on the 
participatory index. 
Multiple Regression 1-1; PARTICIPATION INDEX 6 X Variables 
DF: R: R2: Adj. R2: Std. Err.: 
1802 1.185 1.034 1.027 1.472 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source DF: Sum Sq.: Alean Sq.: F- Test: 
As is very evident, the place where one works shows a very significant 
association with his/her level of positive attitudes toward participation ( B 
= -.137, p = .0001). The negative sign indicates that working for 
Stimerbank fosters positive attitudes for participation, since Stimerbank is 
coded 2 and positive values for participation are indicated by smaller 
numbers. Similarly, we see that Gender is also significantly associated, 
although not as strongly as place of work ( B = -.085, p= .018), but does 
represent another important variable that affects an individual 's attitudes 
towards participation. 
Interestingly, even with Gender being controlled and thus absorbing 
a great deal of variance, the place of work is a highly significant 
determinant of an urge to participation. Quite contrary to the idea that 
innovation will come from private industry workers, state-owned 
facilities have more positive views toward an innovative new managerial 
arrangement. The explanations for these findings can be complex and will 
need to be discussed in more detailed analysis which should include 
descriptive non-quantitative data. 
5.3. Relationship Between Participation and Psychological 
Symptoms 
An individual's willingness to grasp and have control over her/his 
workplace in this study, as will be recalled, represents a proxy for 
"predictive capacity" and thus is expected to be inversely associated with 
psychological symptoms. In Table 12 a regression model, which includes 
control variables of Gender, Age, Seniority, Place of Work, and 
Education along with a participation measure regressed on psychological 
symptoms, indicates that participation is not significantly associated with 
psychological symptoms. As would be expected gender is significantly 
associated to psychological symptoms (B = .1 p= .0001) and surprisingly 
















No Residual Statistics Compute 
Confidence Intervals and Partial F Table 
95% lower: 95% upper: 90% lower: 90% upper: Partial F: 
Note: The variables for education and seniority are positively coded so that higher scores 
indicate higher education and seniority. The remaining variables are coded as such; Gender 
(1-F, 2=M), Place of Occupation (1 =Altznyildiz, 2=Slimerbank), Marital Status (1=married, 
2=single, divorced, widow), Choice of Wage Type (1 =average wage, 2=low wage + share of 
profit 
The data indicate that females have significantly higher 
psychological symptoms scores than do male, and that workers working at 
Stimerbank have significantly higher levels of psychological symptoms 
than those workin2 at Altinyildiz. 
The reason why psychological symptoms are not associated with 
participation may be due to a lack of eventfulness within which to assess 
the affects of stress and herein the buffering factor expected of predictive 
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Regression 5 8.46 1.692 15.393 
Residual 797 87.603 .11 p=.0001 
Total 802 96.063 
3.643 
.01 .011 .034 .951 .3417 
-.153 .024 -.217 6.275 .0001 
-.015 .015 -.034 .998 .3187 
.1 .025 .144 4.003 .0001 
.036 .025 
_ 1.46 .1447 
-.011 .031 -.007 .028 .905 
-.201 -.105 -.193 -.113 39371 
-.045 .015 -.04 -.01 .995 
.051 .149 .0:.)9 .141 16.027 
-.013 .085 -.005 .077 2.131 
Table 12: Regression anal sis of variables Age, Place of work, Education, 
Gender and Participation regressed on the psychological 
synzptoms index. 
Multiple Regression PSY. SYM. INDEX 5 X Variables 
DF: R: R2: Adj. R2: Std. Err.: 
Analysis of Variance Table 
Source Sum Sq.: Mean Sq.: F- Test: 
1802 
1.297 1.088 1.082 1.332 
Beta Coefficient Table 
Value: Std. Err.: Std. Vahm: t-Value: Probab.: 
capacity. Another explanation may be that the shortened version of the 
PERI psychological symptoms scale may have lost its sensitiv ity, 
especially in situations where the level of change or stress on the 
individual is unknown. 
Another shortcoming may be with our measure of participation. 
Only one of the items in the measure probe participation semi-directly in 
a hypothetical case of allocating time. It may be that a behavioral rather 
than an attitudinal measure of participation may be required to understand 
the relationship between participation and psychological symptoms. More 
research on the data set may also reveal a more complex relationship 
which at present is non-apparent. 
In short, the results show that the variables of gender and 
workplace are strongly associated to an individuals' level of psychological 
symptoms, that workers feel it is time to participate and that they are 
more willing to participate in areas of management which have a more 
direct personal consequences on their lives. Their preference of the form 
of participation is direct, especially when the areas of participation deal 







The innovative transformation of managerial systems in the textile 
industry of Turkey, although in its rudimentary stages, is long awaited 
by workers. Looking at the idiosyncratic qualities of each country in this 
process is undoubtedly the most efficient way to proceed. The journey 
toward better products and a higher quality of life for those who 
produce them is a long one. This study hopes to have shed light on some 
of these issues, the consideration of which will hopefully ease such a 
transformation. 
In light of the empirical findings, it is easy to say that the textile 
workers of Turkey from both a state-owned plant and a private plant are 
very anxious to participate in managerial decision making. A large 
majority of workers feel that it is their right to participate and that this 
right grows out of the mere fact that they work at the factory. They 
however also agree to the importance of knowledge and experience in 
the validation of a right to participate. Regardless of the seniority of a 
worker, they feel that participation should be granted in some form or 
another to all those who are affected by the consequences of the 
production process. This they claim should be the rule even if their 
personal interests are at jeopardy. 
One problem with asking questions with socially prescribed 
answers is that often one receives as results not the empirical truth but 
the socially most acceptable. There is little that researchers can do to 
avoid a social response bias since the nature of our world by constitution 
is socially constructed. What is important to realize is that the results 
should be taken within the social context validating it. 
The utilisation of participatory management will only move along 
as workers and managers can conceptualise the value of such a system. 
Information gathered from workers indicates that the most valuable 
aspect of worker participation will be in promoting workplace harmony. 
When one considers the expenses associated vvith high turnover rates in 
an age where skill and information play a dominant role, then work- 
place harmony becomes an important asset. 
Interestingly, informal interviews with top management and 
government officials indicate that workplace harmony and the 
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articulation of employees' knowledge are the most important benefits to 
be reaped from a codetermined workplace. 
HOW ready is the textile industry of Turkey to share in 
management? Looking at the information revealed from the two 
factories we see that workers are ready to allocate unpaid time to 
participate in managerial decision making. 40% of the workers claimed 
that they would allocate 1-2 hours a month of unpaid time, 24% 3-4 
hours, 15% 5-6 hours, 8% 7-8 and finally 12% 9-10 hours. As will be 
noticed, the figures indicate that there is an extreme group which is 
willing to allocate 9-10 hours of unpaid time a month to participate. 
How realistic are these figures and for how long would such unpaid 
participation persist given that no immediate rewards were gained from 
this participation other than perhaps workplace harmony? 
Although we have no way of empirically answering this question, 
the experiences of other countries indicate that when participation goes 
without a share in profit, participation dwindles. On the other hand, as 
we have discussed in Chapter II, when profit sharing schemes are 
introduced economic inefficiencies are to be expected. Optimal solutions 
appear to be culturally mandated and transient. In Japan, being honored, 
may serve as a higher reward than one could attain from material gifts, 
where and at present. Turkish workers may be satisfied with workplace 
harmony but at a latter date such attitudes may change. 
As will be recalled, in Figure 1 in the Results Chapter, only half 
of the workers were willing to participate in a low wage + share of 
profit as opposed to a normal wage. What was more interesting was that 
when the data was looked at by factory those at Siimerbank were more 
ready to take a low wage + share in profit option. As was discussed, the 
factors involved are various and complicated. When concepts such as 
trust and expectations enter into the formula one has to be very cautious 
about making generalizations. An additional piece of information which 
needs to be considered in attempting to explain these results is that 
Stimerbank was considered for privatization shortly before our research 
was conducted. Workers may have interpreted our research as part of a 
larger scheme to asses the feasibility of selling the factory shares to the 
workers, an offer which the union leaders mentioned they had made. In 
such a case they may have felt that it would be in their interest to answer 
questions toward participation in a positive manner. 
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Looking at t-Test scores for the sie,nificance in differences in the 
mean of the participation measures, we see that Siimerbank workers 
scored significantly (p=.0017, t= -3.163) more positive in their 
willingness to participate when compared to the mean of the whole 
sample. Likewise, those workers at Altinyildiz scored significantly 
lower then the population mean (sig. at a p= .0001 level, t= 4.397) on 
the participation measure. These findings can be interpreted as either 
supporting a conspiracy theory of workers at Siimerbank on the verge 
of privatization or as a genuine facilitation of state ownership toward 
participation. 
Another valuable finding of the study was the preference of 
personal areas of participation in the workplace. As will be recalled, 14 
areas of possible participation were isolated and represented on an 
iconic-table for respondents who placed poker chips in various squares 
representing their choice of participation areas. These areas were then 
rated along a dimension of personal to non-personal. The results showed 
that respondents preferred to allocate participation votes in areas of 
personal concern. The less personal the subject of participation the less 
attention it received. 
Considering the cost of participation for both the worker and 
management it is important to devise an optimal balance where workers 
receive fulfillment from paiticipation and the production unit is not 
bogged down by cumbersome decision making processes. Furthermore, 
it was revealed that workers prefer to represent themselves more so on 
issues which are of importance to them personally and leave non- 
personal areas of participation to representatives. This information, it is 
felt, will aid in our endeavor to optimise participation. 
Our final discussion deals with the results that psychological 
symptoms were not seen as associated to positive attitudes toward 
participation. Furthermore, what little association there was, appeared in 
the opposite direction as was hypothesized, such that higher levels of 
psychological symptoms were associated with lc-)w levels of desire to 
participate. 
There are various explanations for these findings. First, it may be 
that an urge to participate reflects an individuals' present level of stress 
with the workplace. As was mentioned shortly before, the study the 
Stimerbank factory was put up for privatization. The workers appeared 
to be concerned about the future of their jobs. It could be that those 
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most concerned about their future were those who were most likely to 
express a strong degree of positive attitude toward having a say so in 
what appeared to transpire outside of their governance. 
One way that such a claim could be controlled for, would be to 
separate the data set by factory. If workers at Stimerbank are 
experiencing high levels of stress due to the possibility of losing their 
jobs their psychological symptoms scores should be higher than that of 
the total sample. Looking at t-Test for differences in the mean 
psychological symptoms scores of workers at Stimerbank, we see that 
their scores are significantly higher than those of the total sample 
(n=490, t= -4.629, sig. at a p=.0001 level). This highly significant 
finding is matched on the other end by workers at the Altinyildiz 
factory, whose psychological symptoms scores are significantly lower 
than those of the sample mean (n=323, t= 5.476, sig. at a p= .0001 
level). 
This supports the possibility that an important probable life event, 
the lose of job through privatization wherein the work force would 
expectedly be drastically reduced, may have increased the psychological 
symptoms levels of the workers at Siimerbank. The nature of the life 
event being that of privatization with the possibility of selling or turning 
over shares to workers, workers may have thought the mission of the 
research was to establish those workers who might be fit to hold shares, 
thus giving an association between desire to participate and 
psychological symptoms. 
Another possibility is that either our participation measure is 
measuring something else or our psychological symptoms measure is not 
a valid measure. One clue to the validity to the measure of our 
psychological symptoms index is that the level of psychological 
symptoms for females is significantly higher as in other research (e.g., 
Mandalinci 1995). This indicates that the measure is reliably performing 
when compared to other research in Turkey. 
Looking further into our measure of participation, as will be 
recalled, the areas of participation were divided along a dimension of 
personal to non-personal. Here participation is represented not by 
attitudinal questions but rather the area of participation. Will the area of 
participation which one was most frequently to desire on a dimension of 
personal to non-personal reveal an association with psychologic-al 
symptoms? After controlling for various demographic variable the 
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analysis shows that a choice to participate in more personal areas is 
associated with psychological symptoms. The more one participates in 
personal areas the more likely he/she is to have more psychological 
symptoms. The findings are similar to the other participation measure. 
The total personal measure was developed by adding the number of 
votes that the individual allocated to the a priori chosen 4 personal areas. 
This is further support that the psychological symptom scale is 
reliable. Further analysis of this data set is needed to bring more clarity 
to the present results. The findings are important in that they reflect 
how a historical event may have enough impact to disturb the 
psychological well-being of such a large group of people. Participation 
hence may be valuable as an effort to buffer the results of any major 
event. Respondents' efforts to seek opportunities to participate may have 
ran simultaneously to the ill effects of the major event. Thus giving us a 






Adaman, F. and M. R. Sertel, 1995. The Changing Economic Role of the State from a 
Turkish Perspective,- Mimeo. 
Adaman, F. and P. Devine, 1994. "Rethinking Socialism," Studies in Political 
Sciences. 
Adaman, F., 1993. "A Critical Evaluation of the Economic Calculation Debate with 
Special Reference to Maurice Dobbss Contribution,- unpublished PhD thesis, 
Manchester University. 
Adamson, Walter L., 1990. "Economic Democracy and the Expediency of Worker 
Participation,- Political Studies. 
Awigil, S. F., 1994. 'fiirk endiistri firmalarinda katilimla ilgili beklentiler: 4 ile 
inançlann etkisi," METU Studies in Development. 
Akder, H., H. Olgun, S. Togan, 1987. Report on Developments in External Econotnic 
relations of Turkey, Ankara: TURKTRADE Research Centre. 
Akyiiz, Y., 1990. "Financial System and Policies in Turkey in the 1980s,- in The 
Political Econonty of Turkey: Debt, Adjustment and Sustainability, eds., T. Aricanli 
and D. Rodrik, London: Macmillan. 
Allen, C.S., 1990. -Trade Unions, Worker Participation and Flexibility," Comparative 
Politics. 
Aoki, M., 1984. The Cooperative Game Theory of the Firm, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Aoki, M., 1990. "A New Paradigm of Work Organisation and Co-ordination? Lessons 
from Japanese Experience,- mimeo. 
Badham. R. and J. Mathews, 1989. The NeW Production Systems Debate,- Labour 
and Indu.stg. 
Bahro, R., 1978. The Alternative in Eastern Europe, London: New Left Books. 
95 
Barber, B. and R. Towers, 1989. "'Worker Participation' in the United States: A 
Preliminary Analysis of Quality of Work Life Prog,rams," in The State, Trade Unions 
and Self-Management. Issues of Contpetence and Control., eds., G. Sze11; P. Blyton 
and C. Comforth, Berlin/Nov York: de Gruyter. 
Barlett, W and M. Uvalic, 1985. 'Bibliography on Labour Managed Firms and 
Employee Participation," European Institute 'Working Paper. 
Baysan, T. and C. Blitzer, 1990. Turkey's Trade Liberalisation in the 1980s and 
Prospects for its Sustainability," in The Political Economy of Turkey: Debt, 
Adjustment and Sustainability, eds., T. Ancanli and D. Rodrik, London: Macmillan. 
Blumberg, P., 1968. Industrial Democracy: The Sociology of Participation, New 
York: Schocken Books Ltd. 
Bonin, J. and L. Putterman, 1987. Economics of Cooperation and the Labor- 
Managed Economy, New York: Harwood. 
Boratav, K., 1991. 1980 'li Yillarda Tiirkiye'de Sosyal Sintflar ve Bijlii,sfun, Istanbul: 
Geryek Yayinevi. 
Borzeix, A. and D. Linhart, 1989. 'Participation: A French Perspective," in 
International Handbook of Participation in Organizational Democracy, eds., C.J. 
Lammers and G. Szell et al., London: Oxford University Press. 
Briefs, U., 1989. "Co-Determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: An Appraisal 
of a Secular Experience," in The State, Trade Unions and Self-Management. Issues of 
Competence and Control., eds., G. Szell, P. Blyton and C. Comforth, Berlin/New York: 
de Gruyter. 
Brundtland, G. H., 1989. "The Scandinavian Challenge: Strategies for Work and 
Learning," in International Handbook of Participation in Organizational 
Democracy, eds., CI Lammers and G. Szell et al., London: Oxford University Press. 
Bullock, 1977. Report of the Committee of Enquiry on Industrial Democracy, 
London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office. 
96 
Bugra, A., 1994. State and Business in Modern Turkey; A Comparative Study, New 
York: State University: of New York Press. 
Cable, J. R. and F. R. FitzRoy, 1980. "Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee 
Participation: Some Preliminary Results for West Germany,"Kyklos. 
Cole, G.D.H., 1920. Guild Socialism Restated, London: Parsons. 
Cole, G.D.H., 1938. The Machinery of Socialist Planning, London: Hogarth Press. 
Cole, G.D.H., 1950. Socialist Economics, London: Gollancz. 
Dahl, R., 1985. A Preface to Economic Democracy, Oxford: Polity Press. 
Deming, W., 1986. Out of the Crisis, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Devine, P., 1988. Democracy and Econontic Planning, Cambridge: Polity. 
Devine, P., 1992. "Book ReVieW of The Political Economy of Participatory 
Economics by Michael Albert and Robin Hahnel," Manchester School of Economic 
and Social Studies. 
Dicle, A., 1980. Endlistriyel Demokrasi ve Ybnetime Katilma, Ankara: Orta Dogu 
Teknik Cniversitesi. 
DIE, 1987. Heine Halkt Gelir ve Tliketim Harcamalart Anketi, Ankara: DIE Yayinlan. 
Dohrenwend, B.S. and B.P. Dohrenwend, eds., 1974. Stress:fill Life Events: Their 
Nature and Effects. New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
Dohrenwend, B.P., P.E. Shrout, G. Egri and F.S. Mendelsohn, 1980. "Nonspecific 
Psychological Distress and Other Dimensions of Psychopathology," Archives of 
General Psychiatry. 
Domar, E., 1966. "The Soviet Collective Farm as a Producer Cooperative," American 
Economic Review. 
Dore, R., 1983. -Goodwill and Spirit of Market Capitalism, Journal of Sociology. 
97 
DOW, G., 1986. "Control RiE,,hts, Competitive Markets, and the Labor Management 
Debate," Journal of Comparative Economics. 
DPT, 1976. Gelir Daplintt 1973, Ankara: DPT Yaymlarr. 
Drze, J., 1989. Labour Management, Contracts and Capital Markets, Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell. 
DISK-AR, MonMly Bulletin, Various Issues. 
Elden, M.J., 1981. "Political Efficacy at 'Work: The Connection Between More 
Autonomous Forms of 'Workplace Organization and a More Participtory Politics," 
Anterican Political Science Review. 
Fama, E., 1977. Foundations of Finance: Porolio Decisions and Securities Prices, 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
Fans, R.E. and H.W. Dunham, 1939. Mental Disorder in Urban Areas, Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Fehr, E., 1992. "Labour-Management," in International Handbook of Co-operative 
Organizations, ed., E. Duelfer. Goettingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht. 
FitzRoy, F. R. and K. Kraft, 1993. "Economic Effects of Codetermination, - 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 
Furubotn, E.G., 1976. The Long-run _Analysis of the Labor-Managed Firm: An 
_Alternative Interpretation," American Economic Review. 
Gorz, A., 1982. Farewell to the %Forking Class, London: Pluto Press. 
Greenberg, E.S., 1986. Ilibrkplace Democracy, Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
Greig, A.W., 1992. "Rhetoric and Reality in the Clothing Industry -The Case of Post- 
Fordism," Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology. 
98 
Hansmann, H., 1990. --When Does 'Worker Ownership Work? ESOPs, Lavv Firms, 
Codetermination, and Economic Democracy," The Yale Law Journal. 
Hayek, F. A. von, 1945/1949. "The Uses of Knowledge in Society,' In Individualism 
and Economic Order. London: Routledge. 
Held, D., 1987. New Forms of Democracy, Oxford: Polity Press. 
Heller, F. A., 1992. "Competence," in Concise Encyclopedia of Participafion and 
Co-Management, ed., G. Szell. Berlin, New York: de Gruyter. 
Hill, S, 1991. "Why Quality Circles Failed But Total Quality Management Mip.,ht 
Succeed," British Journal of Industrial Relations. 
Hodgson, G., 1984. The Democratic Economy, Middlesex: Penguin Books. 
Hollingshead, A.B. and F.C. Redlich, 1958. Social Class and Mental Illness, New 
York: Wiley. 
Holmes, T. H. and M. Masuda, 1974. "Life Change and Illness Susceptibility," in 
Stressfiil Life Events: Their Nature and Effects, eds., B.S. Dohrenvvend and B.P. 
Dohrenwend, New York: John Wiley and Sons. 
ICI, 1983-1993. Istanbul Chamber of Industry 500 Largest Establishments, Istanbul: 
ISO Yayinlan 
Industrial Democracy in Europe, International Research Group, 1993. Industrial 
Democracy in Europe revisited, Oxford; New York. 
Ishikawa, K., 1985. What is Total Ouality Control? Japanese Way, Englevvood Cliffs, 
NJ.: Prentice-Hall. 
isveren, Monthly Bulletin, Various Issues. 
Juran, J., 1988. Juran on Planning for ()wilily, New York: Free Press. 
Kavrakog,lu, I., 1994a. "Toplam Kalite YOnetimi ve Ki§isel Bir Yorum,"Górks. 
99 
Kavrakoglu, L, 1994b. Toplam Kalite YOnetimi, Istanbul: Kalder Yayinlan. 
Keane, J., 1988. Democracy and Civil Society, London: Verso. 
Kleindorfer, P. R. and M.R. Serte!, 1993. 'The Economics of Worker's Enterprises," in 
Public Policy and Econoniic Organization, ed., D. B6s, London: McMillan. 
Lawler, E. and S. Mohrman, 1985. "Quality circles after the fad," Harvard Business 
Review. 
Looise, J. C., 1989. "The Recent Growth in Employees' Representation in the 
Netherlands: Defying the Times?" in International Handbook of Participation in 
Organizational Democracy, eds., C.J. Lammers and G. Sze11 et al., London: Oxford 
University Press. 
Macpherson, C. P., 1973. Democratic Theory: Essays in Retrieval, Oxford: Clarendon. 
Mandalinci, S., 1995. "Class Differences in Vulnerability to Stress: Exploring "Stress 
Loops" and "Predictive Capacity" as Mediating Variables," Unpublished PhD Thesis, 
Princeton University. 
Marsh, R. M., 1992. "The Difference between Participation and Power in Japanese 
Factories," Industrial and Labor Relations Review. 
Mathews, J., 1989a. Tools of Change: New Technology and Democratisation of 
Work, Sydney: Pluto Press. 
Mathews, J., 1989b. Age of Democracy: The Politics of Post-Fordism, Melbourne: 
Oxford University Press. 
Mead, G. H., 1934./1962. Hind, Self, and Society, Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press. 
Morishima, M., C. Drover and D. Williams, 1982. Illy Has Japan 'Succeeded'? 
Western Technology and Japanese Ethos, Cambridge: Cambrigde University Press. 
Mueller, C... D., 1979. Public Choice, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
100 
Neal, A. C., 1987. "Co-determination in the Federal Republic of Germany: An External 
Perspective from the United Kingdom," British Journal of Industrial Relations. 
Nielsen, K., 1991. "Towards a Flexible Future- Theories and Politics," in The Politics 
of Flexibilty, eds., B. Jessop et al., Aidershot: Edward Elgar. 
Nuti, D.M., 1987. "Codetermination and Profit-sharing," in Pulgrave Dictionary. 
OECD, 1991. Turkey 1990, Paris. 
OECD, 1992. Industrial Policy in OECD Countries: Annual Review 1992, Paris. 
Oni§, Ziya, 1993. The Dynamics of Export-Oriented Growth in a Second Generation 
MC: Perspectives on the Turkish Case, 1980-1990," New Perspectives on Turkey. 
Ózar, .5., 1994a. "Alibeyldiy Enformal Kesim Hanehalki Ón Ara§tirmasi (A Pilot Survey 
on the Informal Sector of Alibeykiiy District)," Research Paper, Bogazici University. 
Ózkaplan, N., 1994. Sendikalar ve Ekonomik Etkileri (Tiirkiye üzerine Bir Deneme), 
Istanbul: Kav ram Y 
Ozmucur, S., 1991. Yeni Milli Gelir Serisi ve Gelirin Fonksiyonel Dagilimi Gegici 
Tahminleri, 1968-1994, Research Paper, Boffazifi University. 
Pateman, C., 1970. Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Piore, R. and C. Sabel, 1984. The Second Industrial Divide, New York: Basic Books. 
Qvale, T. U., 1989. "A New Milestone in the Development of Industrial Democracy in 
Norway?," in International Handbook of Participation in Organizational 
Democracy, eds., C.J. Lammers and G. Szell et al., London: Oxford University Press. 
Roca, S. and D. Retour, 1981. "Participation in Enterprise Management: Bogged 
Down Concepts," Econotnic and Industrial Dentocracy. 
Roobeek, A., 1987. "The Crisis of Fordism and the Rise of a New Technological 
Paradigm,- Futures. 
101 
Sartori, T., 1987. The Theory of Democracy Revisited, NeW Jersey: Chathome House. 
Schuller, T., 1985. Democracy at 14..'ork, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Shrout, RE., B.P. Dohrenwend and I. Levav, 1986. -A Discriminant Rule for Screening 
Cases of Diverse Diagnostic Types: Preliminary Results.-Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology. 
Selye, H., 195611978. The Stress of Life, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Serte!, M.R., 1982. Workers and Incentives, Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
Serte!, M.R., 1987. "Workers' Enterprises Are Not Perverse," European Economic 
Review. 
Srole, L., T. S. Langner, S. T. Michael, M. K. Opler and T. A. C. Rennie, 1962. Mental 
Health in the Aktropolis, the Midtown Alanhattan Shay, New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Steinherr, A., 1977. "On the efficiency of profit sharing and labour participation in 
management,- The Bell Journal of Economics. 
Strauss, G., 1989. "Workers' Participation and US Collective Bargaining," in 
International Handbook of Participation in Organizational Democracy, eds., C.J. 
Lammers and G. Szell et al., London: Oxford University Press. 
Streeck, W., 1984. "Co-determination: The Fourth Decade, in International 
Yearbook of Organisational Democracy, Vol. II: International Perspectives on 
Organisational Democracy, eds., B. Wilpert and A. Sorge. Chichester: Wiley. 
TCMA, 1993. Activity Report for 1990-1992, Istanbul. 
TeRK-I., Monthly Bulletin, Various Issues. 
Turner, Ian, 1989. "Co-determination in British- Occupied Germany 1945-1949," in 
International Handbook of Participation in Organizational Democracy, eds., C.J. 
Lammers and G. Szell et al., London: Oxford University Press. 
102 
TOSIAD, Monthly Bulletin, Various Issues. 
Uca, M. N., 1979. 'The Turkish Road Towards A Self-Managed Society," Economic 
Analysis and Workers' Management 
Vanek, J., 1970. The General Theory of Labor-Managed Akrket Economies, Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press. 
Ward, B. N., 1958. 'The Firm in Illyria: Market Syndicalism," American Econontic 
Review. 
Wolff, P., 1987. Stabilisation Policy and Structural Adjustment in Turkey, 1980- 
1985: The Role of the IMF and World Eyternally Supported Adjustment Process, 
Berlin: German Development Institute (GDI). 
l'asar, E., 1994. Turkish Textile and Apparel Industry (Tiirk Tekstil ve Konfeksiyon 
Istanbul: Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters' Union. 
103 
APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLES OF CODETERMINATION 
IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
1 
APPENDIX A 
EXAMPLES OF CODETERMINATION 
IN VARIOUS COUNTRIES 
This appendix presents codetermination applications at country level in 
order to understand better the way that concept has crystallised in 
different socio-political and economic environments. As a prefatory 
remarque, it should explicitly be stated that it has no claim whatsoever in 
being a fully comprehensive and complete survey; rather it aims at 
presenting different countries' experiences, in order to indicate the wide 
range of the applicability of codetermination. 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
The US Industry in the late 1970s got into a deep crisis, loosing its 
competitiveness against the newly industrialised South East Asian 
countries and the Japan. This crisis, coupled with the conservative 
policies of the Reagan Era, forced Trade Unions (TUs) to step back in 
their income-distribution related struggle. This was understandable, once 
one recalls that capital owners were then strongly arguing that "lowering 
labour costs was by far the cheapest 'solution' in the short run" (Barber 
and Towers 1989: 24). However, when one takes a longer perspective 
one notice that, while the relocation of industries to the peripheral and 
semi-peripheral countries and the employment of immigrant labour who 
were ready to accept lower wage offers were both used as measures for 
by-passing industry-related problems, the application of re- 
industrialisation schemes in enhancing overall productivity was also 
implemented by industrialists to re-establish the competitiveness of the US 
economy in general (see e.g. Barber and Towers 1989; Strauss 1989). 
Within this framework, therefore, several types of workers 
participation models have increasingly been designed and applied. While 
TUs were apathetic and incapable in coming up with an alternative, the 
managerial side proposed some "highly controlled forms of worker 
participation" at operational level (Barber and Towers 1989: 24), 
somewhat similar to the Japanese models of participation, under the 
banner of the "Quality of Work Life" programmes (QWL) (Barber and 
Towers 1989). 
QWL programmes are known to be divisable into "operational level 
participation- and "strategic level participation- (Barber and Towers 
1989; Strauss 1989), both of which are summarised below. 
A. Operational Level Participation Forms of QWL: 
More practical, on-the-job, task-related participation models are covered 
under these Quality of Work Life programmes, and can be subdivided as 
follows: 
Job Enrichment: It combines separate job classifications into one, 
where the management's motivation is to break down job demarcation 
lines, with the aim of using its work-force more flexibly, even though 
there might be some resistance from workers to such a scheme. To give 
an example, at the NUMMI industrial site, California, 50 different 
unskilled job classifications were combined into one. 
Autonomous Work Groups: These are operating teams that come 
together regularly in order to discuss production-related problems, such 
as the introduction of new machinery, inspection, materials handling, 
housekeeping and repairs, and to implement necessary changes. They also 
review the pay system along with the costs and revenues associated with 
the work area in order to make some suggestions. 
Qualitv Circles (QCs): QC is a group of workers, usually from the 
same department, led by a supervisory foreperson, meeting at regular 
intervals (e.g. once a week) to solve specific problems arising from the 
production process. QCs can only recommend changes to their superiors, 
and thus they do not have any implementaiy powers; and in that sense 
they are voluntary. Historically attention was first given to quality 
problems, but then it moved on to the working conditions and the issues 
of productivity. In the US context, QCs sometimes even tread on areas 
normally reserved for collective bargaining. One of the implications of 
the last fact is that QCs have usually been seen as a potential threat by the 
TU leadership. 
Scanlon Plan: This plan evaluates workers' ideas for increasing 
productivity by ways of combining participation with financial incentives. 
Evaluation is made by the workplace and plant-wide committees. Savings 
due to increased productivity are shared among workers and the 
company. The main aim is to create a cooperative environment between 
the employee and the employer. 
Management has certain goals in adopting QWL schemes such as 
increasing productivity through enhanced job satisfaction, and thus to deal 
with worker alienation on the one hand and avoiding TU existence on the 
other. 
But a radical perspective such as that of Barber and Towers (1989: 
27) clearly lays down that, with QC, the strategy is still divide and 
conquer, but its application is more subtle and sophisticated". This quote 
reveals that from the managerial point of view participation is not seen as 
a method that will bring, say, a more democratic decision-making process 
into the firm, but as a method of evaluating employees' ideas and 
contributions within the hierarchical structure. TUs had basically 
became inefficient and useless for the labour force. The overall economic 
crisis, the anti-union atmosphere, the alienation of TUs towards workers 
had caused dramatic falls in union membership. Unions were forced to 
have a positive attitude towards QWL because of the simple fact that 
unions may only survive if their employers survive (Barber and Towers 
1989).1 
B. Strategic Level Participation: 
There seems to be no generalised form of codetermination at a strategic 
level in USA. The following two forms, however, are adopted as 
particularistic achievements of TUs by profiting from the financial 
difficulties of some firms. 
1. Board representation of employers: All of these disadvantages of the 
anti-unionism, decentralisation and the weakening of the collective 
bargaining power of unions, forced the TUs to become involved in some 
certain particularistic methods in order to regain power. In that regard, 
union representatives have therefore managed to get a few places on the 
boards of some financially unhealthy companies (e.g. Chrysler and 
American Motors, Pan American Airlines, Western Airlines and Wilson 
1 In his book 'Democracy at Work' Turner (Turner 1991) gives two criteria for defining 
the state of the trade unions in the last two decades with a special emphasis on US 
experience: i) whether the labour is integrated or not into the managerial decision making 
process and ii) the socio-political environment of the country and more specifically the 
approach of the government. These two criteria are very much in parallel with the above 
mentioned reasons (Go11 1993). 
Foods). Such board-member representation has lead the union leaders 
into the apparent conflict of interest on certain occasions. Faced with the 
crude reality that they would have to take the responsibility for making 
difficult production and investment decisions, involving lay-offs, some 
mechanisms were designed to prevent these conflictual situations (Strauss 
1989): 
An outsider worker representative has chosen. 
A key union representative, once selected, is to resign from 
her\his union role. 
A key union representative as to absent him/herself from the 
board during discussion of the collective bargaining strategy. 
2. Company Control: One step beyond the board member representation 
is the union struggle for complete company control. The following list is 
a selection of some methods in achieving a complete control (Strauss 
1989): 
Unions may force a change in management through refusing 
concessions until their demand is realised. 
They may agree to make discriminative concessions during a 
takeover. 
By utilising their stock ownership, they may takeover the firm. 
They may use their political power in favour of one set of 
buvers.2 
FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
The British Forces in Germany in the post-World War II period were 
aiming to break the social patterns which were thought to have produced 
National Socialism and the need to create a strong but independent labour 
movement capable of resisting political extremism of the right or the left" 
(Turner 1989: 65). According to the Allied Forces the "excessive 
consensus" and the corporatist structure of German industrial relations 
was quite dangerous. The German tradition was clearly in contrast with 
the British tradition of conflict in industrial relations; so the British 
2Some unionsts also argued that stock ownership gave workers the illusion of ownership 
without any real control and that it was chiefly a management technique to make unions 
unnecessary or to cut wages. 
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Forces neglected all the demands of co-determination fearing that it would 
be crucial tool for building consensus-based industrial relations. 
However, after the British pulled out, the Germans did not wait long 
before reincarnating codetermination. 
In 1951, after the British Forces left the scene, the Adenauer 
Government gave a start for the construction of the juridical 
codetermination system in Germany in the Iron, Steel and Coal Industries 
(Alontanmithestinzmung) (Turner 1989). This construction resulted with 
the Co-determination Act of 1951 and the Work Constitution Act 
of 1952. This legal framework vvas then fine tuned by the VVorks 
Constitution Act of 1972 and the Codetermination Act of 1976, 
which constitutes today's picture. The application of codetermination has 
two dimensions; namely strategic and operational level participation. 
Strategic level participation is generally applied at board-level, with 
the juridical context of the two-tier system which is constituted of a 
management board and a supervisory board. Operational level 
participation, on the other hand, is widely accepted as plant level 
participation through Works Councils. Our task, here, is to outline the 
main characteristics of the prototype codetermination model of the 1951- 
1952 and the modifications that were made to this particular model in the 
1970's. 
A. Strategic Level Participation: 
"Strategic Level Participation" of workers' and trade union 
representatives in the decision-making of firms take place principally on 
management and supervisory boards. In the application of the 
Codetermination Act of 1951 the following dimensions were drawn 
(Briefs 1989): 
Management Board: A "works director" is included as a regular 
member of the management board. This "works director" functions as a 
personnel administrator and personnel planner, and also deals with health 
and safety issues. 
Supervisory Board: This board, which exercises financial control 
over the management board, consists of equal representation of 
shareholders and workers. (The number of the board, and therefore each 
party's share, changes according to the size of the company, such as five 
plus five or ten plus ten.) Worker representatives include several TU 
members, but it is always assured that a possible TU dominance among 
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the representatives be avoided. As an additional member, there exists a 
Neutral Person,3 usually proposed by employee representatives, playing 
a role in the case of indeterminate voting. On the other hand, for a 
counter balance, the Supervisory Board's President is usually nominated 
by shareholders' representatives. 
This only applied to the iron, steel and coal industry 
(Alontanmitbestimmung), however. For the rest of the economy, the 
1951 Law made it mandatory that firms with more than 500 employees 
were to be represented (on the Supervisoly Board) with the proportion of 
1/3. With the Co-determination Act of 1976, the legal framework 
was modified such that the 1/2 share became a legal constraint for all the 
firms in the economy with 2000 and more employees, keeping the 1/3 
rule intact for firms with more than 500 and less than 2000 employees. 
Further deviations of the 1976 Law from that of 1951 can be cited 
as follows: 
Powered with a second vote right in cases of indecisiveness, the 
President took over the functions of Neutral Person, who ceased to 
exist as a result of the new legislation; 
The President will be among shareholders' representatives; 
Among workers' representatives there must be a management 
employee, who is dependent, directly, to the Management Board 
(Briefs 1989). 
B. Operational Level Participation: 
The existence of Works Councils (WCs) is designed as a counterweight 
to managerial institutions of decision-making. They are almost universal 
for the representation of workers' interests in the firms. In Germany 
they must be functional in every firm with more than five employees. 
They have a basic set of rights to information, consultation and 
codetermination. Their functions can be categorised as follows (FitzRoy 
and Kraft 1993): 
a. Discussing the wages (though they are prohibited from 
participating in collective bargaining), the working environment 
and rules, new recruitments and internal transfers with their s 
uperiors; 
3 To avoid discrimination we have renamed -neutral man" a "neutral person". 
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Trying to solve every kinds of problem between the managers 
and employees, controlling the implementation of the works laws, 
and improving the social life in the vvorkplace; 
Collecting the necessary information in advance regarding the 
plans for lay offs and plant closure. 
Yet, as Briefs (1989) underlines, these WCs' power is limited in many 
ways, which can be put forward as follows; 
WCs cannot prevent dismissals, shut-downs, and neither initiate 
nor prevent investments; 
WCs have limitations in their rights of access to information 
regarding major strategic decisions. 
It can be argued that, initially, WCs were designed to create competition 
or a counterweight against TUs. Structurally, this could be maintained 
through creating a duality in the representation of workers' interest. On 
the other hand, while the mediative functioning of the basic mechanisms 
of codetermination decreases the militancy of the union members, its 
highly juridical procedures undermine TU activities in plants. But now, 
despite all these negative aspects it is observed that unions are becoming 
more and more active in WCs (Briefs 1989; Industrial Democracy in 
Europe 1993). 
UNITED KINGDOM 
The actual situation for the UK is such that the Conservative Party 
dominance over a decade seems to have swept away the post-war welfare 
state tradition which was executed by successive Labour Governments. 
Concomitantly, these political and economic factors have not sustained a 
favourable climate for new developments in industrial democracy to 
surface, let alone flourish. (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). 
The British industrial structure was constructed over a conflictual 
relationship. Furthermore, the malevolent atmosphere of the Thatcher 
years was a major factor that caused a conflictual and harsh industrial 
relationship. Having said this, however, it should also be noted that, at 
operational level, several forms of participatory models have been 
introduced in order to increase productivity and product quality (Hill 
1991). Yet, at the strategic level, there is a clear lack of a legal 
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framework in the British case, compared, for example, to the German 
example that has been outlined above. Although there were some attempts 
from the Labour Government in the 1970s to introduce a legal 
framework towards establishing a "strategic level participation''. TUs 
categorically rejected those attempts (Neal 1987). 
A committee (Bullock) was held in the 1970's in order to examine 
more closely the German and other European experiences of 
codetermination, and to submit proposals for the UK case. T hi s 
Committee, first, echoed the orthodox view that collective bargaining is 
the most effective mechanism for giving workers the right to 
representation in decisions affecting their working lives; and, second, 
made propositions which could enhance participation. Based on the view 
that industrial democracy in UK was far from being sufficient and that 
there were increasing demands for more participation in the vvorkplace, 
the Committee worked out a blueprint. According to that, the 
Management Board (or Board of Directors) should include a certain 
number of workers' representatives in order to have productive 
management and functional participation. This board should hav e 
absolute effectivity without being by-passed by an owner or a board of 
owners. The Managerial Board must have power regarding economic, 
hierarchical and strategic decisions. 
The "2x+y- formula was proposed for companies with 2000 or 
more employees. This report, however, never saw the light of day. 
(Bullock 1977). 
S WEDEN 
The classical Swedish N.lodel is characterised by a relatively fevv, well 
organised and strong employers' associations and unions. TUs rely upon 
the government to pursue an active labour market policy in order to 
absorb technological and structural unemployment. But the 
decentralisation process has forced central bargaining to be diverted 
into industry-wide bargaining (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). 
TWO areas are of importance in the case of the Swedish industrial 
democracy debate: 
work organisation and individual influence over job. 
union influence over the top management by means of collective 
bargaining and board representation. 
i x 
These two topics could also be re-classified as operational level 
participation and strategic level participation respectively. 
Operational Level Participation: 
Works Councils were first established in the 1967 Contract. These 
Councils were aimed at increasing productivity through considering 
workers' proposals about increases in productivity and maintaining 
workplace security. An agreement has been reached between the 
employers and the labour side about co-operating in finding ways in 
corporating new technology into the production" (Industrial Democracy 
in Europe 1993: 56). 
Strategic Level Participation: 
According to the Swedish Codetermination at Work Act of 1977 the 
employer has a duty to consult unions before any important decision, such 
as technological renewals. In firms with more than 25 employees two 
local union based directors can belong to the boards (Industrial 
Democracy in Europe 1993). 
It should also be noted that the Swedish Centre for Working Life, as 
a support institute, was established in 1977 in order to promote a quality 
of working life experimentation on a very wide range. Although 
controlled by the labour force, it is financed from levies on the emplo),Ters 
(Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). 
It is clear that the overdeveloped Swedish corporatist structure at 
the national level has not been translated into the firm level 
codetermination as extensively as the German Model suggests. Yet the 
decentralisation process points towards a deconstruction of the corporatist 
structure and its replacement vvith a more local, firm level 
codetermination. 
NOR W AY 
The economic crisis of the eighties caused an emphasis shift from 
corporatism towards developing strategies for learning, improving 
performance and utilising external resources (Qvale 1989), and 
codetermination assumed great importance in that regard. 
According to Bruntland (1989), the Prime Minister, democracy in 
the workplace means; having security of employment, having a healthy 
work environment, being able to influence their situation, learning as 
working, not confronting any race or gender discrimination, taking part 
in decision-making, having a share of the wealth created, and being, able 
to maintain a balance between working and private lives. This long list 
of definitions includes job security, power sharing and profit sharing in 
more economic terms. Yet it is an important point of inquiry whether 
what Social Democratic Prime Minister describes rather neatly exists in 
the real life. 
Strategic Level Participation: 
The Company Act of 1973 secured 1/3 of the seats on company 
boards for the employees. 
Operational Level Participation: 
The Work Environment Act of 1977 aims at employee 
empowerment and firm development. It stipulates individual workers' 
opportunity for self-determination, and takes into account their 
professional responsibility. The VVork Environment Act of 1977 
represents a break with the legal tradition (in that it usually deals with the 
problem of health and safety seriously), in the sense of bringing in 
worker participation into the decision-making process of such issues 
(Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). Before this act such decisions 
used to be made through negotiations between the top institutions. 
As support institutions, it was suggested that TUs and NAF 
(employers associations) started a joint action research programme on the 
issue of industrial democracy (i.e. a centre), and The Centre for a 
Better Working Life ANUS established in the early 1990s. The Centre's 
function is to release general information and networking, initiate local 
development, and finally organise and finance support activities 
(Brundtland 1989). 
As such, a slow but quite a steady move towards more flexibility in 
industrial relations together with a higher degree of employee 
participation can now be observed in Norway. 
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DENMARK 
The right-wing coalitions through the 1980s where in favour of the 
managerial demands for a higher degree of labour flexibility. Yet the 
amount of organised workers is still quite high: Male 90-95%; Female 
75%. On the other hand, increasing part-time employment seems to 
decrease the involvement of workers in their jobs. 
Strategic Level Participation: 
The Company Act of 1973 secured 2 seats for employees on the 
company's board. The Company ..A.ct of 1980 developed the previous 
Act by reserving 1/3 of the board for employee membership in companies 
with more than 50 employees (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). 
Operational Level Participation: 
With the Agreement of 1986, co-operation committees are held for 
firms with 35 or more employees, if one of the parties raises such a 
demand. Previously the limit was fifty employees. These co-operation 
committees have increased their information retrieval rights about 
technological renewals and made labour representatives on the boards 
more responsible towards them (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993) . 
BELGIUNI 
As is the case in most of the European countries, the decentralisation 
process can be increasingly observed, with the obvious result that regional 
Governments are Gainina more initiatives. 
Social Partners (workers and employers federations) usually 
participate in macro economic and social decisions. But as a result of 
decentralisation fewer agreements are reached at national level, unless 
they are forced to do so by the government (Industrial Democracy in 
Europe 1993). At a more local level, Works Councils constitute the basic 
mechanism for both strategic and operational level participation. 
In firms with 150 and more employees these councils are 
mandatory. In those with 50 to 149 employees, they are voluntary. 
Representative numbers vary with the size of the company (e.g. 500-1000 
workers mean 4 representatives, 1001-2000 workers mean 10 
representatives, etc). Council president is usually the employer and 
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chooses the employer representatives (Dicle 1980). WC and TU 
delegations are informed about new technology changes beforehand: 
however, employees have no right to negotiate about those changes. 
During the eighties informative and consultative roles of Works 
Councils were extended. A new role was introduced: controlling the 
effect of recovery measures at the firm level. Managerial personnel were 
represented at the Works Council as well. 
ISRAEL 
An exceptional economic crisis during the 80s, with 450% inflation, led to 
a Tripartite Agreement and after that TU incorporation into the 
macroeconomic decision-making process; and with the joint efforts of the 
three social partners inflation has been reduced to 20% (Industrial 
Democracy in Europe 1993). 
Collective Bargaining takes place at 3 levels, viz, national, industry, 
and plant levels. There seems to be a shift of emphasis from the industry 
level towards plant level (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). The 
governments seem to be reluctant in initiating attempts at participation. 
This reluctance has led to voluntary forms of participation rather than 
more legalised forms. 
Such productivity aimed voluntary forms can be classified as 
Operational Level Participation forms. The shop steward conunittee is 
the body that confronts management at the plant level. From the mid- 
eighties the growing popularity of Quality, Circles can be observed in the 
private, government and Histradut (workers' economy) sectors. They are 
usually initiated by management, and Shop Steward Committees are 
generally consulted and frequently incorporated formally. 
Joint Productivity Councils, that are also spreading, are based on a 
parity principle in which decisions can be taken by the majority of each 
of the two parties. Mostly these councils concentrate on work methods 
and incentive payments (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). 
To draw an overall picture, decentralisation reveals itself in the 
Israel context with an observable increase in the number of autonomous, 
voluntary forms of plant level employer-employee confrontation. A shift 
of emphasis from industry to plant level collective bargaining is also an 
indicator of decentralisation. 
THE NETHERLANDS 
The Netherlands Government has been playing a very central role in 
economy and bureaucratic administration. Everything has been very 
centralised and under government control. The weakness of TUs due to 
the hegemony of right ideology is easily observable, as is a trend towards 
decentralisation and fragmentation. TUs are offered a role in negotiating 
the outlines of the collective agreement while Works Council handle the 
rest of the work within the firm. This was accepted, and the general 
quality of operational and strategic level of participation has been 
increasing (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). 
As it has been mentioned above, the decentralisation process is 
dominant in the Dutch industrial system, leading especially to an 
intensification of consultation practices at company level. TUs have 
therefore found themselves in a dilemma: either to contribute to 
participation but become decentralised and ineffective as a collective 
labour movement, or reject to participate and have no say in the decision- 
making even though the nature of the new technology demands 
participation (Looise 1989: 278-279). A participative structure of equal 
partners is therefore dependent on the lasting support of the unions. 
As for the legal structure of participation, with the VVorks 
Council Act of 1979 firms with employees more than 100 were 
obliged to establish WCs with an extension of autonomy (exclusion of 
managers from these councils) and domain of advises (issues relating to 
transfer of control of the company, co-operation with another company, 
closing down of the company). WCs can also veto issues regarding social 
matters or can appeal to the court where necessary. They have a certain 
amount of initiative power and they are regularly informed about the 
economic situation of the firm (Looise 1989). 
Two years later with the 100-Law (1981) the range of the 
participatoy legislation was extended to all organisations. Firms with 
emplo-yees of less than 100 and more than 35 are obliged to have WCs. 
Yet these WCs are only slightly less powerful than the firms with 100 or 
more employees (Looise, 1989). 
And, finally, The 1980 Work Environment Act concerns the 
health, safety, and well-being of employees. Influenced by the Norwegian 
Work Environment Act of 1977, it demands the participation of the 
employees in health and safety issues (Industrial Democracy in Europe 
1993). 
FR ANCE 
At the beginning of the eighties the freshly arriving Socialist government 
came up with The Auroux Act (1982), imposing obligations for 
managerial bodies to make yearly negotiations with local union branches 
about wages and working hours. The Act also secures direct and 
collective expression rights for workers about work conditions and 
organisations. The workers' right of expression is defined in two ways as 
direct and collective in order to keep two different doors open (Borzeix 
and Linhart 1989). The former is the right of expression without 
intermediaries, without elections and without delegates, while the latter is 
the right of coming together in groups to express themselves in firms with 
more than 200 employees (Borzeix and Linhart 1989). 
A certain amount of decentralisation of decision-making 
accompanied with the transformation of traditional institutional practices 
can be underlined as the positive aspects of recent developments. It 
should also be noted that, generally speaking, participation in France has 
developed as a solution to the organisational constraints imposed on firms, 
for economic and technological reasons, and not as a result of any labour 
challenge to management nor of any threat to its control (Borzeix and 
Linhart 1989). 
JAPAN 
First Quality Circles have been established in Japan despite the fact that 
they were primarily initiated at a theoretical level by Americans (e.g. 
Shewhart, Deming, Juran, and Drucker. See Kavrakoglu (1994a)). Yet 
the main objective in the Japanese context seems to be being competitive 
rather than maintaining industrial and economic democracy. Operational 
level participation is the dominant form, and there are several basic 
practical types of workers' participation forms: 
1. Joint Consultation System: In JCS, representatives of employees at each 
level of a company meet once a month with their counterparts in 
management, to obtain information about the company's policies and 
production schedule (Industrial Democracy in Europe 1993). 
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Rinoi System: Ringi means submitting a proposal to one's superior for _ 
approval. "A policy proposal is drafted by a junior member of a 
section.[..] It then goes to the vice-chief of the section, the section chief, 
department chief, and may, even on quite minor matters, reach an 
executive at head office" (Marsh 1992). The Ringi system is a highly 
hierarchical model that is aimed to articulate the small pieces of 
knowledge that the lower ranks of the hierarchy possesses. 
Quality Control Circles: QCC are voluntary groups who are organised 
at the plant level in order to contribute to and be responsible for local 
problem solving and to give quick responses to local as well as system 
shocks (Aoki 1990). 
Total Quality Management: TQM is an overall project, aiming at 
perfection in all levels and areas of production, based on mutual 
understanding and extended communication between the managerial 
personnel and and the employee. TQM is a broader participatory 
management system which incorporates all the employees of an enterprise 
and utilises Quality (Control) Circles as an apparatus of direct and on-the- 
point intervention into the problematic issues in production (Hill 1991). 
The system has rigorous techniques for problem solving activities and has 
a tendency of decentralising the responsibility at the lower levels of 
hierarchy (Juran 1988). The usual methods like job enlargement and job 
enrichment (see USA section) are used for creating 'semi-autonomous' 
shop-floor groups (Hill 1991). 
As for the collective bargaining, a certain part of TUs are in need of a 
pre-bargaining system (i.e. JCS) that can provide the necessary feedback 
to the collective bargaining process. 
On the other hand, some of the TUs think that JCS deals with issues 
of mutual interest between the managers and the employees, while 
Collective Bargaining deals with issues of a conflicting nature (Industrial 
Democracy in Europe 1993). Consequently, such TUs, uneasy,' with this 
contradiction, choose a cautious attitude towards JCS in particular, and 
operational level participative forms in general. 
And, finally, some "aggressive TUs criticised the JCS for being 
only consultational and having no decision-making powers. 
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APPENDIX B 
QUESTIONNAIRE AND ICON-TABLE 
Q.1. In an enterprise various decisions, such as employment, investment, 
working conditions, technology, are undertaking by the management. We 
have classified them under fourteen headings. Imagine a situation where 
you, the employees, are asked to participate into the decision-making of 
these areas. 
Assuming that you have 20 points which you are free to allocate 
among these areas. Use the white ones to indicate that you want to take 
part directly, and the red ones to indicate that you rather prefer your 
representative to take part on behalf of you. 
Q. 2. Now that you have chosen the areas and forms of your ideal 
participation in decision-making. Such decision-making requires certain 
time. How many hours you are willing to devote from extra-work time in 






1 *WORK EDUCATION AND TRAINING COURSES K.5 K.19 1 2 
2 *DISCIPLINE AND DISMISSALS K.6 K.20 1 2 
3 *NEW INVESTMENTS K.7 K.21 1 2 
4 *WORKING HOURS AND HOLIDAYS K.8' K.22 1 2 
5 *PERSONAL EQUIPMENT K.9 ' K.23 1 2 
6 *NEW PRODUCT K.1C K.24 1 2 
7 *WORKPLACE CONDITIONS K.11 K.25 1 2 
8 *TASK ASSIGNMENT AND TRANSFERS K.12 K.26 1 2 
9 *HIRING PROCEDURES K.12 K.27 1 2 
10 *APPOINTMEST OF OWN SUPERVISOR, NEW DEPARTMENT HEAD K.1z K.28 1 2 
11 *WAGE LEVELS AND WAGE DII-FERENTIATION K.1. K.29 1 2 
12 *MARKETING, PRICE DETERMINATION K.1( K.30 1 2 
13 *WELFARE FACILITIES K.17 K.31 1 2 
14 *TECHNOLOGY K.1E K.32 1 2 
K.33 
1 1-2 HOURS 
2 3-4 HOURS 
3 5-6 HOURS 
4 7-8 HOURS 
5 9-10 HOURS 
OTHER 
Q.3 How much would you say you agree with the following question... 
Q.4. Imagine that you are participating in management. You have a 
choice, you can either receive an average pay, or chose to receive a low 
wage + a premium from profit. Which one would you chose? 
K.39 
NORMAL WAGE 
LOWER WAGE + PROFIT SHARING I 
Q.5. How much would you say you agree with the following question... 













The rights to manage a factory belong only to the owner 
or those people whom they appoint. 
K.34 1 1 3 4 5 
Those working in a factory have the right to participate. K.35 1 / 3 4 5 
The right to manage a factory depends on the individuals 
level of knowledge and skills. 
K.36 1 / 3 4 5 
The right to manage a factoy depends on the seniority 
level of the individual. 
K.37 1 / 3 4 5 
Workers who participate in management should share in 
both cost and profit. 












Imagine that local citizens are being affected by a 
factories production. Even if the local peoples demands 
fall contrary to your interests, these people should have a 
right to participate in decisions which concern them. 
K.40 1 2 3 4 5 
The participation of workers like me in management 
will increase the profitability of the factory. 
K.41 1 2 3 4 5 
The participation of workers like me in management 
will increase social equality. 
K.42 1 2 3 4 5 
The participation of workers like me in management 
will increase harmony in the workplace. 







Workplace Harmony 1 1 1 
Increase Profit 2 2 2 
Social Equality 3 3 3 
1 
2 
Q. 7. Choose the sentence you agree the most. 
K.47 
Q.8. Everybody from time to time get angry and become aggressive. 
Think about the events that made you crazy, during the past year. 
Q.9. A. Since the time 
you were about 12 years 
old, have you been in a 
physical fight with 
someone? 
Q.9. B. Did you ever 
hurt a person you were 
fighting with pretty 
badly? 
)0( 










when you have gotten angry, how often did you hide your 
anger, try not to show it 
K.48 1 2 3 4 5 
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often 
have you yelled or shouted 
K.49 1 2 3 4 5 
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often 
have you tried to calmly explain your feelings or opinions 
K.50 1 2 3 4 5 
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often 
have you just stopped talking, avoided arguing and started 
to do something else 
K.51 1 2 3 4 5 
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often did 
you take out your anger by kicking things, like a chair, 
giving a door a good slam, punching the wall, or looking 
for something to throw or smash 
K.52 1 2 3 4 5 
when you have gotten angry in the past year, how often 
have you hit someone 
K.53 1 2 3 4 5 
K.54 K.55 
1 YES CONTINUE 1 YES 
2 NO PROCEED TO Q.10 2 NO 
Q.10. How often did you skip school or play hookywould you say... 
1 The time for Turkish workers to join in management is overdue. 
2 It is the right time for Turkish workers to join in management. 
3 It is still early for Turkish workers to join in management. 
K.56 
1 Very often 
2 Often 
3 Almost never 
4 Never 
Q.11. How often you felt like... 
Q. 12. Which sentence defines your ideas about yourself the best? 
xxi 










how often have you had personal worries that get you 
down physically, that is make you physically ill 
K.57 1 2 3 4 5 
when you have gotten angry, how often have you felt 
uncomfortable, like getting headaches, stomach pains, 
cold sweats and things like that? 
K.58 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you had frightening dreams? K.59 1 1 3 4 5 
how often have you feared being robbed, attacked, or 
physically injured? 
K.60 1 1 3 4 5 
how often have you felt confused and had trouble 
thinking? 
K.61 1 2 3 4 5 
hovv often have you had trouble concentrating or keeping 
your mind on what you were doing? 
K.62 1 1 3 4 5 
how often have you had no feeling in one or another part 
of your body? 
K.63 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you lost your voice when you didn't 
have a cold or sore throat? 
K.64 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt you were bothered by all 
different kinds of ailments in different parts of your 
body? 
K.65 1 1 3 4 5 
how often have you been bothered by feelings of sadness 
or depression-- feeling blue? 
K.66 1 2 3 4 5 
in general, how satisfied have you been with yourself? K.67 1 2 3 4 5 
, 
how often have you felt useless? K.68 1 1 3 4 5 
how often have you feared going crazy; losing your 
mind? 
K.69 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you had times when you couldn't help 
wondering if anything was worthwhile anymore? 
K.70 1 2 3 4 5 
how often has your appetite been poor? K.71 1 2 3 4 5 













who feels he has much to be proud of. K.72 1 2 3 4 5 
who is the worrying type--you know, a worrier. K.73 1 2 3 4 5 
who feels that he is a failure generally, in life. K.74 1 2 3 4 5 
who feels either high or low, but not in the middle. K.75 1 2 3 4 5 
Q.13. How often did the following events happen to you. 
Q.14. Which of the following sentences describes your ideas regarding yourself. 
Q.15. How often did the following events happen to you. 







PROCEED TO Q. 21 
Q.17 You are the kind of person who has arguments with his family or 










how often have you felt that a part of your body did not 
belong to you? 
K.76 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt as if you were in a dream even 
though you were awake--would you say? 
K.77 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have familiar surrounding seemed unreal to 
you, as if you were watching a movie or a play? 
K.78 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt that you were physically cut off 
from people? 
K.79 1 / 3 4 5 













who believe that most people are honest. K.80 1 2 3 4 
, 
5 
who feels that most people can be trusted. K.81 1 2 3 4 5 
who feels that when it comes right down to it, most 
people can be counted on to do the right thing. 
K.82 1 2 3 4 5 











often have you had attacks of sudden fear or panic. K.83 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you feared crowds? K.84 
I 
1 1 3 4 5 
friends because of his drinking. 
K.86 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 SOMEWHAT AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE NOR DISAGREE 
4 SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
Q.18 During the past year, how often have you had bad reactions or bad 
effects from alcohol--like DT's, shakes or other bad reactions. 
K.87 
Q.19 Wanting to forget everything, was that... 
1 VERY OFTEN 
2 FAIRLY OF 1EN 
3 SOMETIMES 
4 ALMOST NEVER 
5 NEVER 
K.88 
1 VERY IMPORTANT 
2 FAIRLY IMPORTANT 
3 NOT AT ALL IMPORTANT 
Q.20 Because you needed to drink when tense and nervous... 
K.89 
1 VERY IMPORTANT 
2 FAIRLY IMPORTANT 
3 NOT AT ALL IlMPORTANT 











how often have you been troubled by having a hard time 
getting going when you wake up? 
K.90 1 1 _ 3 4 5 
how often have you been bothered by tiring out very 
easily. 
K.91 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you felt unable to get things done. K.92 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you heard things that other people say 
they can't hear. 
K.93 1 1 3 4 5 
how often have you felt that your unspoken thoughts 
were being broadcast or transmitted, so that everyone 
knows what you were thinking. 
K.94 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you thought that you were possessed by 
a spirit or devil. 
K.95 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you had visions or seen things that other 
people say they cannot see. 
K.96 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt that there were people who 
wished todo you harm. 
K.97 
L 
1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt you had special powers. 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you blamed yourself for everything that 
went wrong. 
K.99 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have felt you deserved to be punished. K.100 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you felt that nothing turns out for you 
the way you want it to. 
K.101 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you felt completely hopeless about 
everything. 
K.102 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you felt completely helpless. K.103 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you had trouble in falling asleep K.104 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you had trouble with waking up too 
early and not being able to fall back to sleep. 
K.105 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you had periods when you could go for 
days at a time needing little sleep or rest. 
K.106 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you had periods of several days or weeks 
when you were feeling so irritable and easily amioyed 
that you were clearly different from your usual self. 
K.107 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you had times when exciting new ideas 
and schemes occurred to you one after another. 
. 
K.108 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you been afraid that you would do 
something seriously wrong against your will. 
K.109 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you done things over and over again 
because you weren't sure you had done them right. 
K.110 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you cleaned or arranged things over and 
over again although there was no need for it. 
K.111 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt that people were trying to pick 
quarrels or start arguments with you. 
K.112 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt that people were talking about 
you behind your back. 
K.113 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt that people were trying to cheat 
you. 
K.114 1 / 3 4 5 
Q. 22 During the past year, would you say your physical health in 
Q. 23 You are the kind of person who feels he has much to be proud of. 
K.116 
Q. 24 You are the kind of person who feels that he is a failure generally, 
in life. 
K.117 










5 very poor 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 SOMEWHAT AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
4 SOMEVVHAT DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
1 STRONGLY AGREE 
2 SOMEWHAT AGREE 
3 NEITHER AGREE OR DISAGREE 
4 SOMEWHAT DISAGREE 
5 STRONGLY DISAGREE 
1 VERY SATISFIED 
2 SOMEWHAT SATISFIED 
3 SOMEWHAT DISSATISFIED 
4 VERY DISSATISFIED 
Q. 26. How often did the following things happen to you? 
Q. 27. Which sentence defines your ideas about yourself the best? 
Q. 28. How often did the following things happen to you? 
D. 1. SEX 
DEMOGRAPHY 
xxvi 










how often have you had trouble with headaches or pains 
in the head. 
K.119 1 1 3 4 5 
how often did your hands tremble enough to bother you. K.120 1 I 3 4 5 
how often have you been bothered by acid or sour 
stomach several times a week. 
K.121 1 / 
,. 
3 4 5 
how often have you been in very low spirits. K.122 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you felt like crying. K.123 1 / 3 4 5 












who keeps personal problems to himself rather than 
talking them out with someone else. 
K.124 1 / 3 4 5 
who daydreams a lot. K.125 1 2 3 4 5 
who seldom visits people or calls them on the phone. K.126 1 1 ' 3 4 5 
who likes to do things by himself rather than with 
others. 
K.127 1 2 3 4 5 
who makes friends easily. K.128 1 / 3 4 5 










how often have you had chest pains. K.129 1 / 3 4 5 
how often have you had trouble with your heart beating 
hard when you were not exerting yourself. 
K.130 1 2 3 4 5 
how often have you had high blood pressure. K.131 1 I 3 4 5 
how often have you had dizziness. K.132 1 1 3 4 5 
how often have you had shortness of breath when you 
were not exerting yourself. 




D. 3. YEAR OF BIRTH 
D. 4. MARITAL STATUS 
K.138 


























D. 2. REGION OF ORIGIN 
K.136 
1 MARMARA 
2 BLACK SEA 
3 INNER ANATOLIA 
4 AEGEAN 
5 MEDITERRANEAN 
6 SOUTH EAST ANATOLIA 





I K.137 I I 
D. 6. THE EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF TRE SUBJECT AND OF HIS/HER 
PARENT'S 
D. 7. JOB IN THE PLANT 
D. 8. FOR HOW MANY YEARS HAVE THE SUBJECT 
BEEN WORKING FOR THIS ENTERPRISE 
D. 9. FOR HOW MANY YEARS 
HAVE THE SUBJECT BEEN WORKING 
D. 10. STATUS OF UNION AFFILIATION 










1 1 1 NONE, 
2 1 I WITHDRAWN FROM PRIMARY SCHOOL 
3 3 3 GRADUATED FROM PRIMARY 
4 4 4 WITHDRAWN FROM SECONDARY 
5 5 5 GRADUATED FROM SECONDARY 
6 6 6 WITHDRAWN FROM HIGH 
7 7 7 GRADUATED FROM HIGH 
8 8 8 WITHDRAWN FROM UNIVERSITY 
9 9 9 GRADUATED FROM UNIVERSITY 
K.147 
1 MEMBER OF UNION 
2 NOT A MEMBER OF UNION 
lyi gOnler. Bogaziçi Oniversitesi Ekonomi ve Sosyoloji BólOmleri adina 
bir anket yaplyoruz. Size ban sorularimlz olacak. Bu bilimsel bir çall;ma olup, 
ara;tirmanin sonuçlarl bilgisayarla degerlendirilecektir. Ara;tirmaya katilanlarin 
isimleri hiçbir ;ekilde belirtilmeyip gizli tutulacak, sonuçta kimin hangi soruya ne 
cevap verdigi kesinlkle belli olmayacaktir. 
S.1. Fabrikalarda isverenler ve pineticiler gesitli kararlar alirlar. Ornegin; 
kim ise alinsin, i; kosullari nasil olsun, yeni bir teknoloji uygulansin mi, kres 
açilsin mi, vb. Biz bu panoda karar alinan konulari 14 grupta topladlk. 
PANO'YU GOSTERtN; KUTULARIN BA§LIKLARI OKUYUN. 
Farzedin ki, Oneticiler çalisanlarin da bu kararlara katilmalarini istiyor. Her 
çall;anin zó. oy hakki órdugunu dOsOnOn. Bu oylarl istediginiz gibi kutulara 
yerlestirmenizi isteyecegiz. Hangi konular slzin icin tinemliyse, yani o konuda 
alinan kararlara katilmak istiyorsaniz, o gruba daha fazla oy kullanin. Konunun 
sizin iqin hnemi yoksa o gruba oy kullanmayin. 
KENDISINE QAOINIK QLARAK,ZQ BEYAZ PUL VERtN. KUTULARIN BA$LIKLARINI.HATIRLATIP 
KENDIS KIN ONENLI GORDUGU ALANLARDA KUTULARA PULLARI VERLE$TIRMESINE YARDIMCI 
OLUN. TON PULLARINI YERLE§TIRDIKTEN $0NRAGEREKIRSE YENIDEN AYARLAMA 
YAPABtLECEGINI HATIRLATIN. §LEMIN BITNESINI BEKLEYtN. 
Simdi oyunuzu degisik alanlarda kullandiniz. BOylece sizi ilgilendiren konularda 
alinan kararlara katilmaya karar verdiniz. Bari konularda kararlara katilmak için 
kendi yerinize bir temsici de seçebilirsiniz. Konulara bir daha balm. Sizin 
yerinize temsilcinin katilmasini istediginiz kararlari shyleyin. 
TENStUtNtN t§ARETLENDtOt KUTULARA BtRER StYAH PUL KOYUN. 
OY SAY151 KENDISI TEMSILCI 
Çall;anlartn egitimi K.5 K.19 1 2 
Disiplin ve 1;ten çtkarma K.6 1(.20 1 2 
Fabrikanin yeni yattrtmlart Or; yen1 bir bOlOm 
agilmasi, makina saytsintn artttrtlmast K.7 K.21 1 2 
he girl; çtkt; saatleri, fazla mesai, vardlya s0- 
releri, haftaltk toplam 1; saati ve tatil zamanlart K.8 K.22 1 2 
Çaltpinlarin kullandigt alet edevat ve i; makinalart 
de ilgili sorunlar K.9 K.23 1 2 
Dretilecek OrOnler K.10 K.24 1 2 
I; ortamt ve i; ko;ullart órovk dOzeni, 
gOroltOnOn denetlenmesi, havalandirma K.11 K.25 1 2 
I; yerindeki grey dagilvint ve salt;anlarin bir 
bOlomden bir ba;kastria transfer edilmesi K.12 1(.26 1 2 
1se allnacak inilerin seqimi 1(.13 1(.27 1 2 
Ustabap ve amirlerin atanmasi 1(.14 1(.28 1 2 
Maa;larin tespiti K.15 K.29 1 2 
DrOnlerin hangi fiyatla kime sattlacagt K.16 K.30 1 2 
Kres, anaokulu, revir, servis ve yemekhane hizmetler 1(.17 1(.31 1 2 






Anketin baslama saati 
Anketin biti; saati 
S.2.Biraz once fabrikada alinan kararlara katilmak istediginiz konularl seçtiniz. Bu 
kararlari almak belli bir zaman gerektiriyor. Arkada§iarinizla ya da temsilcinizle 
biraraya gelip konu;arak bu kararlari almak Ozere mesai saati disinda karsiliginda 
Ocret almadan her ay kaç saatinizi ayirabilirsiniz ? 
5.3imdi size bap cOmleler okuyacaglm. Karttajazanlardan hangisi bu cOmleler 
akkindaki di4Once1er1nizi en iyisekilde if-ade eder ? 
Once bir Ornek yapalim..5ize u cUmleyi okusam "Bence çocuklari hergOn dóvmeli" 
ne dersniz ? 
KART l'I GOSTERIN. ANLADI4INA ENIN OLDUKTAN SONRA DIAER CONLELERI OKUYUN. 
1 
S.4.YOnetime katildl inizi dOsOnOn. Bir seçiminiz var. Ya normal Ocret alacaksiniz, 
ya da dOsOk Ocre + kardan pay alacaksiniz. Hangisini segersiniz ? 
KART 2'YI OSTER N 
K.39 
S.5.Simdi size bazi cOmleler okuyacagim. Kartta yazanlardan hangisi bu cUmleler 
hakkindaki dOsOncelerinizi en iyi sekilde ifade eder ? KART l'I GOSTERIN. 
D826 13134" MA 8227? 
HIC 
WM 
Fabrikayi Onetmek sadece ve sadece fabrika sahip- 
lerinin ya da atadiklari yOneticilerin hakkidir K.34 1 2 3 4 5 
Fabrikada çalisanlarin da Onetime katilmak 
hakkidir K.35 1 2 3 4 5 
YOnetime katilmak galisanlarin bilgi dOzeyine ve 
yetenegine ball ir flaktir K.36 1 2 3 4 5 
YOnetime katilmak o i§yerinde ne kadar sOre çaliq- 
mis olduguna bagli bir haktir K.37 1 2 3 4 5 
'Onetime katilan igiler hem zarara hem kara 










Fabrikanin uretiminden Ore halkinin etkilendigi- 
ni dUsundn. Yóre halkinin talepleri sizin çikar- 
lariniza ters düsse bile Ore halki kendini ilgi- 
lendiren konularda fabrika da sitiz sahibi olmalidir K.40 1 2 3 4 5 
Benim gibi çali§anlarin Onetime katilmasi 
fabrikanin karini arttiracaktir 
- 
K.41 1 2 3 4 5 
Benim gibi çalianlarin Onetime katilmasi 
sosyal adaIeti gerçekleWrecektir K.42 1 2 3 4 5 
Benim gibi çall§anlarin Onetime katllmasi 
çali§ma barisini saglayacaktir K.43 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Normal Ocret 
2 DO§Ok Ocret + kardan pay 
K.33 
1 1-2 Saat 
2 3-4 Saat 
3 5-6 Saat 
4 7-8 Saat 
5 9-10 Saat 
Diger. . 
S.6. Callsanlarin yogetime katilmalari en cok geye fayda saglayacaktir ? 
KART 3'U GOSTERIN. SIRAYA SOKMASINI ISTEYIN. EN FAYDALI 
S.7. Bu karti blrlikte okuyalim. Size Ore en dogru olan cümleyi secin. 
KART 4'U GOSTERIN 
K.47 
Türkiye'de iscilerin Onetimine katilmasl igin, geç kallnmistir 
Türkiye'de tscilerin ydnetimine katilmasi icin, tam zamanidir 
Türkiye'de igilerin pinetimine katIlmasi igin, henüz erkendir 
S.8 Herkes zaman zaman sinirienip bir seylere kizabilir. Gegtilimiz yil boyunca 
sizi de bitiyle sinirlendiren olaylari düsünün._5imdi soraca imiz sorulara 
bunlari düsQgerek cevag vermenizj ¡stiyoruz. KART 5'1 GOST RIN EGER FAZLA 
SINIRLENMEDIGINI SOYLUYORSA AZ SINIRLENDIGI ANLARI HATIRLAMASINI ISTEYIN. 
S.9a.12 yasindan beri hic kimseyle 
diivustünüz mu? 
K.56 
S.9b.Son be yllda hic kimseyle 
dolivOstunUz mü? 




K.44 K.45 K.46 
Kan l arttiracaktir 1 I 1 
Sosyal adaleti gerceklestirecektir 2 2 2 
Calima barislnl getirecektir 3 3 3 













hapgi sikllkta klzginliginizi gizleyip 
ggstermemeye galistiniz K.48 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta bagirip cagirdiniz K.49 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta duygu ye düsüncelerinizi karsiniz- 
dakine sakin bir sekilde aciklamaya calistiniz K.50 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta konusup tarti§maktan kacinlp baska 
bir seyle ugrasmaya basladiniz K.51 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklIkta sinirinizi etrafinlzdaki esyalar- 
dancikarmaya cali§tiniz dr; sandalyeyi tekmele- 
diniz, kaplyi çarptinu, duvarlari yumrukladiniz K.52 1 2 3 4 5 





DEVAM EDIN Evet 
Hayir S.10'A GECIN 
1 Çok sik 
2 Oldukça sik 
3 Hemen hemen hic 





S.11.Simdi okuyacagim olaylar gegtigimiz yil igerisinde hangi siklikla baviniza 
geldi? KART 5'1 GOSTERIN 
S.12.As_agidaki amlelerden.hangisi kendi hakkinizdaki dilOncelerinizi en iyi ekilde 
ifade ediyor? KART PI GOSTERIN 











hangi siklikta bedensel bir rahatsizliga 
yakalanmaktan korktunuz K.57 1 2 3 4 5 
kizginlik hissettiginizde hangi siklikta 
rahatsizlik duydunuz dr; baagrisi, karin agrisi K.58 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta korkulu rOya g6rd6nüz K.59 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta saldiriya, soyguna ugramaktan veya 
yaralanmaktan korktunuz K.60 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta aklinizin kari§tigini ve dU§Onme 
zorlugu gektiginizi hissettiniz K.61 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta dikkatinizi bir konuda toplamakta 
zorluk gektiniz K.62 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta vOcudunuzun herhangi bir yerinin 
hissizle§tigini farkettiniz K.63 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta U§Otmediginiz ve bogaziniz 
agrimadigi halde sesinizi kaybettiniz K.64 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta vilcudunuzun degivik yerlerindeki 
rahatsizliklardan dolayi huzursuz oldunuz K.65 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta uzüntil ve gdküntilden dolayi 
huzursuz oldunuz K.66 1 2 3 4 5 
kendinize hangi siklikta guven duydunuz K.67 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta kendinizi ie yaramaz hissettiniz K.68 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta aklinizi yitirmekten korktunuz K.69 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta "artik higbir§eyin degeri kalmadi" 
diye dti§dnmekten kendinizi alamadiniz K.70 1 2 3 4 5 













Ov6n6lecek gok eye sahip oldugunuzu d6§UnOrstinüz K.72 1 2 3 4 5 
Size endi§eli biri diyebiliriz, hani evhamli biri K.73 1 2 3 4 5 
Genelde hayatta baprisiz oldugunuzu 
hissedersiniz K.74 1 2 3 4 5 
Kendinizi ya gok iyi yada gok k6tO hissedersiniz K.75 1 2 3 4 5 
s.13111111 3kuouctIgilpioailgigeçtigimiz yil igerisinde hangi siklikla basiniza 
S.14.Aaidakicm re kendi hakkinizdaki dOsOncelerinizi en iyi sekilde 
S.15.1T11 c;kuiloggintolultraeçtigimiz yil içerisinde hangi siklikla basiniza 
4 
S.16.Icki kullanir misiniz ? 
K.85 
S.17.0yle bir kisisiniz ki icki ictiginiz igin ailenizle ve dostlarinizla 






Hic dogru del 













hangi siklikta vOcudunuzun bir parcasinin size 
ait olmadigini hissettiniz K.76 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta uyanik oldugunuz halde kendinizi 
rOyada gibi hissettiniz K.77 1 2 3 4 5 
aliskin oldugunuz cevreler size hangi siklikta 
gerçek dip glizOkt0, sanki sinema ya da TV 
izliyormu§sunuz gibi K.78 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta kendinizi bedensel olarak insan- 
lardan kopmus hissettiniz K.79 1 2 3 4 5 
lidUC ellUr f NMI A l OVQPIGRAR 







Insanlarin bOyOk bir çogunlugunun ddrOst Oduguna 
inaniyorsunuz K.80 I 2 3 4 5 
Çogu insana gOvenebileceginizi hissediyorsunuz K.81 1 2 3 4 5 
Insanlarin baskalarina yardim etmekten çok 
kendflerini kolldiklarina inaniyorsunuz K.82 1 2 3 4 5 













hangi siklikta ani korku ya da panikten iit0r0 
carpinti gegirdiniz K.83 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta kalabaliktan korktunuz K.84 I 2 3 4 5 
Evet DEVAN EDiN. 






S.I8.Geçtigimiz yilda hangi siklikta alkplOn Vitt] etkilerini hissettiniz, 
drnegin titremeler, vb. KART 5'1 GOSTERIN 
K.87 
lnsanlar farkli sebeplerden dolayi bira, raki, ;arap, kanyak içerler. 
1nsanlarin neden içtiklerine dair burada bazi nedenler siralanmi;tir. 
Gectigimiz yilda içme nedenlerinden her birinin sizin için ne 610de dogru 
oldugunu belirtin. 
S.19.Herleyi unutma istegi geçen yil içki içmeniz için ne derece 6nem bir sebepti ? 
KART 5'YI GOSTERIN 
K.88 
S.20.Sinirli ve gergin oldugunuz zamanlarda içki igne ihtiyaci duardiniz, bu sebep 
içki içmeniz için ne derece 6nemliydi ? KART CYI GOSTERIN 
K.89 
S.2141md1 okuyacagim olgylar geçtigimiz yil içerisinde hangi siklikta bavniza 
geldi ? KART 5'1 GOSTERIN 













uyandiginiz zaman 'One ba;lamak için hangi 
siklikta zorluk çektiniz K.90 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta çok çabuk bitkin dOrekten dolayi 
sikinti çektiniz , K.91 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi sikiikta bazi Weri halletmekte yetersiz 
kaldiginizi dO;Ondtinuz K.92 1 2 3 4 5 
hangt siklikta ba;kalarinin duymadiklarini 
soyledikleri, bir takim sesler duydunuz K.93 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta kimseye sdylemediginiz dOlünce- 
lerinizin ba;kalari tarafindan ogrenildigini 
hissettiniz K.94 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta bir ruh tarafindan ele 
geçirildiginizi hissettiniz K.95 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta birtakim hayaller fordOnOz K.96 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta size zarar vermek isteyen insanlar 
oldugunu hissettiniz K.97 1 2 3 4 
hangi siklikta birtakim ozel güglere sahip 
oldugunuzu hissettiniz K.98 1 2 3 4 5 
1 Cok sik 
2 Oldukça sik 
3 Bazen 
4 Hemen hemen hiç 
5 Hiç bir zaman 
1 Cok 6nemliydi 
2 Oldukça 6nemliyd1 
3 Hi; 6nemli degildi 
1 Cok 6nemliydi 
2 Oldukça 6nemliydi 
3 Hiç 6nemli degildi 
S.22.Geçtigimiz yil boyunca wOcut sagliglnizIn genelde nasil oldugunu Oyler 
misinlz ? KART ¡'VI GOSTERIN 
K.115 








hangi sikllkta ters giden hersey için kendinizi 
sugladlniz K. 99 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi sikllkta cezalandirilmayi hak ettiginizi 
hissettiniz K.100 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta islerin sizin istediginiz gibi 
gitmedigini hissettiniz K.101 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta her konuda tamamen Omitsiz kaldigi- 
nizi hissettiniz K.102 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta tamamen çaresiz kaldiginIzi 
hissettiniz K.103 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta uykuya dalma 0410g0 çektiniz K.104 
hangi sikliktaçok erken uyanip tekrar uyumakta 
guçlOk çektiniz K.105 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta uyumaksizin veya dinlenmeksizin 
gunler boyunca dayandlginiz sOreler oldu K.106 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta daha çabuk km', kolayllkla 
kbpOrdOgOnOz uzun gunler ve haftalar yawl) 
kendinizi herzamanki halinizden tamamen farkli 
hissettiniz K.I07 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta heyecan verici fikirler ve olayla- 
mil birbiri pesislra akliniza geldigi zamanlar 
yasadlniz K.108 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta isteginiz dlsinda ciddi bir sekil- 
de hata yapacaginizdan korktunuz K.109 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta dogru yam yapmadiginizdan emin 
olamadiginiz için ban Well tekrar tekrar 
yaptiniz K.110 1 2 3 4 
- 
5 
hangi siklikta gerekmedigi halde esyalarl tekrar 
tekrar temizleylp dOzenlediniz K.111 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta insanlarin sizinle tartlsmaya veya 
munakasa baslatmaya meyilli oldugunu hissettiniz K.112 1 2 3 4 5 
.. 
hangi siklikta insanlarin arkanlzdan konustukla- 
rim hissettiniz 
4 
K.113 I 2 3 4 5 
han i siklikta insanlarin sizi kandirmaya 





5 Çok kót0 
S.23.0yle bir kisisiniz ki gurur duyulacak çok seye sahip oldugunuzu 
hissediyorsunuz. KART 7'YI GOSTERIN 
K.116 
S.24.Hayatta genellikle basarisiz bir insan oldugunuzu dOsOnOyorsunuz. 
KART 7'YI GOSTERIN 
K.117 
S.25.Gectigimiz yil kinde vOcudunuzdan ne kadar hosnuttunuz 
KART 811 GOSTERIN 
K.118 
okuyacagim olaylar oeçtigimiz yil içerisinde hangi siklikta basiniza 
S.27.Asadaki cümle1erde hanqisj kendi hakkinizdaki dOsOncelerinizi en iyi sekilde 
9CIUI : RMRI U A. uu4scman 













hangi siklikta bas agrian i yOzOnden siklriti 
çektiniz K.I19 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta elleriniz sizi sikacak kadar 
titredi K.120 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta mide eksimesi yOzOnden sikinti 
çektiniz K.121 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta moraliniz bozuktu veya çok bozuktu K.122 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta aglayacak gibi oldunuz K.123 1 2 3 4 5 
PIOUG CUCI 1 mnn, a a uir.ascnan 
ORRU D°6111) OA 8227? 
HIC 
828R 
KiOsel problem1erinizi ba;kasina aqmaktansa 
kendinize saklarsiniz K.124 '1 2 3 4 5 
Çok sik gOndOz vakti dalip gidersiniz K.125 I 2 3 4 5 
Insanlari çok seyrek olarak ziyaret eder veya 
telefonla ararsiniz K.126 I 2 3 4 5 
Kendi basiniza bir seyler yapmayi baskalari ile 
birlikte yapmaya tercih edersiniz K.127 I 2 3 4 5 
Kolaylik1a arkadas edinebilirsiniz K.128 1 2 3 4 
1 Cok dogru 
2 Dogru 
3 Kararsizim 
4 Dogru degil 




4 Dogru degil 
5 Hiç dogru degil 
1 Cok hosnut 
2 Biraz hosnut 
3 Hosnut deOil 
4 Hiç hosnut degil 













D.5.GOrOWen kisinin annesinin ve babasinin meslegi 
Ili yazin 
Yaz in 
GI,J1 ; mnne 4 A uw.aecnan 
Geçtigimiz yil 4inde, 
Rik 
OLDUK A( BAZEN MENEM HiEitiir MC zlAigN 
hangi siklikta gtigiis agrisi 9ektiniz K.129 1 2 3 4 5 
kendinizi yormadiginiz halde hangi siklikta kal- 
binizin hizli atmasindan dolayi sikinti 9ektiniz K.130 1 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta tansiyonunuz çok yOkseldi K.131 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta ba§iniz dOnd0 K.132 I 2 3 4 5 
hangi siklikta bayginlik nübetleri gegirdiniz K.133 I 2 3 4 5 
kendinizi yormadiginiz halde hangi siklikta 










4 4 getmen 
5 5 Asker 
6 6 Ev kadini 
7 7 Kendi hesabina 
1 Marmara 
2 Karadaniz 
3 19 Anadolu 
4 Ege 
3 Akdeniz 
3 GOneydogu Anadolu 







0.6.GiirOa1en ki§inin, annesinin ve babaslnin egitim durumu 
0.7.Fabrika gdrevi 
0.8.Kag yildir bu fabrikada gallpyorsunuz ? 



















1 1 1 Hig 
2 2 2 Ilkokul terk 
3 3 3 Ilkokul mezunu 
4 4 4 Ortaokul terk 
5 5 5 Ortaokul mezunu 
6 6 6 Lise terk 
7 7 7 Lise mezunu 
8 8 8 Universite terk 





















































































































LIST OF INFORMAL INTERVIEWS 
APPENDIX C 
LIST OF INFORMAL INTERVIEWS 
Akalm, Ono' GSD Foreip Trade Head of Board 
Akm, Nuri Akin Head of Board 
Alptekin, Atilla Bozkurt AS General Coordinator 
Arat, Hasan Arat Holding ex-Head of Board 
Atalay, Sidika Foks A* Head of Board 
Atasayar, K. CTELT1/TISK* General Secretary 
Balin, Veysi Balinler A* Owner 
Beskiik, Orhan IDBT2rTSKB Director 
Benze§, Osman APS A$ Owner 
Bilal, Selman Bilsar A* Owner 
Çak,,lar, Metin IDBT/TSKB Director & Expert in Textile Sector 
Qelik, Seyfettin Siimerbank General Director 
Duman, *enay SP03/DPT Expert in Textile Sector 
Dumlu, Giirkan Alboy President 
Duruiz, Late N.lannara University Academic 
Ege, Yavuz SPO/DPT Ass.to Undersecretary 
Erten, Ay§e CRWU4/DISK Researcher in R & D Department 
Devrimbz, Sitlu-ii Altmyildiz Workers' Representatives 
Giiveny. Levent TFTU5/11DTM Expert in Textile Sector 
Heper, Giilsen Altm3,7ildiz Vice President 
1 Coin ederation of Turkish Employers Unions 
The latter abbreviations are the Turkish version of the fonner. 
-) 
Industrial Development Bank of Turkey 
State Planning Organisation. 
4 Confederation of Revolutionary Workers' Unions. 





































6 Confederation of Turkish Workers' Unions 
7 Association of Industrialists and Businessperson of Turkey 
8 Istanbul Chamber of Commerce. 
ex-Head of Board 
Researcher 
Member of Board 
Owner 
ex- Head of Research Dept. 









Expert in Textile Sector 
ex-Expert 
Workers' Representatives 
Academic 
